IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 5128

International Court of Justice

H-5128

H5128 – 0002

SA 1

I, Enclosure 1

H5128 – 0003

Considerations on the Nuernberg Indictment

After the capitulation of the German Armed Forces and abolition of the Nazi domination, the world celebrated the victory of liberty over enslavement, the victory of right over force. A deep sense relief pervaded suffering, oppressed humanity. The leaders of the victorious powers proclaimed the grave and highly important task that still remained to be accomplished: There must never again be a domination and triumph of force over right, of the power of a few over human justice.

Justice demanded atonement for the past, investigation of the guilt of Nazism and punishment of the guilty.

This task is based on the question:

What are the circumstances which led to the unlimited power of Nazism under the leadership of HITLER in Germany and who bears the guilt for the crimes committed by this tyranny?

The primary requisite for a proper answer to this question is to see the situation as it was then and not as it now appears in retrospect in the light of our present knowledge of the circumstances.

The situation in Germany seemed desperate in 1932. 7 million unemployed, that is to say, about half the total of workers, bankruptcy/after bankruptcy in the economic field, ruin of the middle class. All trade and production was stalled, the revenue of German economy had dwindled to a third. Hopeless situation of agriculture: over-indebtedness and liquidations of property. Farms covering an area the size of the State of Hesse, i.e., 7692 square kms. were sold by auction. Unrest among the farmers was the result. Everyone felt that the foundation of his economic existence was shaken. Crime increased.

The government of that time was helpless in the face of this desperate situation. Two radical currents offered themselves for the salvation of the German nation. As a desperate patient gives himself into the hands of a radical "miracle curer", the masses in Germany turned to these radical currents. On the one side stood the leftist radicals who, for the accomplishment of their cure demanded the abolition of almost all the values of Western civilization (personality, religion, private enterprise etc.) and

H5128 - 0004

accompanied their doctrine of salvation with the threat: "And if you won't be my brother, I'll knock your skull in". On the other side, the rightist radicals promised to remove all distress with due regard for property, private enterprise and Christianity. The political position of the government became so difficult under this assault from left and right that one dissolution of the Reichstag followed another and the government lost control of the situation, despite emergency decrees and the plea of "exceptional conditions".

It was then that President von HINDENBURG, who enjoyed the highest regard within the German nation as well as throughout the whole world, appointed HITLER Reich Chancellor. With the agreement of a section of the Social-Democrat and Center representatives, the Reichstag vested HITLER with full powers by the qualified majority required for a modification of the constitution. In this way, large sections of the German people who still viewed HITLER with aversion or distrust were induced to wait and see. If the Reich President and the Reichstag as the responsible political institutions of the German Nation adopted this attitude with regard to HITLER and his party, could it then occur to the German people that HITLER and his organizations pursued criminal aims? Indeed, the highest German Court had acknowledge some time before (1930) that HITLER worked with legitimate methods. Since HINDENBURG's desire for peace was beyond doubt (it was again acknowledged by the press of the whole world at his death in 1934) the Nation did not see any danger to peace in the investiture of HITLER by HINDENBURG. Moreover, dust was thrown in the people's eyes: thus in 1933 and 1934 a major celebration was staged every few weeks to divert, as was admitted to me later by the National Socialists, the people's attention from the rearmament which was beginning. Neither did foreign countries assume a hostile attitude toward HITLER's regime. He was even allowed to score political successes which had been denied to the preceding democratic government: re-incorporati of the Saar territory, the naval treaty with England (which signified a revision of the Treaty of Versailles), toleration of the re-militarization of the Rhineland. The reproach is now directed against the German people, even down to the plainest citizen, that they should have recognized, as early as 1938 and afterwards, the HITLER government as criminal and opposed resistance, but until 1939 the Allies themselves treated HITLER as a trustworthy contracting party and repeatedly legitimized him. Thus, according to a newspaper report (Hannov. Nachrichtenblatt dated 1.11.45), a German Socialist Party leader, Dr. SCHUMACHER said at a large public function in Kiel: "We were in concentration camps while other nations still concluded alliances with the Reich Government".

H5128 – 0005

H5128-0006

The Christian background of the new State was ostentatiously stressed. A concordat was concluded with the Holy See. The opening of the first Reichstag in Potsdam was opened with a religious service. In the municipalities, as was the case in Hanover, the investiture of the municipal officials was given a religious form by addresses made by clerics of both religious, an unprecedented occurrence.

The anti-semitism already proclaimed by HITLER before his seizure of power, which actually provided a place for the Jews in the Party program, was rejected by large sections of the Nation and was not then considered, even by National Socialist leaders as serious as it later - to the horror of the German People - proved to be. It was at the time considered more as an instrument of election propaganda. However, we have seen, for instance, the case in

H5128 – 0007

Hanover of the highest ranking SA officer at the time, Gruppenfuehrer Corsemann, being the house guest of prominent Jews at the oldest veterans (holders of the badge of honor) declare themselves in favour of the maintenance of a Jewish lawyer in office. Even the Reich Government availed itself of the services of Jewish banking firms until 1937 and the participation by jews in the Olympic Games of 1936 was not prohibited. The revolutionary ontrages (assault and mob violence) which took place at the time were even condemned but considered as ephemeral revolutionary phenomena attendant upon the times. All this, along with many other factors not mentioned here, must be taken into consideration when subsequently uttering critical judgment on membership in the NSDAP or one of its branch organizations. Must those joining have been aware that it meant joining a "criminal organization"?

After Hitler had thus, thanks to the Reich President and the Reichstag, attained an incredible power, he abused it to an ever-increasing extent. The parties saw themselves obliged to dissolve and it was forbidden by law to found new ones. The only organization still existing outside of the National Socialist organizations, the "Stahlhelm", was incorporated into the SA. Having been dituled in this way, the SA was laid aside after the Roehm's murder and occupied with parades and sports, under the leadership of the harmless Lutze, whereas the SS was reorganized under the leadership of Himmler into a political instrument bound by a life and death allegiance to Hitler. With the SS, the Gestapo and the SD, Hitler then introduced in Germany an a constantly more severe and bloody dictatorship which did not shrink from any acts of violence. Indeed, the full measure of these was not know to the German people since their secrecy was imposed under the most severe threats, but all resistance on the part of the powerless nation was nipped in the bud. They included, as Count 4 of the Nuernberg Indictment has it, "the murder and prosecuting of all those who were supposedly hostile to the Nazi party or suspicious of it, or were in opposition to the Plan expounded in Count I of the Indictment or suspicious of it."

H5128 - 0008

The general picture briefly traced above for the exposition of the circumstance leading to this unbounded power of Hitler and Nazism in Germany contains at the same time the general answer to the question of who bears the guilt for the crimes perpetrated by this tyranny. It would lead us too far, within the framework of this brief exposition, to probe further into the particular groups named in the Indictment. As an example, we shall only take into particular consideration those matters concerning the SA. Was the SA a criminal organization and did its members make themselves guilty of participation in a criminal organization by joining it or remaining in it ? True, the SA was originally a political organization with which Hitler staged his propaganda processions, with possibly the use of force against counter-demonstrations, though

H5128 - 0009

not against the authority of the State, and with which he also disturbed rival manifestations. The SA, however, lost its original character to a very considerable extent when the "Stahlhelm" was incorporated in it. The "Stahlhelm", besides being numerically superior to the original SA, in any case brought its mentality to the SA, a mentality essentially different from that of the SA, and incarnated the sort of spirit that is also cultivated by ex-service men's organizations in other countries, its counterparts abroad. Indeed, the Stahlhelm, what is more, introduced a great number of men into the SA whose political attitude were hostile towards the Nazis. These men had for the most part joined the Stahlhelm in 1933 at the instigation of Social Democrat leaders when, the parliamentary system having been crushed and the political parties dissolved, the Stahlhelm remained the sole representative of a major organization which could be expected to counter-balance the Nazis. (That even HITLER saw a danger for himself in the Stahlhelm is shown by the fact that he repeatedly postponed and sought to prevent the celebration of the Stahlhelm Day in 1933). That this expectation was not fulfilled by the leaders of the Stahlhelm and that the latter was on the other hand incoporated into the SA was a great disappointment for many of its members. However, an important modification was introduced in the character of the SA. This was probably brought about by HITLER immediately after the ROEHM affair to create a reliable political combat formation for himself in the newly organized SS. The former Stahlhelm men were mostly divided amongst the "SA Reserves" as elderly gentlemen and employed in harmless occupations, such as blocking streets, filling reunion halls, collecting for the Winter Relief and attending good fellowship reunions in the evening, when they made any appearence at all. Withdrawal from the SA (unless involving a more private) was a step that a member could not venture to take. A campaign of slander and the ruin of his professional life would be the consequences and surveillance by the Gestapo would forestall him everywhere and make any act of opposition impossible from the first. Besides this personal reason, however, it was the sense of obligation to their field of duty and their responsibility to the community which induced officials and employees, especially in leading positions, to give the outward signs of

H5128 - 0010

allegiance, even if they were inwardly hostile. They did not abandon the ship, but tried to save what could be saved and prevent a complete plunge into bestiality. Yet British Foreign Minister BEVIN has declared recently that the English Government had hoped to be able to rebuild on the remnants of the old German civil service, but that the Nazists had destroyed it all in the end. If none the less there are still men to-day at the disposal of the Allies as experienced specialists for the work of reconstruction, it is because such men contrived to evade the terroristic methods of the Nazis. What those terrorist methods were need not be further described here. They are sufficiently thoroughly and clearly exposed in Count 4. In the concentration camps, there were mainly Germans. The terrible conditions as found there by the Allied troops give a staggering picture of the rule of terror over the German people themselves and the very large number of prisoners

H5128 - 0011

constitutes, as the English radio once declared, the best document for the exculpation of the German people. A large part of the members of such an organization as the SA were likewise inwardly opposed to Nazism and sought to contrive a camouflage so that they could protect those industries, firms and other economic and social concerns within their professional care for the benefit of the community.

The younger men composed the SA proper which was particularly trained in sport activities, such as military sport. It received its new recruits from the HITLER Youth and student bodies, on a compulsory basis in a certain sense, which subsequently induced the actively National Socialist -minded youth to turn to the SS. Those youth, in particular, who were reluctant to enter the Party but who had to show up that they belonged to some kind of organization out of consideration for their professional future joined the SA Organization, which appeared less political than sporting. Unlike the SS, membership to the SA was not subordinated to the premary reguisite of membership to the Party. Thus, SA members were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Party Tribunal.

If SA members are also charged with participation in the pogrom against the Jews in November 1938, such participation was not, so far as I can visualize, official. It was probably, HIMMLER, the leader of the SS, who ordered these excesses in the name of HITLER. Both the leaders and the members on many occasions refused to comply with demands from above. These facts speak against regarding the SA in a general and unconditional way as a criminal formation.

Neither could the SA be regarded as a military organization in the real sense, though of course its younger members belonged to the Armed Forces during the War. The SA commanding staff as such lackad every characteristic of military leadership. The SA could not even be considered no a police organization. When, during the War, it was considered using it for air raid protection and police tasks, it was ultimately considered inadequate as an organization and individual men were detached to the air raid protection organizations directed by the police (for rescue stations, clearing away rubble etc.).

In view of the facts stated above, the term of "criminal organization"

H5128 - 0012

cannot possibly be applied wholesale to the SA as a corporate body, and still less to the individual. What has been said above for the SA also applies in many respects to other accused organizations. When, for instance riding and motoring societies were incorporated as a body into the SS cavalry, the NSKK, it was, from that time on, their only possibility of engaging in sport at all, and it would in any case be misleading to attempt to draw any conclusions from this on political motives.

H5128 - 0013

1/ Enclosure 1

(Page 6 of original)

To conclude these considerations, let me add the following general facts in answer to the charge of collective guilt:

Establishment of a collective guilt without investigation of the crime in each particular case is contrary to the sense of justice of democratic nations.

It has been reserved for National Socialism to construct the collective guilt of a community or of a whole race out of the offences of their individual members in contradiction to the legal concepts of the entire civilized world. The individual must have committed a punishable action or participated in it. And it is, as stated on 7. 11. 45 at Lueneburg by Professor SMITH, professor of International Law at the University of London, "a fundamental principle of law that a Tribunal cannot punish a man for an act which was not subject to punishment at the time it was committed". A wholesale incrimination of all members of major organizations, like the SA for instance, would in my opinion, be contrary to justice, as well as to political wisdom. The individuals concerned, who for a large part prepared for positive reconstruction on the side of the allies and who represent a reliable, indispensable and efficient potential, would be driven, in a fit of desperate resignation, into fresh radical currents and indeed, to nihilism. Many, particularly the young, who now feel that they have been deluded and deceived by their former National Socialist leaders and are beginning to believe in the proclaimed principle of justice and law against force, would lose faith in justice and inwardly revert to belief in the domination of force and to Nazism.

signed Dr. MENGE

s/ Dr. Arthur MENGE

I certify the above signature is that of
Dr. Arthur MENGE signed before me this
day of 21 May 1946

s/ S.A. BINDER
Capt. Inf.
6850 ISD IMT

1, 2 SA 2

(Page 1 of original)

CIE 91 Darmstadt

16 June 1946

Affidavit

I, the undersigned, BLOME (Name) KURT (Christian name)

Int. No. 31 G. 5173069, profession: Prof. Dr. med., last residence: Munich, Mottlstr. being informed of the meaning of an affidavit, declare in a sworn statement in lieu of oath the following:

I am conversant with the fact that the making of a false sworn statement in lieu of oath is punishable and that this affidavit will be exhibited at the I.M.T. in Nuernberg.

Re subject:

I know the former SA Chief of Staff Victor LUTZE from the SA, to which I belonged since 1931. I was last the medical local leader at the disposal of Supreme SA Command. Although this position had no connection with the duties of the SA I often met Staff Chief LUTZE, so that I had good comradely relations to LUTZE. These meetings were mostly short and casual, but during the war in 1940, on the occasion of an incidental common journey in the sleeper Berlin-Munich, or vice versa, we had the opportunity to indulge in a lengthy intimate discussion. From this meeting I recall chiefly 2 points of conversation:

1) The general situation,

2) The events of 8 /9 November 1938.

Re 1. Chief of Staff LUTZE complained of the general political development, especially of the fact that, from his point of view, a gradual distinction had developed between the true national socialism as it was represented during the fighting period and in the party programme, and the present regime which he called "Nazism". As the essential feature of the latter he mentioned the suppression of every individuality and every honest expression of opinion. From the desired national socialist people's state had arisen an intolerant Police State. He talked about a general complete "uniformity" not only in outward visible forms but also in the intellectual sphere. The world would have reconciled itself with the old, decent national socialism; Nazism, however, had brought upon us the hate

H5128 – 0014

H5128 - 0015

of all. If a basic change is not made here, a gloomy future awaits us. He himself was sorry for most of the men of the SA, who had been deeply disappointed by the course of the development. LUTZE expressed himself to me similarly on the occasion of my visit to him in Berlin Vosstrasse, about February 1941.

When in 1942 I congratulated Chief of Staff LUTZE on his 50th birthday in his apartment in Berlin, he took me aside, lead me into one of the rooms and said to me almost literally the following:

"Last night the Fuehrer was here in order to congratulate me. There (he pointed to a seat) we two sat alone for more than 2 hours. I told the Fuehrer frankly all my worries and misgivings. He promised me he would do all he can to provide for a change."

H5128 - 0016

He, LUTZE, then expressed his joy on the Fuehrer's promise. Now he hoped to be able to inspire the SA, for years treated like a step-child; with new buoyancy in the old traditional sense.

Re 2:

On this point LUTZE talked to me in an outspoken lively manner. He had known nothing of the matter, otherwise he would have prevented it. I believe he mentioned Dr. GOEBBELS to me as the instigator. By this the SA, quite unjustly, was put in an unfavorable light, which, considering its decent basic motives, it did not deserve. If SA men really took part in it, it was due to their thoughtlessness and the imposition of orders which had not been issued by him. Wherever he, LUTZE, turned up, great disappointment was shown about these events.

s/ Prof. Dr. Kurt BLOME.

(Prof. Dr. KURT BLOME)

I certify above true signature
as witness,
Darmstadt, 18. 6. 1946

s/ Victor POUH(?) Civ.
326 HID

I, Enclosure 3 SA-3

(Page 1 of original)

Oberbuergermeister Nuernberg 21 May 1946

Dr. MENGE

Contains three enclosures

To the International Military Tribunal

in Nuernberg.

I enclose

I Annex I"Reflections on the Nuernberg Indictment"

II Annex II Excerpt of a letter accompanying these reflections which I wrote to the Secretary General of the International Military Tribunal on 27 November 1945.

In connection with the information given in these enclosures I add the following statements:

1) Prior to and also during the first period after the seizure of power the Christian attitude of the SA was stressed repeatedly:

a) Thus I was told by General D. MUFF who is now residing in Haemelschenburg near Hameln and who was in 1931 senior garrison officer in Ludwigsburg in Wuerttemberg, that the highest SA leader there asked him if the SA might participate as a body in the Sunday divine services in the garnison church.

b) In Hameln the SA entered the Hameln cathedral with their marching flags on 1 May 1933 and 1 May 1934.

c) In the late summer of 1933 an assembly of SA Standarte 164 (city of Hameln and Hameln-Pyrmont district) took place

H5128 - 0017

H5128 - 0018

in Bad Pyrmont, its culminating p int was a divine field service on the Emmerwiesen, during which a Pyrmonter clergyman preached. (Publication of retired Regierungsbaurat BECHER of Hameln).

I believe, that the events described above are merely examples which can be multiplied further, if things are examined more closely.

2) The question of aggressive intentions of the SA.

a) The retired general named above MUFF and the present city councillor MUELLER of the city administration of Hameln have told me the following, which is worthy of belief: In November 1939?, after a hunting party in Fahrberg near Hannover, they met the then Chief of Staff of the SA, LUTZE. During this meeting he told them in a very passionate way about a conference which took place in August 1939 concerning the imminent war with Poland. HITLER and GOEBBELS were for the war, which they intended to conduct as a Blitzkrieg. LUTZE is supposed to have declared himself very energetically opposed to this war, the German people not being spiritually prepared for such a war, and that moreover a Blitzkrieg was out of the question. At this meeting retired Admiral STIERINGER is supposed to have been present.

b) In due course the former commander of the Hannover cavalery school Hannover, retired General VOLK, informed me that an agreement was made between LUTZE and the then commander in chief of the army, General v. BRAUCHITSCH, that in case of a conflict between SS and the Wehrmacht, the SA would be on the side of the Wehrmacht.

3) Concerning the question, whether a normal person must, from a

H5128 – 0019

reasonable point of view, consider the SA as a criminal organization, that is an organization, of which it was known, that it served the political leadership as an instrument for the domination of Europe, and tried to attain this aim, possibly by the violent oppression of those who thought differently (terror), by breach of international treaties (wars of aggression), this question in generally answered to the negative among the circle of my acquaint This has been expressed to me, for example, by the Provincial Bishop of the Hanovrian provincial church, Marahnens, of Hanover the secretary of the occumenical council, Oberlandeskirchenrat Lilje, Hanover.

Pastor Mehner, Hanover, business leader of the denominational church in the Hanovrian provincial church, Hermann Schuster, Hanover, professor of theology at the university of Goettingen.and others.

The present President of the Chamber of Medical Doctors of Lower Satory, Dr. Siemens, Hanover, who was a well known opponent of the National Socialist regime, writes to me that it did not seem permissible to him to condemn categorically, in advance, the most widely different formations, and that he would like to warn against summarily considering, the members of the SA in advance etc. as criminals.

At the time of the creation of the SA and SS cavalry companies (Reiter-stuerme), which as it seems, arose from sport clubs nobody knew of any unlawful, or much less, criminal, intentions on activities of these organizat The present President of the Agricultural Chamber and of the Provincial Food Office in Hanover, von Reden, writes to me

H5128 - 0020

that the approximately 280 - 300 rural riding clubs in the province of Hanover in 1933 were forcibly changed over to the SA Cavalry, newly established at that time, and thereby constituted the main body of this National Socialist Formation. Organizations, which were opposed to this change, were designated as "wild", their members no longer could participate in the riding and driving tournaments and in the championship fights. One joined the SA Cavalry out of enthusiasm and love for the riding and driving sports. The SA Cavalry could not be regarded as a political fighting organization. It was, above all, an organization of horsemen who also always strove for a separation from the SA.

From my own knowledge of the conditions in the SA Naval Units, I can prove the above attestation concerning the SA Cavalry. The so-called 4 naval divisions which were established in Hanover in the fall of 1933, included the water sportsmen who were organized in the Hanover rowing, yacht , canoe, paddling, and swimming clubs. The water sports club members joined the SA Naval Units under considerable pressure by the Party. Had they not joined, their boat houses, boats etc. would have been confiscated and the offical financial support, upon which they were dependant for the expenses of regattas, procurement of boats etc., would have been withdrawn. A watersport spirit and comradeship were the backbone of the SA Naval Units, the so-called old fighters were missing in it; the connection with the actual SA was a very loose one. The SA Naval Units were not regarded as a Party fighting organization and, in my opinion, no member of the SA Naval Units, in carrying out his duties, would have thought of serving the preparations for a war of aggression.

H5128 - 0021

When, after HITLER had been entrusted with the Reichchancellory, it became apparent in the course of the year that weapons were being manufactu to a certain extent - only very late, if at all, did the German people lear of the tremendous extent of the German armament - HITLER, through the press and whispered propaganda, was systematically presented to the German people as an angel of peace, who had been in the world war himself for 4 years, knew all the horrors of war, and who would guard the German people from the sufferings of a new war. This devilish propaganda was generally believed i Germany. As a matter of fact, it really was difficult to believe that after the endless suffering and horrors, which the First World War had brought upon humanity, such an unscrupulous criminal could be found who would again unleash a war. In my opinion - with the exception of a few statemen - this was also not believed abroad! Otherwise the German armament, which at that time could easily have been prevented, would not have been tolerated.

I also wish to state that my conscience has forced me to make these statements in order to avoid "further injustice" and "political mistakes" I belonged neither to the Party nor to any SA formation. On the contrary, as the deceased burgomaster MULLLER of Hanover had stated on due occasion, in 1933 I was several times in danger of being arrested by lesser numbers of the SA! These arrests were prevented on the part of the higher SA.

H5128 – 0022

I, Enclosure 3

(Page 6 of original)

I verify in lieu of oath the correctness of the statements made by me in this petition and in the three enclosures. As attorney, I am aware of the consequences of an incorrect statement in lieu of oath.

Nuernberg, 21 May 1948

s/ARTHUR WENGE

former burgomaster of Hanover and member of the Reich Council of the German Republic.

I certify that the above signature is that of Dr. ARTHUR WENGE signed before me this day of 21 May 1948

s/ S.H. BLUMBER

Capt. Inf.

6850 ISD IMT

H5128 – 0023

Oberbuergermeister

Dr. MENGE

Nuernberg 21 May 1946

Contains three enclosures

To the International Military Tribunal

in Nuernberg.

I enclose

I Annex I "Reflections on the Nuernberg Indictment"

II Annex II Excerpt of a letter accompanying these reflections which I wrote to the Secretary General of the International Military Tribunal on 27 November 1945.

In connection with the information given in these enclosures I add the following statements:

1) Prior to and also during the first period after the seizure of power the Christian attitude of the SA was stressed repeatedly:

a) Thus I was told by General D. MUFF who is now residing in Haemelschenburg near Hameln and who was in 1931 senior garrison officer in Ludwigsburg in Wuerttemberg, that the highest SA leader there asked him if the SA might participate as a body in the Sunday divine services in the garrison church.

b) In Hameln the SA entered the Hameln cathedral with their marching flags on 1 May 1933 and 1 May 1934.

c) In the late summer of 1933 an assembly of SA Standarte 164 (city of Hameln and Hameln-Pyrmont district) took place

H5128 - 0024

in Bad Pyrmont, its culminating p int was a divine field service on the Emmerwiesen, during which a Pyrmonter clergyman preached. (Publication of retired Regierungsbaurat BECHER of Hameln).

I believe, that the events described above are merely examples which can be multiplied further, if things are examined more closely.

2) The question of aggressive intentions of the SA.

a) The retired general named above MUFF and the present city councillor MUELLER of the city administration of Hameln have told me the following, which is worthy of belief: In November 1939?, after a hunting party in Fahrberg near Hannover, they met the then Chief of Staff of the SA, LUTZE. During this meeting he told them in a very passionate way about a conference which took place in August 1939 concerning the imminent war with Poland. HITLER and GOEBBELS were for the war, which they intended to conduct as a Blitzkrieg. LUTZE is supposed to have declared himself very energetically opposed to this war, the German people not being spiritually prepared for such a war, and that moreover a Blitzkrieg was out of the question. At this meeting retired Admiral STIERINGER is supposed to have been present.

b) In due course the former commander of the Hannover cavalery school Hannover, retired General VOLK, informed me that an agreement was made between LUTZE and the then commander in chief of the army, General v. BRAUCHITSCH, that in case of a conflict between SS and the Wehrmacht, the SA would be on the side of the Wehrmacht.

3) Concerning the question, whether a normal person must, from a

H5128 – 0025

reasonable point of view, considered the SA as a criminal organization, that is an organization, ofwhich it was known, that it served the political leadership as an instrument for the domination of Europe, and tried to attain this aim, possibly by the violent oppression of those who thought differently (terror), by breach of international treaties (wars of aggression), this question in generally aswered to the negative among the circle of my acquaint This has been expressed to me, for example, by the Provincial Bishop of the Hanovrian provincial church, Marahnens, of Hanover the secretary of the occumenical council, Oberlandeskirchenrat Liljo, Hanover.

Pastor Mehner, Hanover, business leader of the denominational church in the Hanovrian provincial church, Hermann Schuster, Hanover, professor of theology at the university of Goettingen.and others.

The present President of the Chamber of Medical Doctors of Lower Satory, Dr. Siemens, Hanover, who was a well known opponent of the National Socialist regime, writs to me that it did not seem permissible to him to condemn categorically, in advance, the most widely different formations, and that he would like to warn against summarily condemning, the members of the SA in advance etc. as criminals.

At the time of the creation of the SA and SS cavalry companies (Reiterstuerme), which as it seems, arose from sport clubs nobody knew of any unlawful, or much less, criminal, intentions on activities of these organizat The present President of the Agricultural Chamber and of the Provincial Food Office in Hanover, von Reden, writes to me

H5128 - 0026

that the approximately 280 - 300 rural riding clubs in the province of Hanover in 1933 were forcibly changed over to the SA Cavalry, newly established at that time, and thereby constituted the main body of this National Socialist Formation. Organizations, which were opposed to this change, were designated as "wild", their members no longer could participate in the riding and driving tournaments and in the championship fights. One joined the SA Cavalry out of enthusiasm and love for the riding and driving sports. The SA Cavalry could not be regarded as a political fighting organization. It was, above all, an organization of horsemen who also always strove for a separation from the SA.

From my own knowledge of the conditions in the SA Naval Units, I can prove the above attestation concerning the SA Cavalry. The so-called 4 naval divisions which were established in Hanover in the fall of 1933, included the water sportsmen who were organized in the Hanover rowing, yacht , canoe, paddling, and swimming clubs. The water sports club members joined the SA Naval Units under considerable pressure by the Party. Had they not joined, their boat houses, boats etc. would have been confiscated and the offical financial support, upon which they were dependant for the expenses of regattas, procurement of boats etc., would have been withdrawn. A watersport spirit and comradeship were the backbone of the SA Naval Units, the so-called old fighters were missing in it; the connection with the actual SA was a very loose one. The SA Naval Units were not regarded as a Party fighting organization and, in my opinion, no member of the SA Naval Units, in carrying out his duties, would have thought of serving the preparations for a war of aggression.

J. Enclosure 3
(Page 5 of original)

When, after HITLER had been entrusted with the Reichchancellory, it became apparent in the course of the year that weapons were being manufactu to a certain extent - only very late, if at all, did the German people lear of the tremendous extent of the German armament - HITLER, through the press and whispered propaganda, was systematically presented to the German people as an angel of peace, who had been in the world war himself for 4 years, knew all the horrors of war, and who would guard the German people from the sufferings of a new war. This devilish propaganda was generally believed i Germany. As a matter of fact, it really was difficult to believe that after the endless suffering and horrors, which the First World War had brought upon humanity, such an unscrupulous criminal could be found who would again unleash a war. In my opinion - with the exception of a few statemen - this was also not believed abroad! Otherwise the German armament, which at that time could easily have been prevented, would not have been tolerated.

I also wish to state that my conscience has forced me to make these statements in order to avoid "further injustice" and "political mistakes" I belonged neither to the Party nor to any SA formation. On the contrary, as the deceased burgomaster MULLLER of Hanover had stated on due occasion, in 1933 I was several times in danger of being arrested by lesser numbers of the SA! These arrests were prevented on the part of the higher SA.

H5128 - 0027

H5128 - 0028

I, Enclosure 3

(Page 6 of original)

I verify in lieu of oath the correctness of the statements made by me in this petition and in the three enclosures. As attorney, I am aware of the consequences of an incorrect statement in lieu of oath.

Nuernberg, 21 May 1946

s/ARTHUR WEINGE

former burgomaster of Hanover and member of the Reich Council of the German Republic.

I certify that the above signature is that of Dr. ARTHUR WEINGE signed before me this day of 21 May 1946

s/ S.H. BENDER

Capt. Inf.

6850 ISD IMT

I, 4 SA 4

(Page 1 of original)

Dr. ASCHENAUER
Defense Counsel for the SA

Willy NEY

Nuernberg, 22. 6. 1946.

Affirmation in lieu of oath.

After having been informed of the penal consequences of a false affidavit, I state as follows in lieu of oath for submission to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg.

Personal matter: My name is Willy NEY, born on 10.8.1893 at Schertendorf District Gruenberg in Silesia. I was a SA-Fuehrer in Standarte 4, finally Fuehrer of this Standarte with the rank of a SA-Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Matter relevant:

1. SA-members of Standarte 4 in Berlin did not receive orders to participate in excesses in November 1938.
2. On the contrary the Head Office ordered us to see that under no circumstances should SA-members participate in excesses. This occurred.
3. According to reports of the units, members of Standarte 4 did not participate in excesses.
4. On my way from my office to the business office of the Standarte I could confirm, together with the SA-Oberfuehrer MENDE - Fuehrer of Standarte 4, that civilians were conspicuously busy at the shopwindows in the streets of the inner town of Berlin and fled when they saw us. These people gave us the impression of being anti-social elements who, according to experience, do dirty business when the slightest occasion arises.
5. I repeatedly heard from people that foreign elements were concerned in these excesses.
6. I learnt through the SA-Fuehrers of the Standarten 5, 10 and 12 in Berlin that members of these units were not concerned in the excesses.

s/ WILLY NEY

H5128 - 0029

H5128 - 0030

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

.....24.....day of June 1946

s/ ROBERT B. STARNES
O-1334763
1 Sq Lt Inf.
Lt.

J, PAUL SCHMIDT, fully conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/ Dr. PAUL SCHMIDT.

I, 5 SA 5

(Page 1 of original)

AFFIDAVIT

Declaration in lieu of oath.

I certify the following declaration in lieu of oath for submission to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg after I have been informed of the consequences of a false declaration:

Re person: Dr. med. KARL-HEINZ KOCH, born 5 March 1910 in BREMEN, acting as doctor in the Staff of the SA Supreme Command, at present at camp LUDWIGSBURG No.9971.

Re subject: The methods of work of the Health Service in the SA indicate that the SA was neither a military organ nor had it wanted or made any preparations for a war of aggression. This was proved by the medical examinations of the candidates to be admitted and also currently of all SA men with respect to their capability for service in the SA without taking into consideration their military fitness. The examinations were especially made to test the fitness for attaining the SA-Sport insignia which did not coincide with the fitness regulations of the German armed forces. Also those absolutely unfit for military service could be found suitable for SA. These current examinations were ordered only in the effort to lift the general health of the people, especially to fight tuberculosis and were set up, corresponding to the general aims of the SA, for the protection of the health of those belonging to the SA. The Chiefs of the Medical Corps were called upon for lectures and instructions of their SA-units on general hygienic conduct (reform of nutrition, sport as means to general health, general hygiene, venereal desease and such like). Health units were next to the sanitary care, during the SA-service introduced by the health service at the great institutes of the party. They were also obliged to organize the health service during Reich Party rallies in Nuernberg and also during Gau Party rallies. They were called upon for medical service during large sporting fetes, as for instance during the Olympic Games 1936. Further possibilities for employment were provided for in cases disaster. Because of this latter possibility of employment some city administrations made financial contributions to the local SA Health units, as for instance by the city administration of Wuppertal. Neither in their

H5128 – 0031

H5128 - 0032

general organization nor in the equipment was a war of aggression considere Units of the Medical Service of the SA were partially set up in the frame-work of the public life-saving service, as Sanitaetssturm Nuernberg. Efforts to include the general set-up of the Medical Service SA in this life-saving service have failed, as this service was reserved for the Germ Red-Cross, and a further extension was refused in the interest of uniformity in this sphere of activity of the Medical Service of the SA. The instruction book of the Red Cross, used as a basis in the development of th Health Service, was sufficient for its purposes. There was no health servic training practised or demanded, which in any way complied with military demand. In conformity to the prohibition which generally existed in the SA also during health service exercises, it was forbidden to set up military installations. The training of the medical men was completed after an examination, which if passed entitled them to the SA-Medical Certificate Of what little military importance however this SA-Medical training was, is shown by the fact that all these men were obliged to complete without limitation the medical schools of the Wehrmacht before their appointment in the Wehrmacht-Medical Organisation.

In this connection it appears important that no training was given the Chiefs of the Medical Service of the SA (doctors, dentists, chemists, veterinary surgeons) which would give them medical knowledge in addition to what was needed during the war. In this way also were they appointed

H5128 - 0033

to the SA, merely from a general technical professional point of view. The bestowing of service ranks until 1934 was exclusively dependent upon it. If a doctor, for example, was entrusted with performing the duties of the Health Service within a Sturmbann, he was appointed with the service rank "Sanitaetssturmbannfuehrer" without taking into consideration the previous membership to the SA. After 1934 a half-year of service was required in the SA before such appointment, in order that the doctor may by made familiar with the general service conditions and required duties in the SA. His immediate appointment in the Medical Service could be made with the service grade "Sanitaetssturmfuehrer." This custom explains the considerable distinction in the SA between the ranks in the Medical Service and the military ones. Both organizations are absolutely separated and even a lengthy activity in the SA does not imply that medical officers have complied to the demands of the German Armed Forces. The service ranks of the Medical Officers could be obtained only after performing the prescribed exercises and serving the required time in the German Armed Forces (thus, for example, the last appointed Chief of the Health Service Organization in the SA, Sanitaets-Obergruppenfuehrer BRAUNECK held in the German Armed Forces the service rank of a Marine-Oberstabsarzt (the Chief Naval Staff Doctor) and fell as such).

A working session for Medical Chiefs (Sanitaetsfuehrer) took place in the spring 1939 in the Reich Medical School of the SA in Tuebingen at which the Chief of the Department of the National Socialist Party for Racial Policy (NSDAP), Professor Walter GROSS, also spoke about the populati biological situation of the Reich. At the same time he underlined especiall that considering the existing biological danger of the Reich a war must be avoided by all possible means. A war for Germany would be very unfavorable up to 1950, as up to then the years with a poor birth-rate of the first world war affected the youth of military age. Thus the predominate idea of the Chiefs of the Medical Service (Sanitaetsfuehrer) that a war should be avoided, was strongly supported.

The Chief of the Health Service, Obergruppenfuehrer BRAUNECK, with the most important divisionsof his office was already in Nuernberg

H5128 - 0034

during the summer months of 1939 in order to prepare the health service of the Reich Party Rally. First of all an inspection by Roentgen-rays of HOHLFELD process of all SA men present - over 100,000 men - was planned for this Reich Party Rally. This big manifestation required the most extensive preparations on a large scale and could have hardly begun if an outbreak of war was to be expected.

From this it follows that the Medical Service of the SA has not transgressed in any way the bounds of those duties exercised by Medical Services of even such organizations, as "Bergwacht (Mountain Watch), German Red Cross, NSKK, NSFK" and such like, which are not criminally accused. If the SA had made preparations for an aggressive war, their Medical Service also should have betrayed a military character.

Moosburg, 29 April 1945. s/ Dr. med. K.H. KOCH.

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the above signature is that of the party who signed in my presence.

8 May 1946 s/ Dr. ZWINGMANN

Assistant of the Defense Counsel of the SA
Georg BOEHM

I attest the signature of Dr. ZWINGMANN,
Internee Buergermeister of Civilian
Internment Camp No. 6.

SA-6

GEORG ZELNHEFER

No. 6 - 2238

Camp Moosburg.

A F F I D A V I T.

I make the following statement under oath, to be presented at the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, after I have been instruc about the penal consequences of a false affidavit:

Datas concerning the person:

GEORG ZELNHEFER, born on 24 January 1908 in Nuernberg, in the SA from 1932 until 1945, former referent for organization and its divisions, for construction of SA settlements and problems concer ing Reich Party Days in the Staff of the SA Group Frankonia.

At the present time Civil. Internment Camp 6, Moosburg.

Relevant material:

In the year 1939 I worked in the Deployment Staff (Aufmarschstab) for the Reich Party Day. Due to the various incidents on the Polish border the rumor of an imminent war was circulated. In th period between 15 and 25 August (I do not recall the exact date anymore) Dr. ROBERT LEY appeared and called the chief workers in this matter together for a discussion. Asked by us whether in vi of the foreign political situation there was any sense whatsoever to continue to work, LEY said that he just came from the Fuehrer and had the order for us that the Reich Party Day had to take pla under all circumstances. The Fuehrer was in no respect thinking of war, but quite the contrary, was ready to do everything to pre the peace for Germany.

Civil.Internment Camp 6
Moosburg, 29 April 1946

s/ GEORG ZELNHEFER

H5128 – 0035

The above signature has been made before me after I was shown th papers and is hereby certified by me:

(Illegible signature)

8 May 1946

I certify that to the best of my knowledge, the above signature is that of the party who signed in my presence.

(Illegible signature)

Assistant of the Defense Counsel of the SA, GEORG BOEHM.

H5128-0036

H5128 - 0037

I attest the signature of Dr. ZWINGMANN, Internee Buergermeister of Civilian Internment Camp No. 6. (sic).

I, 7

SA 7

Georg MAPPES (Page 1 of original)
Prisoner No. 2426 - B 15

Internment Camp 78

I have been informed as to the consequences of a false declaration in lieu of oath, and I know that the following declaration is being made for submission to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg in Court proceedings against the SA of the NSDAP as an organization. According to the best of my knowledge and in good conscience I make the following declaration in lieu of oath:

A. - Personal Career.

I was born in Karslruhe/Baden on 24 July 1900 as the son of Georg MAPPES, independant merchant. After attending the Realschule (school with 6 grades - 10 to 16) and, later, Oberrealschule (school with 9 grades) until the first class, I volunteered for military service in 1917 and served as a gunner throughout the First World War, until the end.

I then entered my father's business (office machines and sewing machines) as a apprentice. In 1921 I became a senior clerk and co-proprietor of this business. During the time of my apprenticeship I worked every year for several months in factories, as an volunteer, in order to increase my experience. Our business was doing well, even after stabilization of the currency in 1924. In 1933 I worked as a volunteer for the firm of Pfaff at Kaiserslautern, and was subsequently employed by that firm as manager of their branches at Solingen and Remscheid, still continuing as partner in my father's business. Economically, my position was very satisfactory. On an average my monthly earnings amounted to from 600 to 1,000 marks during the years 1928 to 1933. In October 1933 I resigned from my position with the firm of Pfaff. The reasons for this, as well as for withdrawing from my father's business which occurred in 1934, are explained furtheron.

H5128 - 0038

H5128 - 0039

After having attended a National Socialist meeting in Munich in 1927, I came to the conclusion that this party would reach this goal, and that is why I joined in October, 1928.

At that time the organization of the Party was such that almost every Party member was also an SA man. When considering the tasks assigned to the SA at that time, there should be differentiation between the SA service, strictly speaking, and the use of the SA for Party purposes. Directives and orders to the SA service properly speaking came from the Supreme SA Leadership in Munich to the SA Gau Leaders who, in turn, passed them on to the SA units under their jurisdiction. In those days the ordinary SA service was not efficiently organized, the SA activities consisted mainly in marching in propaganda marches, forming cordons during party affairs; providing protection for speakers during meetings, making and putting up posters etc. The SA was not excluded from information regarding the aims of the NSDAP; information and indoctrination were made part of Party gatherings. These goals were all laid down in the NSDAP program, that is known.

The goal to be reached was the taking over of power in Germany. As was emphasized in innumerable gatherings by leaders of the Party, this taking over of power was to come about in a legal way. The legal way was to obtain so many votes in the elections, that by reason of a majority of votes, governmental power would be transferred on the basis of the democratic Weimar constitution. From this it followed that special attention was to be devoted to elections and election propaganda.

As already emphasized , the special tasks assigned to the SA consisted in marching, distributing leaflets and handbills, and providing protection during meetings. This special task of safeguarding had become necessary because political opponents had disturbed numerous meetings not only through shouting but also through violence, and had even broken them up. The SA, on the other hand,was merely intended to serve as a protective measure, which means it entered into action only when disturbances occurred through opposing parties.. The Fuehrer demanded that repeatedly and emphatically.

H5128 - 0040

In that connection the Fuehrer also forbade explicitly the carrying of weapons by the SA. There also existed an instruction, given by the Supreme SA Leadership, which pledged the Sturmfuehrer to search their men for weapons before every meeting. I have myself carried out this instruction at a number of meetings. Whenever disturbances occurred in meetings or in the course of other legitimate propaganda activity - for instance during propaganda marches or the distribution of handbills, they naturally were put an end to, but without the use of force.

In election speeches and other propaganda activities of the Party, the Treaty of Versailles played naturally an important part. Already in the years after 1920 - especially after the inflation - it had become manifest that it was impossible to carry out the Treaty of Versailles in its original form. This was also known to the ex-enemy powers; the USA had never ratified the Treaty of Versailles; and moreover several new agreements had been concluded which made essential provisions of the Treaty of Versailles obsolete; as, for instance, the YOUNG Plan, the DAWES Plan and the LOCARNO Agreement. Germany's continued economic decline, and its effects on the world economic situation as a whole, showed that these changes constituted merely unsatisfactory partial solutions. That is why all parties in Germany demanded to a greater or lesser degree a fundamental revision of the Treaty. In that respect

H5128 - 0041

the NSDAP differed little from numerous other German parties which were also influential. On the other hand, the NSDAP took the stand that the German governments of that time did not represent these basic conceptions energetic enough in their negotiations, or conferences, with enemy powers. From this it follows that the fight against the Treaty of Versailles which the NSDAP had made part of its program, was in the first instance a fight against the German governments which had proved too weak. The NSDAP took the point of view that this weakness arose from the fact that these governments were backed by numerous smaller and larger parties and by other powerful groups; frequent changes therefore became necessary, which made a clear, uniform line in the pursuit of that goal impossible. That is why it was the aim of the NSDAP to come to power in a legitimate manner, through a majority of votes, and thus to form a government capable of doing successful work. This government was expected to bring about fundamental revisions of the Treaty of Versailles also in a legitimate manner through negotiations with the respective powers. It is therefore an absurdity to hold that any SA man thought, or could have thought, that after assumption of power through the NSDAP, a revision of the Treaty of Versailles would have to be obtained by force.

It is my opinion, and also that of the Party, that one of the principal causes for Germany's economic plight derived from the fact that through the Treaty of Versailles we were deprived of exploitation of former areas of raw materials in the colonies. Germany was poor in raw materials and could not recuperate without new raw materials. That is why, within the frame-work of its fight against the Treaty of Versailles, the Party also embraced the demand for restitution of the former German colonies, all the more so as according to the Treaty they had been assigned to other powers temporarily only, as mandates. It goes without saying that in this respect also nobody thought of reconquering the colonies by force of arms. I have never been informed of a provision or the setting of a Party goal, according to which European countries were to be attached to, or incorporated into, the German Reich by force of arms. Personally I was of the opinion that a great

H5128 – 0042

contribution would be made to the economic prosperity of the world if customs boundaries between individual States could be eliminated. I am of the opinion that a great portion of the Party shared that opinion.

As regards innerpolitical affairs the NSDAP carried on warfare against the parties in the manner already referred to.

At that time, there was no tension between the Catholic or Evangelical Church. On the contrary, numerous Catholic and Evangelical clergymen were active and useful members of the Party lending their support wholeheartedly particularly in the fight against Communism. In this connection I should like to refer to a rather sensational pamphlet written by the Catholic priest Senn, of Sickingen/Baden, which won the approval of the widest circles in Baden. The SA was not antagonistic towards the Church; I know that in several localities SA units were marched to Church services.

The attitude of the Party and, consequently of the SA to the Jewish question is known; essentially it also corresponded with my own opinion. For the SA it was a foregone conclusion that the elimination of Jewish influence, which had been too preponderant in the fields of public, economic and cultural matters, would be brought about in a legitimate manner.

H5128 - 0043

I do not know whether already at that time an elimination of trade unions had been demanded. In any case, the question of trade unions played no part in the SA.

On the other hand, one of the most important points on the NSDAP program was not only to strive for improvement of the workers' economic position but also to safeguard his right to work and due respect for work. Just because these demands were so zealously fought for numerous workmen who formerly had belonged to the SPD or to the KPD flocked to the Party and to the SA.

Moreover, the SA embodied the much-desired great racial community. In it the ordinary worker was linked in fellowship with the academician, the city dweller with the people living in the country, and the Protestant with the Catholic.

C.- Assumption of Power by 30 June 1934

I myself witnessed the taking over of power in 1933 in Duesseldorf when I was already employed by the firm of Pfaff. At that time I did not serve actively in the SA. I was merely an honorary member of the Group Detachment Baden, as Standartenfuehrer (about equivalent to Colonel in the Army). It goes without saying that I welcomed the election results which brought us the majority of votes, and with it the legal assumption of power. The taking over of power in Duesseldorf and vicinity took place without friction. Cases of excesses against Jews or political opponents did not come to my attention although one should bear in mind the fact that particularly in the Rhine-Ruhr section the SA had suffered considerably because of the violent measures previously taken there by political opponents. It is natural that as a result of the taking over of power considerable contingents joined the SA from all political camps. In the Duesseldorf region, for example, many Stahlhelm member joined the SA immediately after the assumption

H5128 – 0044

of power. In addition, great numbers of workers who until then were in favor of Communism or Social-Democracy, joined the SA hoping for the most part that membership in the SA would help them find work more readily. The task of the SA did not change. Where here and there SA men were used in Police service, these men were removed to the Police; they were on their payroll and, where necessary, they were also supplied with arms by the Police. The SA had nothing to do with the assignment of these to the Police. A great number of these men remained with the Police and were taken over by it or by offices of Home Administration. In general, the old ban against the carrying of arms continued to remain in effect for the SA.

As a result of the very considerable numerical growth, – which increased the total SA strength to 3.5 – 4 million men, constant reorganizing became necessary. As another result of this sudden growth an effective service organization was hardly possible in the SA for a long time.

It did not take long, however, for Roehm, – at that time the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) – to introduce order in this field. The SA service regulation, the SA clothing regulation, disciplinary regulations and so on, for example, were issued at that time: but nothing changed in the fundamental task of the SA; it was centered predominantly in the social field, as will be described later on.

H5128 – 0045

Technical units of SA, which had begun to appear here and there, were at that time also organized; for example the motorized SA, SA units on horseback, medical service units. The idea in forming these special units was to win over men who had special love for technical matters, for horses, or for medical service for the type of service which suited them particularly and to foster their love for the service.

Chief of Staff Roehm placed the relationship with the political leadership on a different basis. This became necessary because individual leaders of high political rank tried to build up SA Gau units of their own and to place them under their exclusive jurisdiction. Roehm was very much opposed to such aspirations and in time he also was successful in preventing formation of such Gau units.

On the other hand, the Party and the Supreme SA Leadership issued numerous orders, directives, and suggestions intended to bring about by all means the economic rise which the program had promised. Individual members of the SA were over and over again advised in evening training courses to do their own buying, to have repairs done, and so on, to help priming economy again. It did not take long for this progande to show results because not only did it become possible to give work to a consiberable number of SA men thus far unemployed, but also to give work to many unemployed men who had previously been political opponents. The SA leadership also gave special thought to work to people with different political ideas in order to win their cooperation.

SA had set itself the special task of fulfilling this purpose by establishing SA Auxiliary Working Camps which came into existance shortly after the taking over of power. I remember exactly that immediately after the assumption of power the SA Leadership emphatically demanded that the groups establish such camps. That is why when Group Leader Ludin congratulated me on my birthday anniversary, 24 July 1933 he pleaded with me to take over this task for the region of the Southwest (Wuerttemberg and Bavaria) Group because he did not have any other suitable man. Finally yielding to the repeated urgent requests of various SA Leaders, among them Brigadefuehrer Plesch, Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, and also Chief of Staff

H5128 – 0046

Roehm, I accepted the assignment of Gruppengeldverwalter (Group Finance Administrator) in October 1933, with headquarters in Stuttgart and took over the creation of relief camps within the region of the Group as full-time activity.

These Auxiliary Working camps were expected to admit SA men who were out of work and, where necessary, to supply them with underwear, to refresh them (because many of them were undernourished) and to obtain work for them. At that time I had under my orders a technician whose exclusive task it was to be in contact with labor offices and have them direct the SA men to the camps. In these camps SA men also benefitted along professional lines, for instance, through work in small work shops. In addition to this, I succeeded in arranging with trade schools in the vicinity the introduction of special courses for these men.

On the basis of that assignment I established between 1933 and the middle of 1934 the following Auxiliary Working camps: Villingen, Gammertingen, Stuttgart, Isny, Sigmaringen. Each camp accommodated 300 men in round figures; admission was on the average granted for 6 to 8 weeks. Needed structures were in part available and to some extent, were placed at our disposal by communities free of charge; in Stuttgart, for example they were erected exclusively from SA funds.

H5128 - 0047

with subsidies granted by the town. During the first year of my activity with Group I South-West, expended 3 million Reichsmark, in round figures for such purposes. The best part of these funds was remitted by the senior SA leadership for these purposes.

The SA social-welfare work, however did not end with such Auxiliary Working camps; we helped wherever necessary. I know - to give an example that with the consent of Group Leader Ludin I distributed at Christmas 1933 underwear, socks, and boots which cost 100,000 Reichsmarks, in round figures. Sometime in the spring of 1934, the SA Supreme Leadership introduced the Adolf HITLER Fund, for the creation of free board and lodging. The populati was asked to provide free board and lodging for SA men in need of a change. This found ample response within my field of activity and great numbers of SA men from all parts of the Reich obtained in that manner an opportunity for a needed change. In addition, we supplied these men with daily pocket money of RM 1.- which was obtained through voluntary contribution within the SA. The SA devoted special attention to matters pertaining to public health As a beginning, I established an SA Medical School in Tuebingen Castle, wher men were receiving instruction in medical, and public health service, to permit their giving first aid in cases of accidents. Under the direction of medical men and professors from Tuebingen, the school was much sought after, so that I decided in 1934 to erect a new structure in Tuebingen and in the beginning of 1935 it was used by the Supreme SA Leadership as the Reich Medical School of the SA. Finally all the SA men were periodically also examined by SA physicians, particularly to combat tuberculosis of the lungs, a very common affliction at that time. Whenever serious diseases were confirmed in regard to SA men or their families, we contacted the competent public health agencies and saw to it that the sick persons were taken to hospitals or were otherwise given such care as the situation required..

During that time I observed no religious tension. I myself was married early in August 1934, in church, in uniform. Several high ranking SA comrades attended the ceremony. The SA Leadership, in any case, did not issue any orders which were in any way aimed against the Church, or reflected animosity to the Church. The German Christian movement did not

H5128 - 0048

play any important part in the SA. It also never came to my attention that within the SA there had been opposition because of differing religious views. Comradeship continued to predominate in the SA.

Settlement of the Jewish question was a matter for the State. I am of the opinion that it is entirely out of the question that the SA would have interfered in any form in this domain reserved to the State or even that it would have made suggestions for settling the Jewish question. I cannot remember any excesses against Jews within my Group area, and I certainly would remember them if they had been of any importance. It goes without saying that SA men were expected to observe the greatest reserve in their dealings with Jews; as an example, they were not to buy in Jewish business establishments.

After the assumption of power, and especially after the dissolution of the other political parties, political campaigning against people endorsing other views had lost all purpose, at least within my Group. As already emphasized, the SA now saw its primary task in winning the outsiders through deeds, in other words through the social-welfare measures already discussed.

H5128 - 0049

The dissolution of the parties came about without the exertion of any influence by the SA as an entity. Should it happen, here or there, that SA members were used to fill certain positions in other parties, they were not assigned as SA members but as auxiliary police. In so far as the property of dissolved parties was confiscated, the SA did not benefit directly by it. Whenever the SA desired to have the use of recration grounds or of recreational establishments, and so on, I - and this applies at least to my Group area - made the proper arrangements with the competent authorities.

As far as I know, the SA had nothing to do with the establishment of concentration camps - at least not within my group area. It is therefore also impossible that the SA could have been used for guard service in that field.

In the beginning of 1934 the question of taking over the Stahlhelm (steelhelmet) into the SA became acute. The Supreme SA Leadership issued orders on the manner in which this transfer was to come about. The necessary negotiations were to be carried on by the SA Group Leaders with the respective Stahlhelm leaders. These negotiations lasted for months and the final result was that the greater part of the Stahlhelm was transferred to the SA Reserve, and a smaller portion to the general SA. I am not in a position to state whether any pressure or compulsion was used by the Stahlhelm in connection with the transfer. In my Group area, also, no other formations were transferred to the SA as a whole.

It has already been stressed that as a result of the great number of new members reorganization had also become necessary. This is how it came about that the SA service strictly speaking - which heretofore centered primarily in the protection of meetings, - was placed on a new basis. In that respect the SA member's physical improvement through sports was placed into the foreground. This physical training formed a very essential part of the social program of the SA, because the physical condition of the SA men was largely unsatisfactory. Open air physical exercise was expected to

H5128 - 0050

and could help to improve this.

For that reason the SA Sports Badge was created: requirements for its award are known. In addition, it also became necessary to educate the SA men so as to assure their statisfactory and appropriate behavior in their contacts with other people. This also brought about the temporary ban on smoking in the street for the man in uniform. Great attention was also paid to decent and neat clothing. The SA had no military duties, all the more so as it had no arms at its disposal outside of those which, on the assumtpion of power, might have been temporarily in the · possession of the SA from confiscated weapons of the KPD and SPD. It is true that at that time the Reichswehr established so-called Chef-AW-Lager. Upon agreement between the Supreme SA Leadership and the Reichswehr, SA made SA men and leaders available for brief instruction courses, but enlistment was on a voluntary basis. Direction of this entire organization was in the hands of Krueger, at that time SA Group Leader. I recall a Group-Leader rally, in the spring of 1934 at Hotel Elizabeth on the Starnberg See, on which occasion several Group Leaders complained to Chief of Staff Roehm that these camps not only were not under the jurisdiction of local group leaders but

H5128 - 0051

it was not even possible to have an influence ever such camps.

In all other respects considerable value was attributed to keeping the SA decent. For example, all SA members who had beenmpunished or were being punished because of dishonorable offenses, were excluded from the SA. In addition, SA jurisdiction was also introduced, so as to requite infractions against the internal descipline and order of the SA.

The SA had nothing to do with the dissolution of the trade unions; in any case I know nothing about it.

D.- 30 June 1934, until the outbreak of the war.

The events which led up to 30 June 1934 are not quite clear to me. The immediate result of events in Munich was firstly that the operations of the S were severely curtailed, particularly as part of its former leadership had been shot and part removed from their positions. Then followed the Fuehrer's decree on decency and simplicity within the entire Party. I heartily welcomed this decree, which had at all times found application within my Group. A review of administrative affairs was also carried out in my Group area, but no cases of complaint occurred within my Group. I believe that this may be the reason why I was appointed Administrative Chief of the Supreme SA Leadership in Munich, in October 1934. There I made the acquaintance of Chief-of-Staff LUTZE, who so far was known to me by name only, and Reich Treasurer Schwarz who initiated me into new duties. They consisted in the creation of a well-ordered and decent administrative system for the SA, the settlement of its debts and/at the same time the taking of the necessary steps to keep undesirable and unreliable elements out of the Leadership Corps. Following an order given him, Chief-of-Staff LUTZE had at that time already demanded that the SA should be cut down to a maximum of 1-1/2 million men and the elimination of all men from SA who for one reason or another might be a burden to it.

H5128 - 0052

Already some time previously, the SS and the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Corps) had become independent organizations by reason of the Fuehrer's order, and the SA had to supply them with many of their men. Important tasks were assigned to the SS and NSKK by the Fuehrer while, after 30 June 1934, the SA was completely relegated to the background. SA men were now awaiting a declaration by the Fuehrer regarding the events which led up to 30 June 1934, because through the measures then taken they themselves felt outlawed. When such a declaration by the Fuehrer failed to materialise, the effect on the SA service was that numerous men stayed away from their duties, which meant automatically their resignation.

Through renewal of the SA Sports Badge in 1935 - which the SA was charged to carry out -- this duty assumed still greater importance.

Following the Fuehrer's order, I had in the meantime given instructions for a thorough checkup of all full-time SA Leaders as to their personal desirability. Through brief instructional courses, held in the Reich Leader School, these leaders were also tested for their leader qualifications from the viewpoint of character, physical condition and intellectual ability. For the carrying out of my checkup, I followed these rules:

a) statement as to indebtenes; to be made out yearly;

b) submission of a political certificate of good conduct and an extract from the penal register. I had the right to ask for extracts from the penal register.

c) later on its became necessary to submit possible divorce records, so as to establish whether the respective SA leader's moral conduct was in any way objectionable.

H5128 - 0053

By reason of this action several SA leaders were forced to resign from their full-time activities, or to resign altogether from the SA. Those who had distinguished themselves through services rendered to the movement were placed elsewhere whenever possible, with the help of the SA.

About the same time I succeeded in prevailing upon Schwarz, the Reich Treasurer, to consent to the creation of an SA Administrative Leader Corps which had been approved by the Fuehrer - and to have it placed under my personal supervision. I wished to safeguard thereby the decency demanded of the SA, which I succeeded in doing, particularly because I ordered the meting out of severe punishment, by legislative and disciplinary action, for all infractions, irresp of position or rank. Especially during the first years of my activity I brought about quite a series of Court proceedings against SA Leaders guilty of embezzlem In these instances the culprits were expelled from the SA without regard for ran or position, In addition to that quite a number of Leaders were thrown out whose not guilty of embezzlement but of negligence and of infractions of administrativ regulations. Upon request of the Supreme SA Leadership, Prosecuting Authorities and Courts of Law were also obliged, from that time on, to inform the SA Leaders of each penal sentence at least.

I also took steps so that all contracts which had been concluded by SA offices before I took office were checked and placed upon economically sound bas with due consideration of legal regulations.

My special attention was devoted to the further extension of the SA Auxiliary Working camps/concerning which I had already had excellent experience in Gre Southwest. I brought about the creation of approximately 78 such camps throughou Germany. Their aims were not changed. Through enlarging the extent of these ca further training workshops were provided, under the direction of experts, and S. men could even take their journeyman's test there.

In view of the improvement of the economic situation by 1936-1937 wi attendant scarcity of labor, and since there no longer existed a need for such c I gradually closed all these relief camps except for two. This definitely prov that these camps served purely social welfare purposes and no other military ai

H5128 – 0054

I kept in two camps where foreign-born Germans - who at that time returned in great numbers from almost all countries - were given retraining according to the same principles, thus preparing them for earning their livelihood.

In this connection I should refer to the following fact: After the abortive Dollfuss Plot in 1934 Austrian National Socialists, some of them armed, crossed the German border in great numbers flocking particularly into Bavaria. Upon the Fuehrer's order these units were disarmed and the SA was assigned the task of housing these fugitives in camps located at a distance of at least 500 kilometers from the Austrian frontier. I established these camps on the Lower Rhine. The fugitives were retrained in these camps, and work was provided for them through these camps. The Fuehrer's order explicitly prohibited their returning to Austria. The Fuehrer also had ordered every fugitive who attempted to cross the Austrian border armed to be shot. These camps were also called Auxiliary Working Camps. These Camps also served no special purpose.

H5128 - 0055

These camps had nothing to do with Chief AW Camp. As a matter of fact, the camps of Chief AW were dissolved after 30 June by a Fuehrer order. This development was strictly the concern of the Reichswehr. These camps had at no time been of appreciable importance; they were still in course of construction.

Incidental to the Fuehrer's birthday in 1936, I started a drive for funds within the SA; the purpose was to make a considerable amount of money available to the Fuehrer for the creation of settlement of various kinds. The drive yielded between 12 and 13 million Reichsmarks which were turned over to the Fuehrer on 20 April 1936. The putting of this plan into practice, along the lines as proposed by us, was assigned by the Fuehrer to the SA, and thus to me. In the years then following, numerous settlements were created in all parts of Germany through these funds which were replenished through new drives each successive year. The total number of such settlements was about 2,000. All kinds of settlements were considered, such as settlements at the outskirts of cities - Leipzig and Munich - newly created farms in Pomerania, and, finally, a whole series of community-settlements near Gleiwitz. The local SA units contributed generously to the creation of these settlements by voluntary work.

In the selection of settlers consideration was given not only to SA members or Party members, but at least 30 to 40% also included other racial comrades, particularly families with numerous children and war veterans whose income - depending upon the number of children - was not to exceed 300 Reichsmark per month. These settlements were deeded to the settlers as their property, after a probation period of two years. The debts on the settlements were kept as low as possible; provisions for amortization also were as generous as possible. Funds from this drive were also used to assist young farmers who through no fault of their own - for instance through epidemics or through floods - were in need.

A rather considerable sum of money was also turned over every year to the German Life-Saving Society.

H5128 - 0056

(Page 10 of original, cont'd)

25 trucks with X-ray equipment were made available throughout Germany for X-ray examination; this equipment was bought by the SA.

Finally, the free-board contribution also continued to operate; my activity did not cover this field, and I also had no influence on the drive for children evacuation; I do know, however, that measures of that kind were wholeheartedly supported by the SA.

Immediately after taking over my central offices in Munich, I started work on the reorganization of the SA administration into a uniform body from entirely new angles, not following Wehrmacht instructions which I considered extreme, obsolete and impractical for our needs. My endeavor was to create an administration as simple and as comprehensive as possible. These ideas were reflected in the administrative instructions which I issued, regulations pertaining to salary, travel expenses and cost of removal; regulations governing leases and tenures, regulations governing purchase contracts, and so forth. To enforce these regulations a special administrative inspectorship office was established in Munich; in addition the offices were inspected by the Reich Auditing Office, an Agency of the Reich Treasurer. By the end of 1934 the total monthly SA budget amounted to 5 to 6 million Reichsmarks, a somewhat modest sum when considering the membership body previously mentioned, and not sufficient to cover preparation for war.

H5128 - 0057

With the approval of the Reich Treasurer I refused to make grants of money from SA funds to SA Leaders for special purposes. Only on special occasions, such as 50th birthdays, silver weddings and Christmas, special honorary gifts were presented in the name of the Chief-of-Staff. These honorary gifts always consisted of books, personal photographs with autographs, etc. The value of such gifts did not exceed 100 to 150 Reichsmark. Incidental to the 50th birthday anniversary of Chief-of-Staff LUTZE and Chief-of-Staff SCHEPMANN a birthday present was offered by Group Leaders the expense of which had been covered through voluntary contributions. The cost of these presents amounted to from five thousand to seven thousand Reichsmark. On the other hand, and also in agreement with the Reich Treasurer, I gave orders that without my approval the SA was not permitted to accept contributions of any kind and from anybody. I turned down such requests on principle. In cases where funds or material of value had already reached the SA, it was a general practice to turn them over to the NSV (National Socialist League for Public Welfare) to be used according to their discretion. I will not fail to mention that every cashier in the Group had every month to hand an official declaration to me, stating that no contributions had reached him. I therefore hoped to discourage embezzlement and opportunities for the SA to come under the influence of donators.

I should still add a few explanations relative to SA publications. The Supreme SA Leadership published the weekly paper "Der SA Mann" with a special group supplement; also the monthly publication "Der SA Fuehrer". The purpose of the paper "Der SA Mann" was to acquaint SA members with the work of their follow comrades in other group areas, and thus to have a stimulating effect. Important political events were discussed therein. The editing of the "SA Mann" was in the hands of the SA Leader KOERBEL who, as far as I know was under the orders of LUTZE and therefore had his headquarters in Berlin.

Articles which appeared in "SA Mann" were contributions from the various groups sent to the press offices in Berlin. Their content gave repeated cause for controversies between the Central Office and the Adjutant of the Chief-of-Staff. It was in that connection and upon my request

H5128 - 0058

that KOPPEL relinquished his post. Moreover it should be remembered that the writers of these articles were inclined to present their work [illegible] the work of their units in a particularly favorable light. That is why accounts given in these articles very frequently are not in keeping with facts. Most likely, the wish was father to the thought. The paper was financially self-supporting. It remained in existence until 1942 when its publication was banned by the Fuehrer because he disapproved of its tendency.

The monthly publication "Der SA Fuehrer" was first supplied on subscription, but subsequently furnished free of charge to SA Leaders down to the rank of Sturmfuehrer. It served the intellectual training of the SA Leadership.

The effects of the events of 30 June 1934 deeply affected relations between the SA and the political leadership. This became evident from the fact that - to give an example - no local leaders of SA Gaus were asked to attend Gau leader meetings, or regional leaders' meetings. This gave cause to innumerable complaints made by groups to the Supreme SA Leadership. But cooperation between the Supreme SA Leadership and the Party Chancery was also/so bad that the SA was frequently only informed subsequently of important Party meetings

H5128 - 0059

This is why in discussions with me the Chief-of-Staff often made reference to the impossible attitude of the Party Chancery and to the arrogant style of their letters. Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER repeatedly made the same complaint. I know that Chief-of-Staff LUTZE lodged frequent complaints with the Party Chancery though evidently with little success. This bad relationship between the SA and the Political Leadership was manifest throughout, down to the most subordinate offices.

All of these circumstances show that for the Party Leadership the SA had become a matter of very minor importance. Even Reich Treasure Schwarz and several of his colleagues told me this bluntly and repeatedly. At the same time, some of the Gau leaders supported by the Party Chancery constantly renewed their attempts to bring the SA men of their Gau under their control. Chief-of-Staff LUTZE protested vigorously against this, because he considered it incompatible with the purpose for which SA was formed. The Fuehrer too, disapproved of such schemes. This was probably one of the chief reasons why, from that time on, the SA was hardly ever asked for any more replacemtns. These bickerings also explained why there was little inclination on the part of the SA to carry out orders or instructions from the Political Leadership. There is therefore no ground for the claim that an intimate and close relationship existed between the SA and the Political Leadership.

There were no closer ties between SA and the other formations. Unfortunately, each organization went its own way.

Tension, which in the meantime arose between the Churches of both creeds fround little expression in the SA. There were leaders who took the stand that he only could become a SA Fuehrer of the Central Office who had left the Church. But on the other hand there was a far larger number of leaders who objected vigorously to this. I recall that incidental to a Group-Leaders' Rally orderd by the Fuehrer in 1935 or 1936, held on the Obersalzberg, and which was attentded by

H5128 - 0060

the Chief-of-Staff and all Group Leaders, the Fuehrer stated unequivocally that he had no intention of abolishing the Churches or of introducing a new religion; and he forbade any pressure on members of the Party or SA members, to force them to separate from the Church. This basic order of the Fuehrer was thus brought to the knowledge of all Group Leaders and it never became known to me that - aside from unimportant individual incidents - higher SA Leaders would have violated this order.

I attended the Fuehrer Rally in the Old Townhall in Munich, on 9 November 1938. After conclusion of the official part of the program during the evening, and after the Fuehrer as well as part of the Leader Corps had already left the Hall, Dr. GOEBBELS stood up and said he had still to make a brief announcement. He stated that he had just been informed that Embassy Councillor von RATH had succumbed to his injuries, and that as a result of this news there had already occurred spontaneous manifestations against the Jews in two cities - I believe it was in Kassel and Halle-Merseburg. Dr. GOEBBELS further declared that for his Gau Berlin he had given his approval for a public demonstration to be held that same evening, whereupon several of the Leaders of the Party who were also present requested approval of similar demonstrations in their areas. GOEBBELS immediately gave his consent. Some of the Gau Leaders declared that this concerned the SA, and they tried

H5128 - 0061

to rope in the SA Leaders of the respective Gaus who were still present. LUTZE intervened immediately and protested against such an imputation, and he prohibited SA Leaders who were still present to permit participation of the SA in such demonstrations. Inasmuch as some of the SA Leaders had already left the Hall, the Chief-of-Staff gave me the order to proceed at once to Hotel Rheinhof where the SA Leaders were billeted and to transmit to them his strict order. I gathered the SA Leaders together in one of the small halls of Hotel Rheinhof and acquainted them with the order of the Chief-of-Staff. As far as I remember all the SA Leaders were then present. In other words, the Supreme SA Leadership explained clearly and unmistakably to the subordinate offices namely the Groups, all of which were represented, that the Highest SA Leadership prohibited participation.

I, of course, know that in some parts of Germany SA members participated nonetheless. It is my personal conviction that the explanation for this is that immediately after Goebbels had made his declaration, several Party Leaders - but none of the active SA Group Leaders - made telephone contact with their home offices and ordered the above mentioned demonstrations. The respective home offices then took steps to give the necessary instructions for the demonstrations, and naturally, in that connection they also informed home formations. In that manner it might have happened that here and there SA agencies might have been called upon by the Party, or by other formations or organizations, and given the order for the carrying out of the demonstrations in a manner which implied that orders for such demonstrations came from Munich. Events then occurred in part so rapidly that orders of the local SA Group Leaders - to the effect that participation by the SA was prohibited - arrived too late, all the more so as SA offices were no longer open in the evening. After news spread of what had happened in the course of the night and during the following day, the Fuehrer gave the order to the Chief-of-Staff to post immediately SA guards in uniform at all demolished business establishments so as to prevent pillaging. That order was carried out, and it is my opinion that

H5128 – 0062

this accounts largely for the impression that the SA was responsible for this destruction.

A few days later I was in Berlin, calling on Chief-of-Staff LUTZE, who explained to me that the Fuehrer had stormed on account of the excesses. At that time I was present during a telephone conversation between the Chief-of-Staff and Dr. GOEBBELS, during which the Chief-of Staff reproached Dr. GOEBBELS, telling him that his declaration alone had set the entire matter going, and that he was trying to make the SA play the part of scapegoat. Dr. GOEBBELS tried to vindicate himself by saying that he had not given orders but that he had merely given instructions which affected his own Gau. Chief-of-Staff LUTZE protested vigorously against that interpretation and I remember very clearly my very deep indignation at this answer given by Dr. GOEBBELS.

From conversations with the head of the SA judiciary, I also remember that court proceedings were opened against SA members who had enriched themselves personally in connection with these excesses and most of which ended with the imposition of considerable terms of imprisonment, in consequenc of which the men were expelled from the SA. Altogether the impression prevailed in the SA - where the excesses met with disapproval - that the ultimate originator was Dr. GOEBBELS and that the SA members who participated as individuals had got into the mess through him and as a result of unfortunate circumstances. I remember that during one of the following Group Leader rallies Chief-of-Staff LUTZE,

H5128 - 0063

when he made mention of the events of 9 November, expressed the point of view, while at the same time he also expressed his severest displeasure to the Group Leaders in whose areas improper behaviour on the part of SA men had occurred. The events of 9 November undoubtedly contributed further considerably to the SA's protest against being made use of by the Political Leadership.

The SA derived no financial benefits from these excesses. No money was made available to it from the sequestrated property.

Relationship with the Wehrmacht was friendly, especially after the reintroduction of the general draft act. The SA considered the reintroduction of compulsory military service as justified in view of the fact that the other signatories to the Treaty of Versailles not only failed to disarm but even continued to arm.

Sometime in 1938 a Fuehrer order assigned to the SA the task of pre-military and post-military training. Details for the execution of this order resulted in negotiations between the offices whom this order concerned lasting many months. Their final result was that pre-military training was to be handled by HJ (Hitler Youth), that SS and NSKK handled the training of their own men and that, practically speaking, the SA was to handle the training only of that which was left. The question of what this training was to consist of was a matter of concern to the leadership who, as far as I know, carried on deliberations for months until a result was finally reached. The militiamen (Wehrmannschaften) who were subsequently trained did not make their appearance for practical purposes at all. Immediately after the outbreak of the war a decree was issued suspending all work connected with the organization of this militia program until the end of the war and as a matter of fact, nothing had really been built up when the war broke out, not even the reorganization which had become necessary in connection with this program had been put into effect.

H5128 - 0064

(Page 14 of original, cont'd)

The SA took no part in the entry of German troops into Austria. I know nothing whatsoever of preparations of any kind, which I should have known of had it been planned for the SA to participate in that invasion in any form whatsoever. I did not learn of that invasion until it was announced over the radio, while I was on a duty journey in Tuebingen, when all of a sudden the first radio announcements were made about the invasion. It is true that thereupon I was immediately ordered to Munich where I received the order to proceed to Vienna the following day, whereto a part of the SA Supreme Leadership had already preceded me. In Vienna I was ordered to organize the Austrian SA - which though previously illegal, had managed to exist without any financial assistance from the SA of the old Reich - according to the administrative principles approved by me. That order was carried out. Moreover, in this instance also I immediately directed my attention towards the improvement of social conditions-true to the calling and tradition of the SA - , submitting my proposals along such lines to the Chief-of-Staff and to the Fuehrer. To give an example of such activities: the creation of large-scale settlements in Vienna was initiated with the cooperation of Oberbuergermeister Neubacher; nine months later these buildings were ready for occupancy. I also took steps to have meals distributed to the needy population of Vienna and vicinity from the field kitchen, free of charge. The cost was covered out of SA funds. I also gave order to send large quantities of underwear, clothes, and so forth, from SA supplies in Germany to Austria where they were likewise distributed free of charge to needy people. This social welfare work was continued later on and it was considerably expanded.

H5128 – 0065

I also wish to stress that Austrian SA members quartered in the Auxiliar wordring camps on the Lower Rhine wished to return to Austria immediately after the Anschluss. It was the Fu[illegible]er's order, however, that they must two weeks and then only after they had been searched for weapons.

Immediately after the invasion SA Leaders from Germany (Altreich) were stationed in Austria for the purpose of initiating SA Austrian Leaders. These men were also tested at the SA Leader School, newly established in Vienna, with regard to their suitability. The same checkup-principles which had successfully found application in the Altreich were applied here also.

I will not fail to mention that the SA welcomed Austria's Anschluss. It was generally known in Germany that as far back as 1919 federated States such as Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg had in a plebiscite demanded by a 90 to 100 % majority that Austria join Germany. The Interallied Commission, however, did not permit this step. When I was in Austria, a few days after the invasion, I could myself confirm that this desire continued to exist throughout Austria as far as the majority of the population were concerned.

Late in the summer of 1938 German refuges from the Sudetenland arrived in the Altreich. I cannot say just how many there were, bacause personally I had nothing to do with the care for these men. I merely remember that one day - I do not remember whether it was before or after the Munich Pact - Obergruppenfuehrer JULT[illegible]NER called me on the telephone. He informed me that he had been given the assignment of administering to the needs of refugees from the Sudetenland, and he asked me to send administrative leaders to help him. I first communicated with Reich Treasurer SCHWARZ who told me explicitly that he had no orders along that line from the Fuehrer and that I could send a man only with the explicit understanding that his function would be that of a consultant. I then sent Standartenfuehrer ROS[illegible]IG from my Bureau. He reported to me that he had to handle feeding and maintenance, and in order to help him he asked me to send out blankets and cooking vessels from SA stocks. Groups stationed nearby, in Silesia and Bayreuth, had already of their own accord given their assistance along such lines.

H5128 - 0066

I subsequently approved of these measures, and I did this without qualms of conscience because I was under the impression, and had reason to believe, that what was involved meant mitigation of the suffering of the refugees. The SA did not place money at their disposal.

I did not know whether these refugees were gathered into formations and for a certain purpose. As far as I know the SA did not play any part in connection with the occupation of the Sudeten country; in any case I did not make any funds available for such purposes; nor had they asked for from anywhere. It is true that the SA unit "Feldherrnhalle" was used. This formati was at that time, however, a part of the Air Force, and consequently of the Wehrmacht. In all other respects the same measures were repeated, after occupation of the Sudetenland, as after the invasion of Austria.

H5128-0067

E - The War.

It is true that the SA had taken measures in the event of war. However, in keeping with the purpose for which the SA was formed, these were measures of economy, for example combining of offices, etc. When the war broke out, a considerable percentage not only of SA men but also of the Leader Corps joined the Wehrmacht. As a result all SA activity was suspended at first; nor was the SA given special assignments. I remember that it was planned to assign to the SA the task of organizing the air raid protection, but Chief-of-Staff LUTZE refused. On the other hand, pre-military training now became an active duty for the SA in that it embraced the older age-classes, the call-up of which could be anticipated. Training consisted of basic Infantery training without arms; only small-caliber rifles for shooting practice were available in limited quantities. SA leaders or men who had served in the Army handled the training. Participation in such training was voluntary. In my opinion these measures had little military value because the trainees were very rarely regular in their attendance and, in any case were usually very soon transferred to the Wehrmacht or drafted for labor service.

SA members called up for military service were cared for through so-called Group or field post letters, which contained news from the homefront of interest to the respective SA man.

It goes without saying that with the outbreak of the war there were also other assignments given the SA, for example, collecting of metal scrap, rags, paper and similar drives. It was also called upon to help in cases of emergency such as heavy snowfalls, catastrophies caused by floods, or bringing in the crop. The SA had nothing to do with organization of air raid protection, as already mentioned. It stands to reason that the individual SA man had to do his share of air raid protection duties, just as any other man. Otherwise nothing was changed in the assignments of the SA.

As regards the parts of the occupied territories which were incorporated into Germany - for example the Warthe region - the SA soon came into existence. Only racial Germans or German nationals were admitted; no

H5128 - 0068

special assignments were given to it.

In the General Government - just as had previously been done in the Protectorate - SA units were recruited from racial Germans or German nationals; they likewise were not given special assignments. I remember that Chief-of-Staff LUTZE flatly refused to use SA in those regions for Police duties. In so far as in these regions premises were needed for the establishment of central administrative offices, they were rented or purchased in a normal manner.

Also during the war the SA carried out no assignments of a purely military character. For example, no SA units in their entirety were used in guarding prisoners of war camps. In any case I know nothing about it.

As regards the establishment and supervision of concentration camps, the SA as such had nothing to do with this. I am convinced that all the SA men knew no more about the concentration camps than I did. Until the end of the war I only knew about camps at Dachau, Oranienburg and Woellerdorf. I attended numerous meetings of Group Leaders and many Party meetings; at no time was there anything discussed about the meaning, purpose and organization of the concentration camps. And until the end of the war I

H5128 - 0069

knew nothing of atrocities said to have been committed in the camps. Also I never heard that it had been planned to use the SA proper in combat against parachutists, or agents, much less that they were actually used. In my opinion they would not even have been qualified to serve that capacity because they were unarmed and were not quartered in barrac

I also wish to stress that the SA was completely passed over at the time the German People's Levy (Volkssturm) was established. This in my opinion bests reflects the situation that during the war also the SA had no influence at all. I was under the impression that HIMMLER and BORMANN both fought for the power.

In any case during the war the SA had still less to do with the State leadership and direction of the Party than before. From the beginning the Chief-of-Staff LUTZE had had but rare opportunities - and if so only after overcoming great difficulties - to discuss SA matters with the Fuehrer. Appointments were often made but either posponed or cancelled. So it came about that LUTZE had a conference with the Fuehrer at the utmost two to three times a year. He never took part in Cabinet metings. None of the Chiefs of the Central Office of the SA had occasion to report to the Fuehrer; only Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER called on the Fuehrer a few times after LUTZE's death. These conditions did not change when SCHEPMAN became SA Chief of Staff. There is equally little cause to speak of actual links between the SA and the individual ministries or most of the offices of the Party Leadership. Relations between the Chief-of-Staff and BORMANN and HIMMLER were such that I cannot remember that at any time during the last few years had there been a serious conference. LUTZE and SCHEPMAN repeatedly expressed their annoyance about this. It is true that GOERING came from the ranks of the SA and for a brief period was SA Chief-of-Staff. But especially after the assumption of power his connection was very slight. He only made his appearance before the SA as honorary leader in connection with important affairs. His authority to issue orders was nil; he also never gave his attention to purely SA matters. The reason for GOERING's

H5128 - 0070

becoming Chief of the "Feldherrnhalle" regiment was on the one hand an expression of appreciation of his services to the SA during the time of its struggles and, since respect for the SA had dwindled considerably as a result of 30 June 1934, it was expected to help to improve this situation. The fact is, anyhow, that GOERING put in an appearance with SA as its member so rarely that undoubtedly a great many SA men did not even know that GOERING was an Honorary SA Leader.

Among the rest of the defendants on trial in Nuernberg, only FRANK and STREICHER are known to me as SA members. They also were in no way prominent in SA matters; STREICHER was Honorary SA Leader and, towards the end, FRANK headed only nominally the General Government Group; in fact the leadership was in the hands of SA Leader PEIZ and SA Leader KUNSTMUND. Neither FRANK's nor STREICHER's influence over the SA amounts to anything; in any case I know nothing about it and in this respect likewise I am certain that hardly any of the SA men - with the exception of those in the regimental areas - knew that FRANK and STREICHER were SA Leaders. I do not know whether any one else, or several of the others, who are on trial in Nuernberg were members of the SA; but I do know for certain that none of the other defendants had any influence on the SA in any way.

H5128 - 0071

In conclusion I may state with fullest conviction and in keeping with my oath.

1) The purpose for which the SA was intended excludes beyond doubt the commission of crimes such as mentioned in article 6 of the Indictment of the International Military Tribunal. Should such crimes have been committed nonetheless, persons who committed them placed themselves thereby in opposition to the purposes for which the SA was intended; they are outsiders and, consequently, the SA has neither any connection with such crimes nor can it be held responsible for same.

2) Membership in the SA was on the whole voluntary. It is possible that when the admission of whole units was concerned - as for instance in the case of the Stahlhelm - that some of these men became SA members under some pressure, so to say. I also believe that after the assumption of power quite a few men joined the SA hoping thus to be more successful in finding work.

3) Since the SA did not pursue criminal goals it follows that SA men also could not be acquainted with such goals. Should the defendants on trial in Nuernberg be guilty of such crimes an SAman had knowledge of it in but very few - in fact exceptional - cases which did not come to my attention. The great bulk of the SA know nothing about such crimes and could not know of such crimes, since such crimes had not even come to my attention who, as the head of the SA Leadership, of course knew so much more about what was going on.

This statement on 18 pages is made at IC 78 Zuffenhausen/Germany/ at 14.00 hours 9th of May 1946. I swear before God that it is the whole truth.

(s) Georg Mappes
Georg MAPPES
Internee No. 2426
Internment Camp 78
Zuffenhausen/Germany

Subscribed and sworn to before me at IC 78 Zuffenhausen/Germany 9th day of May 1946.

(s) William W. Silver
William W. Silver
Captain Inf.
Investigator
War Crimes Branch
Ludwigsburg Detachment

SA 8

I, 8

The German Camp Director
Internment Camp 79

(Page 1 of original)

Ludwigsburg, 13 April 1946

In reference to the indictment against the SA. I state the following:

REIMANN, Hans, born on 13 November 1906 at Lueben/Silesia
Business manager, later main office SA-leader,
now residing at Diesen on Ammersee/Upper Bavaria.
Prisoner No. 5 301 171

I was in the SA from 1930 unitl the end. In the year 1931 became Sturmfuehrer, 1933 Sturmbannfuehrer and in July 1934 main-office SA-leader. I then led two units in succession in Silesia. In September 1936 I was transferred to the staff of the supreme SA-leadership at Munich, and there I was departmental chief of the SA-Sports-Badge-Division until the beginning of the war. I served in the armed forces from August 1939 until July 1943. After being discharged from the armed service I was leader of the Graz-Brigade until the end.

I. 1930 until 30 January 1933

In the years prior to 30 January 1933 the task of the SA consisted of propagandizing for the NSDAP, protecting meetings and recruiting members of the party and the SA. Several attempts of the German Communist Party and the German Socialist Party to disturb and to break up meetings were prevented. Many of the SA-men under my command were maltreated by political opponents in the street in front of the employment office and also at their place of work.

Recruiting marches of the SA at that time were numerous. For the preparation of a disciplined and impressive appearance drill- and marching exercises were regularly carried out. We practiced many songs in order to draw the attention of the population on recruiting marches. Every SA-man had to purchase his own uniforms and other equipment. On many occasions the expenses for propaganda-trips, repairs of bycicles etc. were paid from personal funds. Since the majority of the men were poor or unemployed, much idealism was needed.

H5128 – 0072

H5128-0073

General physical sport-training, including small-caliber firing, more extensive marches and terrain sports, were already at that time part of the regular training.

The entry into the SA was always voluntary, and it could be left at any time.

Every SA-man swore an oath of loyalty to Adolf HITLER and in the text of the oath also swore to obey the orders of all superiors, insofar as these did not demand "anything unlawful" from him.

Terrorism toward political opponents was never practiced in my territory, insofar as individual clashes occurred, the SA-men were always attacked and had to protect themselves in self-defense.

H5128 - 0074

II. 30 January 1933 until August 1936.

Nothing has come to my knowledge of the introduction of military combat training by the SA after 30 January 1933. Since protecting meetings and general recruiting for the party became rather superfluous, more time was at our disposal for more intensive physical training and for the training of units in strict, disciplined deportment. In this every single SA-man was constantly urged in his personal appearance and his conduct in the family and at his place of work to be an example to his fellow-nationals in comradeship, willingness to help, willingness to work, and personal, decent living. SA-men who acted contrary to this demand were reprimanded and lectured to, and dismissed from the SA after repeated offenses.

Lectures by doctors and other specialists on public-health problems were to further mental flexibility and increase the knowledge of all SA-men. SA-men thus treated helped raise the general level of public health.

By an increase in physical training the one-sided physical development caused by professional work was to be compensated for, and the SA-man kept physically and mentally healthy and agile until ripe old age.

On marches and in terrain sports the SA-men were pointed out the beauties of their homeland and of nature and urged to use all their strength to improve this homeland and the living conditions of the people living in it. We voluntarily assisted in the construction of settlements, in bringing in the harvest, in draining and in regulating creeks; in the country especially we constructed sport-fields and swimming-pools; by way of precaution we trained ourselves in fighting natural disasters, like forest fires, floods, etc. We always only wanted to be active helpers in the reconstruction of a beautiful German fatherland in which every German, regardless of profession, religion or former political attitude, could earn a living wage and lead a decent life. For these reasons alone even a contemplated aggressive war would have been contrary to our actions.

I would yet like to emphasize that every SA-man took these tasks upon himself without compensation and without any personal advantages. The expenses for his uniform, for small-caliber ammunition and personal expenses on parades etc. had to be borne by him personally and in addition to this, he sacrificed

H5128 - 0075

his spare time which others could devote to their families, for his idealism..

Aside from the SA-dagger, the SA-man did not possess any weapons; SA-leaders could also carry a pistol. Besides a few small-caliber rifles (on the average approximately 3 per Sturm), the SA-units did not have any weapons or other military items of war equipment.

Special units, like the Combat Engineers, dispatch riders (Nachrichter), and medics were activated for use within the framework of the SA-service. The Riding Stuerme (Reiterstuerme) trained their men in riding and driving, and deepened the knowledge for the sensible care and treatment of animals among the rural population.

H5128 - 0076

Sheet 2 to the report of Reimann, Hans.

The exercises were not based on strategical assumptions, but as training for combatting of potential catastrophes, and similar things. I recall that in the years 1933-34 Sunday duties somtimes began with field services and that in the year 1933 some SA-men who had only be married officially before now were afterwards married clerically. I also know that ministers belonged to the SA, one of them even was SA-Sturmbannfuehrer. On the occasion of my wedding in 1933, units of the Sturmbann under my command at the time, about 500 men strong, marched in formation and participated in my clerical wedding with all flags of the Sturm.

Since the rush to enter the SA in 1933 was very great, every applicant had to submit a testimonial of condact by the police to prevent the absorption of anti-social or criminal elements. On the other hand, during this time I have accepted many former members of the German Communist Party and the German Socialist Party if theyr seems suitable as to character and reputation. Some of them have even obtained leading positions in the SA at a later time.

In many cases excerpts of court-prosecution-registers were furthermore requested in order to keep criminally inclined elements from the SA or to dismiss them.

In the fields under me a relationship of courtesy without mutual influence existed with the armed forces, which expressed itself in the participation of officers and SA-leaders as guests at social and sport-meetings of the armed forces and the SA.

In and the unit-leaders under my command made use of the service-law-code only in indivdual cases, whereby prison-sentences were not imposed. As fas as I can remember, an introduction to the service-law-code stated that the latter was to be primarily an instrument of education. It was effective merely by the fact that it threatened punishment.

H5128 - 0077

In my capacity as leader of an SA-unit I was not subordinated to the local political leader. He could not issue any orders to the SA. The SA-duty was only carried out in accordance with my directions. If meetings were to be heldin common, then their procedure was agreed on in a mutual discussion.

III. September 1936 until the beginning of the war.

Early September 1936 I was first of all placed on the Staff of the Supreme SA-Leadership, and later on transferred there. After several months familiarizing myself with the work I took over the direction of the SA-Sports-Badge Division, a post I held until I was called into the armed services at the beginning of the war. During the period of this activity, a new procedure was introduced for obtaining the SA-Sports-Badge. In connection with this some fundamental remarks are pertinent:

Several years after the First World War the German Reich-Sports-Badge, was introduced. The conditions for obtaining it were relatively severe. One had to be an experienced, well-trained sportsman in order to be able to obtain it. I is also a fact, that during a period of many years only a very small percentage of the population, which could not bear any weight for a general physical education of the whole people,was able to get it. It therefore, could not be considered as an attraction for a work of the masses.

I believe that this fact was an important reason for the institution of the SA-Sports-Badge. In any case this point-of-view influenced my conduct during my term of office in the Supreme SA-leadership. By simple, popular exercises which appealed to the interests of the broad masses with relatively small demands on one's ability all classes of the people in the cities and in the country were th be attracted to compete for the SA-Sports-Badge.

H5128 – 0078

I suppose that the International Military Tribunal has in its possession the "Regulations of Procedure and Examination" for the SA-Sports-Badge.

In them my assertions can be proven.

If, for example, a full field-pack-march, small-caliber-firing, throwing and aiming of hand-grenades, swimming biccling and an obstacle course with gasmask were demanded from Group II, then these exercises on the one hand corresponded to the tendencies of the German male population, and on the other hand they were to stimulate activity in the sense of raising the general public health by strengthening the will, the endurance, etc., and for the preparation of a purely passive defense of the country.

As the basis of this I list:

Firstly: March with full field-pack: More extensive meetings of the party and the state were almost always connected with parades of all organizations, for example, the German Labor Front, etc. For these parades the participants for the most part had to make long advance marches. The advance march, parade, and return march often consisted of more than 20 kilometers. Aside from its plupical value this fact was also factor in introducing marching with a full-field-pack.

Secondly: Small-caliber firing. Shooting practice is not only popular in Germany. I recall the example of Switzerland, whose regulating for training in shooting I studied prior to the re-construction of the SA-Sports-Badge. Sharpshooting - clubs have existed in Germany for hundreds of years, even in many smaller towns and villages. National and international competitions were also held by these clubs prior to 1933, which already existed a long time before the founding of the SA. The inclusion of small-caliber firing into the conditions for the elegibility of the SA-Sports-Badge was one of the ways this badge was hoped to be made popular. Furthermore, the conditions for the German Reich-Sports-Badge also contained small-caliber firing.

Thirdly: Hand-grenade target throwing was originally called "cudgel-target-throwi It is an exercise for increasing the power of concentration, for distributing labor and safety-measures. Practice grenades made of wood were used. The name of "hand-grenade" for this actual wooden cudgel was to conciliate the veterans.

H5128 – 0079

(Page 4 of original, cont'd)

Fourthly: Swiming or bicycling. In Germany, just ar everywhere in the world, thousands drown annually because they do not know how to swim. If the SA demanded swimming-achievements in its Sports-Badge, it wanted to help save many human lives. However., since in many rural areas without any larger bodies of water the population could not be given any opportunity to learn how to swim, another exercise had to be selected as a substitut for these areas. We chose bicycling because it is indispensable in rural traffic; for example the rural firemen used bicycles if they had to fight fires in the neighboring villages. With this exercise, therefore, the SA was of service to those institutions common to both the state and the communities. Since in this exercise more credit was given for swimming than for bicycling, the construction of swimming-pools was stimulated.

Fifthly: Cross-field obstacle-course with gas mask. The civilian air raid precaution measures had led to the manufacture and distribution of a people's gas mask. As the grim reality later on confirmed, it was presumed that all able men would have to be assigned to combat the damages during or after air-attacks. Since this compelled them to climb over rubble, jump into cellars, crawl through the small openings and,under certain conditions,had to protect themselves at the same time with the gas mask, these facts were a reason.

H5128 - 0080

for the introduction of this exercise. Since civilian air raid precautions can probably only be considered as defense, it thereby at most served in the preparation of a very passive warfare.

The above explanations about the "military sports" of Group II generally also apply to the "terrain sports" of Group III.

By means of the most simple exercises like reconnaissance, observing, locatin, etc. mental agility was to be improved, and the German man was to learn how to travel through his homeland with open eyes.

For these territories with an overwhelmingly sea-faring population the "terrain sports" of Group III were adjusted to the interests of these people in water sports, as can be seen from the orders of procedure.

At the beginning of Paragraph III I have pointed out that the SA-Sports-Badge was to be the foundation for improving the physical fitness of the German people on the broadest basis.

The repeater-exercises introduced in the year 1937 were to be a further means for this purpose. We wanted to prevent a man from obtaining the badge in his best years and there after place no value on this physical fitness. With the introduction of the repeater-exercises,he had to pass a certain number of exercises prescribed for obtaining the badge, if he wished to remain in the possession of it. If he refrained from taking the repeater-exercises, then the badge was taken away from him. If he participated regularly in these repeater-exercises for a number of years, then he received in recognition the badge in silver and later on in gold. This was to provide them with the necessary stimulation to keep physically and mentally sound and agile up to an advanced age.

For purposes of eduction and for giving the tests,many of those who were eligible teachers and examiners,had to be trained all over Germany. They had to receive detailed instructions prior to the beginning of their activity as the tests for the German Reich Sports Badge were only given by active sportsmen with years of experience after having undergone courses or training in the various sport branches.

H5128 - 0081

Eligibility to teach and to examine was not only conferred on members of the SA, but also on those of the SS, the NSKK and the RAD who had fulfilled the prerequisites after having undergone a training course. The training courses were given at the Reich- and Group Schools of the SA. The armed forces took part neither for the personnel nor technical aspects of the planning and training. Achieving the goal of the training course involved being qualified as SA-leader or sub-leader but, this was not acknowledged in the armed services, nor was it a qualification for any grade in the armed forces.

Of the many examples which have come to my knowledge, I only wish to recount a personal one: When in the year 1938 I reported for my first training into the armed forces, I was a Senior SA-leader (SA-Oberfuehrer) and had obtained the right to teach in Munich and the right to examine at the Reich School at Dresden. In spite of this, I entered the armed forces as a rifleman and was only appointed to Private First Class after my second training in autumn of 1938. In this capacity I reported to the armed forces at the beginning of the war, and, after having stood the test, I became corporal in the spring of 1940. After I was decorated I became Sergeant in the autumn of 1940, and only after having made good further I became Lieutenant in May 1941. With this rank I was discharged from the armed service in 1943. Looking back on these years, I can only state that I have at least worked as hard to become an officer as the other German

H5128 - 0082

officers. The same thing happened to many SA-leaders I knew. Our work in the SA therefore did not bring us any advantages with regard to service in the armed forces, but to the contrary, we SA-leaders were so taken up with work in the years before the war, that we were only able to take part very late and then for the most part in only few training courses of the armed forces. In contrast to us SA-leaders, for example, many teachers and members of other professions were already reserve-officers at the beginning of the war because they had enough time in the years of peace to go through the required obligatory exercises. According to my knowledge, the SA-leaders were urged not until the years 1938/39 to go through their exercises with the armed forces, because it had been discovered, that many SA-men did not return to the SA after having served their active obligatory duty, because they did not want to subordinate themselves to superiors who had not served. Even as the SA-leader entered the armed forces as a rifleman without having previously served after he had obtained the right to teach and to examine in the schools of the SA, but did not draw any advantage there from his previous activity in theSA, so, according to my knowledge, the active non-commissioned officer or officer, who had been discharged from the armed forces, could also only enter the SA as an SA-man. (Pvt.) Only after properly qualifying in an SA-school was it possible for him to occupy leading positions in the SA.

In concluding my statements about the relationship of the SA to the armed forces, I would not leave unmentioned, the fact that the SA in various regulations about drill, marches, etc. has depended in a large measure on customs of the armed forces for its oral nomenclature as well as in the formal execution of the regulations. These were either bound by tradition or they had proven themselves adapted to the purpose. Why should an SA-man be taught a command and its execution in a form which varied from that of the armed forces? He would have forgotten whatever he had learned when he entered the armed forces, would have to relearn everything, and after his time of service he would have to repeat the same procedure again with his entry into the SA. I believe that most of the SA-men would never have found their way back into the SA after their time of service, especially if it were known

H5128 - 0083

that large circles of the armed forces did not recognize the activity of the SA and described it to the young soldiers as playing around. However, decisive for both parts were the declarations by Adolf HITLER and other authoritative personalities of the state given repeatedly in public that only the Wehrmacht were the armed forces of the nation.

During the period of my activity in the Supreme SA-Leadership the annexation of Austria and the events of the 9 November 1938 took place.

In connection with the annexation of Austria I only know that some time after the marching in of the armed forces the "Austrian Legion" marched in its homeland. It consisted of SA-men who had previously been forced to flee from Austria to Germany because of political persecution, and who were organized here in the SA in a closed unit, the so-called "Legion". It can be imagined that these men had the sole wish to be able to return as quickly as possible to their families.

On 9 November 1938 I was in Munich, and in the evening I returned with my wife and my oldest son on the express-train Munich-Breslau to my Silesian homeland in order to attend a family celebration. Although I was always informed of all orders of the Supreme SA-Leadership, neither a written

H5128 - 0084

nor an oral order for the burning of synagognes or similar measures have come to my knowledge. In my home town of Lueben the local synagogne was not destroyed and must still stand if it has not been destroyed by military action.

Towards the end of 1938 the Supreme Command of the SA began with the preparatory work for a pre- and post military training. As HITLER stipulated in his decree of January 1939, in which he entrusted the SA with this task, this should be done on the basis of the SA-Sport Insignia. The insignia itself received the name of "SA-Military Insignia" ("SA-Wehrabzeichen").

As already mentioned above, it should be made possible for every German man to carn the badge and he will then be induced by regular repetition of the training to keep physically end mentally alert and healthy as long as possible.

The first year of repeater exercises, 1938, showed that the recruiting and registration of all participants was attended by difficulties which could be solved only by employement of an extensive executive organization. With the adoption of the repeater excersises as pre- and post military training, the SA was placed in a position to use the recruiting office and their trained personnel for this purpose.

Discussions with the OKH should result in the clarification of this question. Moreover, for reasons already stated before, the partly achived assimilation of certain expressions, commands and their execution linguistically and practically, to the terms usual in the German Armed Forces should be examined again. I remember that during one of these conference, the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) rejected full-field pack- march as being unpopular and not modern. But it was retained as many other exercises. Training with modern weapons and in the technique of a modern war of aggression was not mentioned, as far as I know. It would also have been impossible to carry it out at that time as only a diminishing percentage of the SA-Leader and Sub-Leaders had served or held ranks as officers and N.C.O. of the service rank in the German Armed Forces, as my own example showed already. To my knowledge, the conferences did no come to a conclusion and a final settlement, because the war broke out.

H5128 - 0085

IV. From the beginning to the end of the War

At the beginning of the war I was called up to the Army and fought in the 19th Infantry Regiment.

I was discharged from the German Military Forces in the summer of 1943 and appointed as a Leader of the SA brigade in Graz. The SA men of this brigade were about 90% from the military services. Only a small number of these SA men who were distributed through a large district and were overburdened with work in the farming, industry and restaurant business, were still at home. The SA units had an average strength of from 10 to 15 men; units of only 4 - 5 men were distrubuted in many districts and were no rarity. It was impossible to carry out a regular, and to some degree a planned, SA-Service. Essentially only a skeleton of the SA units could be kept together after the war. Occasional meetings served to foster comradship and a permanent connection with the retired friends.

The numerous and somewhat stronger units were combined into auxiliary troops for clearance work after air raids.

During my activity in Graz the SA units were not used for guard duties of concentration camps, prisoners of war and camps for foreigners.

All the SA work practically ceased with the organization of the Volkssturm in 1944.

H5128 - 0086

as all SA leaders and men were placed in the Volkssturm.

I certyfy in lieu of oath that I have made the above statements to the best of my knowledge and conscience. I have been informed about the criminal consequences of a false declaration in lieu of oath.

s/ Hans REIMANN

I certify and confirm the above signature after evidence of identity according to authorization of the CI of the Internment camp 79 of 15.4.46

s/ ALTSTADTLER (?)

I, 9 SA 9

(Page 1 of original)

C.I. Camp 91, Darmstadt

Darmstadt, 26 April 1946

PETERSEN, Hans, born 13 September 1885 in ATHENS (Greece) Major (ret.) resident in IMMENSTADT/ Allgaeu, Internment No. 533094

former SA-Obergruppenfuehrer

Personal:

Offices held in the SA:

1933: Instructor in ideological training in the Reich Leadership School of the SA in Munich (Highest SA-Command)

1-1-1934 - 14-1-36: Department Chief in the same office of the Supreme SA-Command

15-1-1936 - 30-9-1941: Leader of the 39th SA Brigade in Dessau (Anhalt)

20-4-1940 - 30-11-1941: Deputy of the Leader of the Thueringen SA Group in Weimar

1-12-1941 - 1945: Chief of the Main Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Command in Munich.

Pertinent Matter:

The opportunity has just now been afforded me to take a position to the extraordinary weighty charges against the organization of the SA before the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, which purport to declare the organization named as criminal.

Before I attempt to render impotent and contradict the prosecution's charges individually in the form of a statement in lieu of oath, I consider myself especially obligated, as former Obergruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Main Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Command, to take a stand concerning the charges against SA, because:

1. I do not know whether the former Chief of Staff of the SA, Wilhelm SCHEPMANN or his permanent former deputy, Obergruppenfuehr Max JUETTNER, as the most professional and responsible leaders in Nuernberg, were present, or whether another former active higher leader, active in the SA, represents the interests of the SA before the International Military Tribunal,

H5128 - 0087

H5128 - 0088

2. the sole responsibility in affairs relating to personnel for the Chief of Staff was carried over to me as Chief of the Main Personnel Office,
3. beyond that, the Office of the Supreme SA-Court in the Supreme SA-Command was subordinated to me.

On the part of the Prosecution, the Chief American Judge expressly stated that the more important aim than the punishment of the leaders of the Third Reich was the erection of a dam of international law against war. There can be no doubt that almost everyone will approve of this goal. The former League of Nations recognized this aim also, but nevertheless did not attain it. The reasons for the failure of the League of Nations are to be found in the fact that the most important state in this board, the U.S.A. was not represented as a member in spite of the fact that the great idea had come from the U.S.A. For another thing, it was above all the impossible severe conditions which were imposed on the German nation in the peace treaty of Versailles, in the Dawes and Young Plan which practically would have allowed Germany to lapse into slavery for centuries. Only he who was familiar with the inner-political conditions in the Germany of the years 1920-1932 can understand the fact that a basic change was longed for by all German-conscious circles. That such a change of the inner-political relationships, after the failure of the national revolution of 9 November 1923, could come about only by legal means, was clear to see. The legality of the struggle for the usurpation of the state power was sworn to by the leader of the Party in 1930 before the highest German court, the Reich Court in Leipzig. The program publicly announced by the leader of the NSDAP promised the nation freedom, work, and bread. At that time, 1919, commencing with the collapse, a change of values took place through a widespread inflation brought about by hyenas of finance without conscience; the destruction of a healthy economy by the reparations imposed, coupled with an avalanche-like increasing

H5128 - 0089

unemployment such as had been hitherto unknown, brought a horrible need to Germany for the first time in its history to such an extent. The rousing call of Adolf HITLER for cooperation in order to overcome Germany's want, called the most active worthwhile forces of the nation to the plan. The number of the followers of HITLER grew in ever-increasing numbers and came from all sections and classes of society. Men who, for the most part, had been together in the horrors of the first World War united in order to save Germany from the certain decline, just as the same men before, without regard for person, rank, or lineage had performed their duty to the fatherland in the trenches of the first World War.

H5128 - 0090

(Page 3 of original)

The indescribable want in Germany had as consequences: insecurity before law, unrest, acts of violence, corruption, anarchistic conditions, which finally threatened to throw Germany into a chaos. In order to meet this need with success, to prepare an end to the anarchistic conditions, to reinstitute the order disrupted by bad elements, that could only succeed if unselfish men united to serve only the community, ready for sacrifice, who were ready under disciplined leadership but nevertheless on a voluntary basis, to stake all for the community living in dire need. The extraordinary high casualties in the battle for inner-political order and the re-establishing of generally held concepts of law attest to the idealism and the devotion with which the fighters of the NSDAP were inspired, to preserve not only their fatherland, but also Western Europe from Bolshevism, which is the denial of all human order. How clearly did Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1919 already and again before the outbreak of the second World War point out this dangerr for Europe!

For the protection of their political gatherings which served for the enlightenment of the bulk of the nation, a well-disciplined "Order Unit" had to be created; it was composed exclusively of independent and young members and followers of the Party, of which about 80% had participated the World War. They had the horrors of the war behind them and naturally were completely opposed to the thought of a new war. The charge of planning, preparing, or completely carrying-out a war of aggression appears accordingly in itself as senseless. This" Order Unit" received after its first trial the name "SA-Sturm Abteilung". It protected the work of the Party and its propaganda from the for the most part armed terrorism of political opponents, the K.P.D. and the U.S.P.D. (Spartakus) and the S.P.D. (Reichsbanner), without itself terrorizing. The basic thought of the SA was to serve the community, through bbodily exercises and sport activities to strengthen the body, to educate its members to honor-

H5128 - 0091

loving, healthy manhood, to weld itself together into a closely-knit manly comradeship, disclaiming all differences of class, forming a well-disciplined organization of the Party in voluntary subordination to its appointed leaders. The SA never bore arms, as has been repeatedly publicly emphasized. They carried as external sign of their right of defense a small dagger, and completed their final education in small arms as was practiced in the youth organizations of almost all the countries. If an SA man wished to carry a weapon (a pistol, for example), he had to get a weapon permit issued by the local police authorities. The SA was never employed to carry out state or organizational matters. All duties of the SA took place completely in public, also in view of the foreigners residing in Germany. Since 1934, a long list of foreign diplomats took part in the manifestations of the SA, representing crosssections of the official labor elements. It never came to my knowledge that one of the

H5128 - 0092

signatory powers of the peace Treaty of Versailles ever protested against the nature and activity of the SA; on the contrary, members of the diplomatic corps were represented in almost all great organizations, taking part also in conradly gatherings. Would that have been possible in full public sight, had the SA been a criminal organization? Also, the former Ambassador of the French Republic, Mr. FRANCOIS PONCET, was among the guests of the SA. One of the most celebrated American authors of today, Sinclair Lewis, also reported concerning the SA in his book "Adolf Hitler"; he wrote from his own observation and experience but writes nothing of the criminal intentions or of secret conventions, but tries in his book to present the true ideas and intentions of the National Socialists to the American nation. The contention put forth again and again by the prosecution that the SA was involved in a conspiracy intended or designed to train its members in crime or offenses against humanity, can now be labeled as absurd since the contrary is the case. The SA was again and again the special organization of the party, always ready to help. Under natural conditions or in states of emergency of any sort, it was on the spot, provided shelter and aid for those threatened or stricken, and was active in housing emergencies by founding settlements in community labor without any sort of recompense. That can be no criminal organization which has readiness to help and humanity written on its shield. Especially also during the last war, the SA, during and after the fearful ravages by the air raids, distinguished itself by its readiness to sacrifice.

Many hundreds of thousands of innocent leaders and men of the SA, serving only their idealism, are to be held as criminals; this is without doubt the deeper significance of indictment raised in Nuernberg. Of these 200,000 have found a soldier's death at the fronts for their fatherland, genuinely believing in an ideology which is considered by the democracies as a false doctrine. The so-called crime of these SA adherents consists only therein, that they were adherents of the National Socialistic idea, that they staked all for their nation, for the state which was recognized

H5128 - 0093

by all nations of the world and with which diplomatic relationships were carried on until the outbreak of war in 1939, by all the states which are now prosecutors. To impose a collective responsibility on the SA openly is something new in the German concept of law. I hold myself duty-bound to save the honor of my living and fallen comrades as a former leading personality of the SA, if only from moral grounds, to take a stand to rehabilitate it as its sacredness demands.

H5128 - 0094

Being informed of the penal character of a false affidavit, I hereby make the following statement in lieu of oath, giving particulars concerning the documents and the indictment counts submitted by the Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal of Nuernberg:

1) The objectives and tasks of the SA are generally set forth in ADOLF HITLER's book "Mein Kampf" in the 9th Chapter which can be presumed to be generally known. Furthermore, the tasks, objectives, activities and methods, as well as structure and organization, of the SA are set forth in detail in the service directives and educational regulations. The task of the SA has also been repeatedly and clearly outlined quite publicly in ADOLF HITLER's speeches. The educational regulations and service directives were to be found in book-shops and likewise all publications concerning the SA service and its organization were to be found in the periodical "The SA Man" and its supplement "The SA Officer" both of which could even be bought in railway station bookstalls. It was obvious that in a disciplined organization like the SA, observance of the given regulations and directives should have been strictly enforced and any infraction of them severely penalized. An implication of SA members in a general, collective plan to participate in actions which are bound to be described as criminal could not occur without the knowledge of the supreme SA command and would, if such was actually, the case, be ruthlessly prevented and the culprits punished and expelled regardless of who they were. It is utterly impossible that secret organizations with criminal objectives should have existed within the SA without being discovered, admitting that they existed at all. In this connection, it must be pointed out that it was expressly stipulated in the oath formula that no SA member need comply with orders violating existing laws. In the position I held, any secret agreements or secret objectives of the supreme SA command were <u>bound</u> to come to my knowledge but there were none.

H5128 - 0095

It must also be emphasized in this connection that after 30 June 1934, the SA was completely withdrawn from political leadership. Whereas Chief of Staff ROEHM was a "Reichsminister", his successor VIKTOR LUTZE became merely "Reichsleiter", a position which was not even any longer conferred on the last Chief of Staff, WILHELM SCHEPMANN. Since 1 July 1935, therefore, the supreme command was not represented in the Reich cabinet, neither did it have any influence on the plans of Foreign policy or the decisions of the supreme leadership of the Reich. I,therefore, consider inadmissible the contention that the SA has participated in the planning, preparation, initiation or conduct of a war of aggression or of any war, involving violation of international treaties, agreements and promises or had previous information of such.

H5128 - 0096

2) The SA-Organization never received an order fro execution, on the contrary such an order in principle was deliberately refused by Chief of Staff LUTZE, as well as by Chief of Staff Schepmann. It was most strictly forbidden for all members of the SA to be a member of a secret league. If the State demanded the detachment of men to special units as, si.g. in 1933, after the seizure of power, to the auziliary police in order to reinforce the State police authorities, or to the protection of objects (Objektschutz) or to other special tasks of the political system, the assignment took place by the emergency service obligation, while relieving the Supreme SA-Leadership and of responsibility its subordinate offices.

3) In the sphere of church policy, a clear interdiction had been given as early as 12 May 1934 by the decree of former Chief of Staff ROEHM, according to which any participation of the SA in political demonstrations against the church whatever and any kind of measures against clergymen of both denominations was forbidden.

4) Insofar as SA-members were guilty of looting and self-enrichment during the campaign against the Jews in 1938, these men, according to my knowledge, were handed over to the regular courts and punished, in the same way as the dirty elements of the populace that had chiefly availed themselves of the opportunity to plunder. The Supreme SA Leadership was <u>not informed</u> of the campaign in advance, had received no orders for this purpose nor passed them on; but had disapproved them in every respect.

5) I never received any information about the SA being used or ordered for guarding or controlling prisoners-of-war, concentration or forced labor camps.

6) Although I was employed in leading positions in the SA ever since the seizure of power in 1933 and after this time in the Supreme SA-Leadership for 8 years, I never saw or heard about an order, according to which confusion was to be created and political opponents terrorized. I do maintain, however, that the SA Organization had to take over the protection of the Party from enemy terrorism during the struggle for the legal seizure of power, terrorism which at that time was mostly carried out by armed terrorists,

H5128 - 0097

and so against the "Rot Front", "Spartakus" and "Reichsbanner."

7) The SA attached the greatest importance to having only irreproachable men, without a criminal past, in their ranks. Impure elements were expelled. From the year 1935 on excerpts from penal records were obtained from the competent courts and examined. If it appeared that previous criminal convictions were recorded, a dismissal from the SA followed on the grounds of unfitness.

H5128 - 0098

A great many cases are known to me, in which members of the SA, because of criminal actions in or off duty, were punished with expulsion and surrendered to the ordinary courts. According to an agreement with the Reich Ministry of Justice, all courts of the Reich have been instructed to inform the competent superior SA offices of those charged with any punishable actions of SA members before condemnation, so that the SA was able to exclude these elements even before condemnation from the ranks of the SA, if this appeared necessary on account of the severity of the punishable action. On the other hand, no case has become known to me in which a member of the SA, convicted of a crime, has escaped punishment by a regular court. The Supreme SA Tribunal had jurisdiction in all punishable offence in the SA service, but decided also on the decision and punishment in cases in which criminal proceedings were initiated by ordinary courts with regard to the consequences, which were to follow for the entire organization of the SA with regard to the guilty person."

8) It has never been known to me that crimes or offences against humanity were committed by the SA, also, I assure you that with regard to myself I never have participated in such actions. It was equally unknown to me, that the SA is said to have violated internationally binding rules of warfare. Here also I assure you that I did not take part in any such offenses.

In the same way I assure you that on the part of the SA leadership or myself no common plan was ever worked out, nor did a conspiracy for the execution of the above-mentioned actions take place.

9) The SA was never urged or trained to use force. Training and education were strictly checked centrally by the Supreme SA Leadership and were subject to constant checking by inspections ordered especially for this purpose. Violations by individuals of clear regulations were punished as lack of discipline.

10) If in an organization of men of 1,4 millions, individual persons of this organization committed offences or even crimes, as this is fully possible in such an extensive organization drawn on a voluntary basis from all classes of the population and is also humanly understandable, then these

H5128 - 0099

individual crimes cannot provide an occasion for declaring the entire organization criminal. The organization of the SA to my knowledge, neither received an order to commit a crime nor issued such; it, therefore, cannot logically be considered as criminal and still less declared as such.

Hans ?

Signature: illegible

I certify above true
signature as witness
Darmstadt
1097

H5128 - 0100

I hereby certify that the above signature agrees with the accompanying letter.

Signature: illegible

I, 11 SA 11

(Page 1 of original)

Contribution to the defense argument of the SA
that it is a criminal organization.

I declare in lieu of oath that I have made the following declarations to the best of my knowledge.

Personal data.

My name is Alexander GROSSKOPF. I was born in Strassburg in Alsace on December 14th 1884, am of Catholic faith, married; was municipal administration employee in Cologne by profession and am living now in Wahl (Rheinland), Linder Mauspfad 373.

During the period 1919 - 1933 I was for a few years a member of the Social Democratic Party and on that account I had in 1933 to fear that I would lose my job. In order to avoid that danger - I had a wife and three children to take care of - I joined the Stahlhelm Association of front soldiers. Many politically like-minded friends did the same in order to have a political alibi. Together with this organization I was transferred to the SA reserve in April 1933. I belonged to the SA until called up for military service on 26 August 1939. During that time I made several requests for discharge which, however, were refused. Even upon my entry into the army I was not formally discharged; but from then on I had no more relations with the SA. As a soldier, I was no longer subject to them. I considered myself discharged. In these 6 years I reached the rank of an"Oberscharfuehrer", despite the fact that I never had led any "Schar" (troop) or even the smallest unit. I was a good sportsman and occupied myself exclusively with sports. I refrained from any active participation in politics and found that belonging to the party was not intolerable because I thus escaped being seized by the party for some political activity.

I am making the following factual explanations on the basis of my personal experience and observations and from the remarks made by higher SA leaders As I was critical of the inner working of the SA, I believe my observation were pertinent. I have often spoken about these things with like-minded comrades.

H5128-0101

H5128-0102

Pertinent material: It is not intended to prove here that before the assumption of power by National Socialism the SA did not have the task of disseminating this policy among the people or that this task was not a criminal one. It is also not intended to prove that this task was theoretically not imposed on the SA after the assumption of power.

We intend to prove here that the greater part of the men who joined the SA after 31 January 1933 or who were transferred to the SA from other non-National Socialist associations did not take this step voluntarily, that they did not realize the import of their act, and that, when later they had misgivings, they were held fast by brutal measures, for instance, the dismissal from work.

It shall further be proved that the service in the SA after 1933 progressively and increasingly consisted in military sports and that the political part of its activity was more and more driven into the background; furthermore, that advancement in the SA after 1933 was obtained in the Unterfuehrer service ranks (up to Obertruppfuehrer inclusive) not chiefly from the political point of view, but in each case according to aptitude for military sports and that these ranks were in the course of time conferred without regard to existing leader positions, so that little by little all men physically and mentally fit became Unterfuehrer, without ever having led a unit or even the smallest part of one. These ranks in time came to have merely a decorative significance.

H5128-0103

To this it must be added:

When power was transferred to Hitler or seized by him there were in the Reich about five million unemployed. These were drawn into the SA by an active propaganda and the promise of procuring work and bread. Many others, particularly those who had belonged to the Marxist parties at first fled from persecution by the National Socialists into the Stahlhelm, Association of Front Soldiers, which was considered non-political but whic was in opposition to National Socialism. It also promised work and bread. Both organizations became abnormally large. In accordance with the totali tarian pretentions of National Socialism a continued independent existence was made impossible for the Stahlhelm and it was therefore nearly everywhere transferred into the SA in each case according to the attitude of its higher leaders. Individual members were not consulted as to their wishes. Whoever did not follow was labeled as a traitor to the people and threatened. Thus did the SA increase from a small group of agitators into a gigantic organization of millions. Every discerning person gained the impression that the only remaining aim of the SA was to restrain and watch all unsafe but militarily fit elements so as to prevent any reactions.

Up to the ROEHM affair this tremendous reserve of men was not organised systematically or politically at all, but given military training quite superficially and this probably for reasons connected with the putsch. For a while tension even existed between the party and the SA. The SS looked down upon the SA as inferior.

A large percentage, indeed, was in the SA against its will. The only thing they had cared about was to obtain work and bread or, if they were small officials, to gain security against interference of the Party. The former soldiers and the workers liked the sports, the hikes in the open while singing the old soldiers' songs better than the distasteful political service with the Party.

The way requests for discharge from the SA were treated is shown by the following personal experience: The Chief of Staff LUTZE had referred before the press in Berlin to the "performances" of the SA and at

H5128-0104

same time stressed the fact that belonging to the SA was purely voluntary and that no SA man was kept in the SA against his will. Upon this I renewed my previous requests for discharge and this time I referred to the statements of LUTZE. I declared that I did not want to remain any longer in the SA. I was informed that the SA was no transient hotel and I was given to understand that upon a further repetition of my request my employers would be notified. Some time later I was made Scharfuehrer.

After the bloody repression of the ROEHM putsch, in which , however, the Rhineland SA did not take any part, the Party again wanted to attract the SA, which had practically slipped away from it. The SA had aroused the anger of HITLER and felt itself left out in the cold. It started a course of political instruction, but this soon died out because the old SA leaders were not suited for the purpose. It was always the same trite old catchwords that were repeated. The old SA leaders just were no teachers in spiritual matters. For the most part they were not taken seriously by the me and inwardly rejected. There was little interest for politics. NS literature was accepted only unwillingly. Hardly anybody wanted to have the "Stuermer" because of its aims and its low level. The enrolment following the appeals for instruction never exceeded 25 - 30% of the actual force. In the end all means of pressure and threats were no longer of any avail.

H5128-0105

Finally, the SA had in fact no longer any assigned task. It stagnated; there was talk of dissolution. The supreme SA command beat the propada drum and, the less work there was done in the SA, the more ado was made by the professional leaders. These offices fought for their existence.

In order to give the SA a new task, HITLER created the SA sports badge. This gave the multitude which threatened to be split asunder, a new impulse, but not along political, but along athletic lines. Practice was not carried out with military weapons, but there was merely practice in target shooting with small caliber rifles, which was indeed done by any shooting club. Map-reading and use of the marching compass were practised: There was no question of a real military training.

An active propaganda by word of month, in writing and by film tried to justify the necessity for military training by trying to prove that Germany, was again encircled as in 1914, and that all neighboring states were armed to the teeth in order at the given moment to fall upon Germany in order to destroy it: If it only now became known that the attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter by Polish troops was a fake staged at the time b HITLER, it can be imagined with what means the German public was at the time worked upon. But who can hold it against a man if he takes up arms when a foreign power invades his country, and seizes a radio transmitting station?

In 1933 there were in the SA, besides working men and small artisans, a number of small officials who formerly had been soldiers. These men, used to obedience and well-trained as soldiers could be used to best advantage, for which reason they were jealously held on to. These men also would have been glad to have been released particularly in view of later disappointments. There was, however, no niggardliness in the distribution of stars and collar stripes. In the course of the six years most

H5128-0106

of the men by and by reached the rank of Scharfuehrer or Truppenfuehrer. During the war many SA men who went to the front are said to have been further advanced in rank. In many cases they are hardly likely to have been able to hear of their promotion.

The preliminary military training, which was during the last years the only occupation of the SA, was so badly carried out that the other associations, for instance the HITLER youths, refused to accept the SA as teachers and turned to the Wehrmacht.

From the point of view of the Prosecution a clear distinction should be made between the old SA of the so-called "fighting times" and the inflated SA of after the seizure of power. The former was in fact a political fighting troop. The men coming from it also had priority in the new SA. Only they rose to the rank of Sturmfuehrer. With this rank only did the real corps of leaders begin, as was the case in the Wehrmacht where the non-commissioned offices belong with the privates, and the corps of officers represents a closed body of leaders. The words of the Prosecution to the effect that the task of the SA was to hammer National Socialism into the German hearts apply only to old SA, which also in the new SA represented the actual corps of officers. The new SA men did not hammer, they were hammered, although without any appreciable success. The only satisfactory thing in the SA was the good comradeship among the men and the readiness to help. These virtues, however, were not the products of the SA spirit, but arose from the fact that most of the men had been soldiers in the first world war.

It must of course be admitted that there were also in the SA quite a few hotpurs. In such a large organization all types are naturally represented so that anything may be proved by citing examples.

H5128-0107

Is, however, a small percentage of evil-doers enough to declare a whole organization as criminal against humanity, and thereby destroy morally and economically hundreds of thausands of men who are not aware of any quilt? The SA never even hinted at the crimes for which the Party and its sub-organizations now have to answer. Nor did the Cologne SA taks any part in the destruction of Jewish houses of worship nor in the other excesses against Jews.

(signed) Alexander GROSSKOPF.

Doc. Reg 369/1946

I certify herswith to the above signature of Mr. Alexander GROSSKOPF, municipal administrative official in Wahn (Rhineland) Linder Hauspfad.

I have not taken cognizance of the contents of the document.

Cologne, 28 February 1946

The notary

(sig) FRANKEN

Seal:

Wilhelm FRANKEN

Notary in Cologne.

I, 13 SA-13

(Page 1 of original)

I. Introductory Remarks.

I am pleased to make use of the opportunity to discuss the question whether certain organizations which existed in the National Socialist State are to be treated as criminal. I trust my explanations will contribute to a solution of this problem according to the basic and actual facts and thereby serve the cause of truth and justice. May I say at the outset that my fundamental explanations are based on the irrevocable and for all times and conditions obligatory principles of Christian morality. My actual statements naturally refer to the facts which I was able to observe, mainly therefore, to the conditions and events within the Catholic, religiously inclined inhabitants of Western Germany.

II. Fundamentals.

The present lively discussion concerning the possibility of a collective guilt seems to suffer from the double meaning of the word "guilt".. The word may be used in a very wide sense, to designate any type of misdemeanor, even only a juridical one. Under the conception of collective guilt then, would fall all those obligations which accrue to the members of an organization as a result of the attitude of their authorized representative leadership. It cannot be disputed that a collective guilt applies in this sense not only to the National Socialist Organizations but to the entire German Nation as well. The word "guilt" can also be used, however, to describe a condition in which a person finds himself as a result of a moral offense. In this sense, only the individual person may be considered guilty insofar as he has willingly and knowingly violated a moral obligation. However, it is not in accord with Christian teachings to try and punish as dishonored or criminal a person against whom there is no proof of deliberate and voluntary transgression of a moral law.

H5128-0108

H5128-0109

What has been said does not mean that under circumstances, namely when their declared aims and methods are immoral, organizations must also be branded as morally corrupt and criminal. Members of organizations must, however, be affected only insofar as they have joined this organization voluntarily with the knowledge of the organization's moral corruptness, and thereby approved of its criminal aims or have actually participated voluntarily and knowingly in the immoral activity of the organization. Only on this supposition can the moral guilt and punishable acts of its members be deduced from the objection to an organization.

The above conception of the Christian moral teachings concerning collective guilt, is for Catholic Christians particularly binding and will remain so for all times. Quite recently it was expressly confirmed by the Pope who, on a solemn occasion declared before the world: "Erroneous conceptions are circulating throughout the world which declare a person guilty and responsible just because he is a member or a part of a certain community, without first attempting to investigate or prove whether by acts of commission or omission he is personally guilty. That means that one usurps the rights of God, the creator and redeemer who, in the mysterious plannings of his ever-loving Providence, alone is absolute master of events and as such, in his boundless wisdom,

H5128-0110

may decide to link together the fate of the guilty and the innocent, the responsible and the irresponsible." (allocution of 20 February 1946).

III. Facts.

In applying the Christian doctrines set forth to judge membership in the National Socialist Party and its branches, three periods are to be distinguished:

a) The period before the seizure of power. At that time it was clear to one able to judge that the Party represented ideas which are not in accord with Christian moral teachings. To join the movement was entirely voluntary. The bishops publicly pointed out the morally corrupt character of the movement. However, according to my observation, the great masses of followers did not join the movement during this period in order to further their morally corrupt aims, but because they had expected a domestic political victory of the movement to bring about an improvement in the wretched economic, social and political conditions of Germany.

b) The first period after the seizure of power. The Party leadership now attempted to create the impression that with the taking over of the Government it had abjured its aims, which were not in accord with Christian principles. In this matter, HITLER himself gave the most solemn assurances. At the same time there was no doubt that to stand apart from the movement was for the individual connected with the greatest disadvantages. In the face of this new state of affairs, the bishops declared that they could no longer uphold the former warnings and prohibitions. Also in our sections numerous persons joined the Party and subsidiary

H5128-0111

clubs, particularly the SA, the Hitler Youth who had nothing further from their minds than to thereby participate in the service of morally corrupt or even criminal endeavors. There were at the time SA formations which took over church duties, and HJ formations in the country who differentiated themselves only by uniform from church-religious youth-organizations.

c) The later period.

I very soon became apparent that Hitler in 1933 had deceived the German people concerning his view point and intentions. Since then the bishops again and again have found it necessary to publicly fight the morally corrupt ideas and tendencies of the Party and Government. In order to spare the believers, who had joined the Party in good faith the pangs of conscience, the bishops even had public announcements made from all pulpits that the oath given to Hitler could never be obligatory to anything which was in contradiction to the will of God. The compulsion to join the Party and its branches remained. In my opinion therefore during this period mere membership in a party or their auxiliary organizations was by no means considered in the public opinion as proof for the approval of Party tendencies. This applies particularly to the professional organizations, to the youth organizations and the SA. Many younger people joined the SA particularly in order not to be obliged to join the Party itself. According to my observations, some SA formations only carried on a fake existance and often were unable to bring their members together for years.

In the face of these facts, I would consider it a great injustice, if someone were to be considered deserving of punishment for his mere membership in the SA or other National Socialist organizations.

COLOGNE, 4 July 1946.

s/JOS. CARDINALIS FRINGS,

Archbishop of COLOGNE.

I, 14

SA 14

(Page 1 of original)

Nuernberg, 18.7.46.

A F F I D A V I T

by

Professor D. CAJUS FABRICIUS.

I, D. CAJUS FABRICIUS, born on 16 Aug. 1884 in Graudenz, by profession a full professor of theology, residing in Hirchhorn on Neckar, at present Court prison Nuernberg, being duly sworn, depose and say:

a) Personal Data:

I am professor of theology, ordained as a protestant clergyman in 1909, university teacher in Berlin since 1911, in Breslau since 1935. Maintaining relations with numerous foreign Church Leaders through my theological publications, I always strove for peace in the church and among nations. In 1932 I became a member of the NSDAP for Christian-Social reasons, I never belonged to the SA. In 1939, because of my opposition to the anti Christian efforts of HIMMLER, I was imprisoned by him for two months, and in 1940 I was expelled from the Party by BOUHLER without legal party proceedings. After that I had five years city arrest (Stadtarrest) and in 1943 I lost my office as professor as an enemy of the state. Since 17 June 45 I have been interned in Ludwigsburg.

b) Concerning the Case:

The religious attitude of the SA. As an objective observer I have ascertained the following:

1. During the period after 1930, especially after 1933, large numbers of Protestant theological students in the institutions where I was teaching, th is the universities of Berlin and Breslau, were at the same time members of the SA. I myself - apart from my Christian-Social service for the unemployed - was also induced to join the Party because of the outstanding character of these students. The fact that these future spiritual advisers of the people, young men of undoubtedly the most noble conviction, became

H5128-0112

members of the SA in such large numbers, proves irrefutably that the SA cannot have been a criminal organization.

2. As a student of theology from Lauban in Silesia reported to me in 1936, since 1933 all the members of the Young Men's Christian Association from there, that is an association of strongly Christian laymen, joined the SA together. It is not conceivable that members of this world-wide Christian organization, which has its headquarters in the U.S.A., should have joined a criminal organization.

3. At the end of 1933 I had a conference in Berlin with the two highest officers of the Salvation Army; the latter informed me that the asylums of the Salvation Army for the homeless and neglected in Berlin had been emptied in the course of 1933, because as a result of the National Socialist rising unemployment had considerably decreased. The Salvation Army voluntarily put these asylums at the disposal of the SA for its purposes. As is well known, the Salvation Army is a Christian organization, which has as its principal goal the conversion of those who have gone astray. And so if the Salvation Army transferred its asylums to the administration of the SA, this proves, that it did not consider the SA as a criminal organization, but on the contrary that it considered the brown battalions precisely as a Salvation Army.

Notes.

1. If in the period before 1933 individual Germans in great distress sought and found refuge in the SA, this does not mean that there they allied themselves with a gang of robbers. On the contrary, they wanted to extricate themselves from the desperate situation in which the German people found itself under the pressure of the Treaty of Versailles, and - with the help

H5128-0114

of one party in one democratic state - to return to a decent and orderly life.

2. If in later years isolated attacks occurred against Christianity and the churches even within the SA, this, just as in the NSDAP altogether, is traceable to the acts of individuals, who fell away from the Christian principles of National Socialism and must therefore be considered as illegitimate.

The above-mentioned facts correspond to the truth. This statement has been made of my own free will and without any compulsion. I have read it through and signed it.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of July 1946 at Nuernberg, Germany.

s/ Signature

Name, Grade, ASN

I, KVETA LIKOVSKA, being thoroughly conversant with both English and German, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of this affidavit.

s/ Signature.

SA16

Dr. ASCHENAUER, Defense Counsel for the SA. I, 16

(Page 1 of original)

Affidavit

Being informed of the consequences of a false affidavit and of the fact that it will be submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg, I state as follows in lieu of oath:

Personal Matter: Leonhard GONTERMANN

Born on 16 June 1896 at Siegen/Westphalia;

Profession: Merchant;

formerly SA-Gruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Leadership;

at present in Palace of Justice at Nuernberg.

Relevant matter: On 23. 6. 1946 I discussed with Walter SCHELLENBERG his Affidavit No. 3202/USA Exhibit 435 submitted by the Prosecution. Walter SCHELLENBERG stated in this connection that a misunderstanding might exist here; it might very well deal here with the talks of the SA-Leadership with the Reich SS-Leadership regarding the question of the City and Rural Guards. About the middle of 1943, after LUTZE's death, Max JUETTNER, as permanent representative of the Chief of Staff, was the Fuehrer of the SA.

I know for certain that he neither desired nor suggested that the SA participate in guarding concentration camps, prisoners-of-war camps or in the supervision of forced labor; nor did he ever carry on or order discussions concerning this.

Also until the end of the war no directives whatever in this matter were sent to the SA; nor under the Chief of Staff SCHEPMANN.

It would have been in contradiction to the very nature of the SA to concern itself with such tasks.

The SA as an organization was not concerned.

s/ Leonhard GONTERMANN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of June 1946.

s/ Robert B. STANNES
AT 01281783
1st Lt. Inf.

H5128-0115

H5128-0116

I, Paul SCHMIDT, fully conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/ Dr. Paul SCHMIDT

SA16

Dr. ASCHENAUER, Defense Counsel for the SA. I, 16

(Page 1 of original)

Affidavit.

Being informed of the consequences of a false affidavit and of the fact that it will be submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg, I state as follows in lieu of oath:

Personal Matter: Leonhard GONTERMANN

Born on 16 June 1896 at Siegen/Westphalia;

Profession: Merchant;

formerly SA-Gruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Leadership;

at present in Palace of Justice at Nuernberg.

Relevant matter: On 23. 6. 1946 I discussed with Walter SCHELLENBERG his Affidavit No. 3202/USA Exhibit 435 submitted by the Prosecution. Walter SCHELLENBERG stated in this connection that a misunderstanding might exist here; it might very well deal here with the talks of the SA-Leadership with the Reich SS-Leadership regarding the question of the City and Rural Guards. About the middle of 1943, after LUTZE's death, Max JUETTNER, as permanent representative of the Chief of Staff, was the Fuehrer of the SA.

I know for certain that he neither desired nor suggested that the SA participate in guarding concentration camps, prisoners-of-war camps or in the supervision of forced labor, nor did he ever carry on or order discussions concerning this.

Also until the end of the war no directives whatever in this matter were sent to the SA; nor under the Chief of Staff SCHEPMANN.

It would have been in contradiction to the very nature of the SA to concern itself with such tasks.

The SA as an organization was not concerned.

s/ Leonhard GONTERMANN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of June 1946.

s/ Robert B. STANNES
AT 01281783
1st Lt. Inf.

H5128-0117

H5128-0118

I, Paul SCHMIDT, fully conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/ Dr. Paul SCHMIDT

SA17

I, 17

(Page 1 of original)

Dr.HORST LAUBE Nuernberg, 18 June 1946

Declaration in lieu of oath.

I, Dr.HORST LAUBE, born on 12 April 1892 at Chemnitz, formerly Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and residing at Garmisch, at present in the court prison at Nuernberg submit herewith the following declaration in lieu of oath, being fully aware that this deposition is destined to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg and that any false declarations would be severely punished.

I state:

After having undergone the normal education for an administrative official of the higher grade, I occupied in the normal career of a professional administration official the post of Landrat in Stollberg from 1933 until 1935, and the same post in Zwickau from 1935 until 1940. In 1940 I was temporarily called up to the Wehrmacht and appointed to the Military Government in France. From March 1944 I was charged with the direction of the subordinate branch in the Ministry of the Interior in which the principal affairs of the employees serving public bodies and of the officials were dealt with, and finally as Ministerialrat.

Between 1919 and 1933 I was employed in an honorary capacity on the Council of the former Provincial Association of higher ranking official in Saxony dealing with trade union matters.

Having belonged to the German Peoples Party I joined on 1 May 1935 the NSDAP and from 1934/35 collaborated in an honorary capacity with the Security Service in questions of its interior administration, and since 1937 as SS Untersturmfuehrer.

Having come into contact with many officials of all careers, salary groups and localities on account of my various posts and activities, I consider myself competent to make general depositions regarding the relations between the officials and the NSDAP.

H5128-0119

H5128-0120

Only a very small number of those officials, who had chosen this life long profession of official out of inner conviction, and who from the very start were properly and expertly schooled for their career joined the NSDAP. Only after the Party had, in a manner the legality of which was not contested internationally, succeeded in 1933 in forming a government recognised by international law, after the other parties had been dissolved and had declared itself to be the sole admitted political form of organization of the German people, greater number of officials and teachers of all kinds were prepared to join the Party. This happened principally because the official had, in his official capacity, in any case devoted his knowledge and strength to the nation and soon after the assumption of power, the Party leaders made use of the officials' duty of obedience and their dependence upon the political references to be obtained from the Party, for the purpose of inducing as many officials and teachers as possible to join the Party or its organizations.

Legal basis for the relation between the official and the Party were in particular the Paragraph 26, 27 and 28 of the German Law for Employees, together with the Reich Principles issued for its enactment, dealing with the employment, appointment and promotion of employees dated 14 October 1935 together with the regulations issued from time to time for the individual careers of officials.

H5128-0121

These principles and rules did not generally represent the start of new adjustments, which had first to be transferred to administrative practice, but they to great extent lent legal form and basis to an actual condition created by the Party. As the actual conditions were later again changed by numerous sanctions of exceptions from the general regulations, it was intended from 1944 to bring the Reich-Principles and the Regulations concerning careers into agreement with actual practice. This seemed to be imminent in April 1945. According to the rules hitherto valid, an official could as a rule only be engaged or promoted if he guaranteed his unconditional backing of the National Socialist State at any time. The minimum of loyalty of the official towards his State and leaders is a self evident demand, the fulfilment of which any state must and will demand at any time from its officials, who are its representatives and agents. This therefore is no peculiarity of any authoritarian system, but likewise the custom and right of democratic states. The method of its execution is alone everywhere authoritative for the consequences of such a principle.

The political judgments, which were to certify the reliability of the officials within the meaning of the German Civil Service Law, were established according to the principles which had been issued by the Party through the Party Chancery and not by the State, in which case the Reich Ministry of the Interior would have been competent.

As the Gauleiter, who fancied themselves to be more and more independant, regarded these principles as general directives only,, they considered themselves authorised to give orders regarding the establishment of political certificates by far exceeding the ones of the Supreme Party leadership.

H5128-0122

Even in the event of the Party Chancery ordering the official, who is Partymember to be presumed politically reliable, this did not prevent the Gauleiter of Saxony from demanding, that any official, in order to prove his reliability, must put himself or his family at the disposal of the State to perform small tasks for the Party or any of its organizations. By this means moreover, the Party could increase to the desired extent the workers required for the performance of its small duties. The official, if he did not wish to imperil the basis of the existence of his family or of his career, had no alternative but to accede to the demands of the Party. He believed also by so doing to fulfill in the best manner his duty towards the community, because he had to consider the service in the Party or in any of its organizations according to the principle repeatedly proclaimed "Party and State are one and the same" as a service for the community as service in the National Socialist State, recognized by International Law. To which Party organization the individual official finally offered his services was not seldom a matter of chance or a question of particular personal sympathy towards the representatives of the local Party organizations Moreover it was often of some importance whether an organization offered the possibility of making use of technical knowledge and experiences in the Party's service or of cultivating personal inclinations. This may explain that,for instance, many teachers from amongst the officials decided on the HITLER Youth service or Party training; officials engaged in Charity matters decided on the NSV, cashiers on the discharge of Party financial matters, members coming from farming families decided to enter the Riders' SA or Riders' SS, technicians the National Socialist Motor or Flying Corps. The result was, that the officials belonged to the different organizations, to those which are considered criminal by the Board of Prosecution as well as to those which are not stated to be of a criminal character.

H5128-0123

The attempt to withdraw from this Partyservice world have led to the severest consequences according to the Disciplinary Penal Code and the Police Code. Even a resignation from his post, even under the renunciation of lawful claims was, since 1939, expressly denied to the official. Considering the total devotion which the NSDAP claimed to be entitled to, it would have been absolut impossible for the official to create for himself a new existence against the will of the Party.

Even if many officials, as well as many Germans, recognized more and more slowly the contration between the Theory of the political slogan and the and the practise of the actual execution of the Party program, and the attitud of the authoritative leaders of the Party and State, the officials took these slips in general for local divergences of turbulant subordinates, which could still be removed. Of the conditions in Concentration camps and measures really taken against the Jews, of which they only learned after the end of the war, the officials as a whole had just as little knowledge as the majority of the German people. The knowledge of the true association of the leadership in th National State had remained limited to small circles, which, at the control point, could remain in the closest contact with authoritative headquarters. They mast also bear the responsibility for it.

Having myself been an administrative official, I can from my own experience better judge the special conditions of this particular group. So, for instance the Gauleiter of Saxony, who was at the same time Reich Statthalter, demanded that the Landraete appear in Party uniform and their activity in a party organization. The tried to achieve their entry into an Pa organization by preventing, them from wearing the official uniform lawfully permitted by the Reich.

H5128-0124

He directed the district leaders (Kreisleiter) to turn out of the hall officials who wished to attend a party meeting in their official uniforms.

For the Landrat or the administrative officials, activity in the staff of the District Leader or in the District Office for municipal policy, would have been most suitable. Since, however, it was to be foreseen that in administrative questions, in particular of a municipal-political nature, divergences of views between representatives of the State and of the Party would become inevitable, because of the splitting up between Party considerations and claims de lege ferenda and practical administrative work de lege lata underpinned by professional officials, many preferred not to joint the political authoritative power of the District Leader as political leaders. Precisely for this reason also administrative officials, like many other officials, often declared themselves prepared for honorary cooperation in the Security Service, especially as there it was possible for them to take also a critical attitude to all acute local administrative problems of their professional sphere, on the strength of their own technical knowledge and professional experience, whereas this would appear hopeless through official channels when high Party Leadership and State Offices e.g. Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter were combined. The following were among such problems for example:

Relationship of the Party to the State.
Unity of the administration.
Policy of incorporation of the large towns.
Exaggerated organization of economy.
Relationship between the borough where the plant is established and the borough where the worker is domiciled.

s/Dr.HORST LAUBE

I certify that Dr.HORST LAUBE personally appeared before me on the day of June 1946 and after being duly sworn, signed the above statement in my presence.

signature

Captain Inf. 0.358 239

I, IRENE VRBOVA, certify that I am fully conversant with the English and German languages and that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/IRENE VRBOVA.

I, 18

SA 18

(Page 1 of original)

Guenther PAPE

Brigadier General

Nuernberg, 22 July 1946

Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.

re: The Army Group Units called "Feldherrnhalle".

Personal: Brigadier General Guenther PAPE, Commander 1. Tank Division Feldherrnhalle (PZ Div. FHH) from September 1944 to the end of the war.

Born 14 July 1907 in Duesseldorf.

From 1 April 1927 regular officer in the army.

re subject

1. Question: When did you take over the 1. Tank Division FHH?

Answer: In the beginning of September 1944 I took over the 1. Tank Division FHH then being re-organized.

2. Question: Were there any other units in the army which were called Feldherrnhalle, perhaps also such with the designation SA regiment or SA Division FHH?

Answer: As far as it is known to me there was in the army one Battallion in one Infantry Division, later a Regiment, which were entitled to bear the additional designation FHH. About the end of June 1943 this regiment was incorporated into the 60. motorised Infantry Division. At this time this division was re-organized into a Tank Grenadier Division with the designation "Panzer-Grenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle" (PZ. Gren. Div. FHH). In September 1944 this division was formed into the 1. Tank Division FHH; at the end of 1944 the 2. Tank Division FHH was formed from the remainder of the 13. Tank Division. From both parts, with the addition of the IV. Tank Corps

H5128-0125

H5128-0126

and other army units the Tank Corps FHH was formed in the beginning of 1945. Just as in the case of the units of "Grossdeutschland", the units of the FHH were, as a privileged unit, the depot Brigade FHH in the depot army. In addition to the army units just named, there has existed a normal Brigade FHH, formed out of convalescent wounded and remainders of this Tank Grendadier Division FHH, which had been almost entirely annihilated near Mogilew in the Spring of 1944.

All these units designated FHH were exclusively army formations. They never had the designation SA Regiment or SA Division. They are not to be confused with the SA Standarte FHH.

3. Question: What were the relations of the SA to the army units called FHH?

Answer: The army felt itself particularly closely connected with the SA, as it was formed, just as the SA, out of the mass of the German people and did not only pick the best as did the Waffen SS. To give an appreciation to all men serving in army units and SA men who distinguished themselves, and thus to the SA for their educational work, the army units, called FHH, were established at the beginning of the war. They wore the armlet FHH in addition to the army uniform. When these units were mentioned in the High Command Communique, then it was simultaneously an appreciation of all SA men serving with the army. With each year of war the reserve situation in the army deteriorated. On the one hand by the fact that the army bore the main burden of the fighting, on the other hand by the increasing demand of the navy and airforce, but mainly by the continuously increasing Waffen SS. This resulted in a sore

H5128-0127

deficiency of fresh officers and H.C.O. for the army. It was, however, possible by a preferential quota of volunteers for Grossdeutschland and FHH, to procure additional good material in the way of men with leadership qualifications for the army. On the occasion of the taking over of 1. Tank Division FHH, General GUDERIAN or his Chief of Staff, General THOMALE, in the Fuehrer's H.Q. gave this as the reason why the army desired good relations with the SA, and why it was desired to create, apart from the Tank Division FHH, a Tank Corps FHH with 2 Tank Divisions.

The SA had no influence/or even right of commandover the units of the army designated FHH. They supplied a number of volunteers and cared for the mentioned troops units with charitable gifts, books etc. The relation between my division and the SA was exactly as loose as between my old Motorcycle Riflemen Bataillon 3 and its traditional troop unit in the old army of the Kaiser, the old Schwedter Dragoon Regiment.

. Question Where did the reserves for the army troops designated FHH come from?

Answer: The reserves for the army troops designated FHH came only partly from the SA Standarte Feldherrnhalle. The volunteers, enlisted by the SA Standarte FHH, with the HITLER Youth and with the Reich Labor Service (RAD) took a short military sports training with the army before joining the ranks. They were then called up as soldiers for the Reserve Brigade FHH, i.e. the army. There they underwent the usual recruit drilling customary in the army, and were transferred to the front units according to requirements.

I may mention in this connection

H5128-0128

that at any time the army SA leaders, regardless of their SA service grade, like every other soldier after the prescribed training period, were promoted officer or N.C.O. But only then, if the full military suitability existed. With the re-organisation of the Division FHH into a Tank Division a great many expreriemced specialists from other old tank divisions were needed. The young volunteers, who were recrutted through the SA Standarte FHH, could not however, be trained into highly qualified specialists so quickly. Moreover, after the complete annihilation of Tank Grenadier Division FHH - I believe at the end of 1943 at Narva - and its re-forming in spring 1944 at Mogilev - and also of the 1. Tank Division FHH at Budapest in the beginning of 1945 - only a fraction of the needed replacement of volunteers could be furnished by the SA Standarte FHH. The mass of the members of the Division were, therefore, normal army reserves. (see also Qeustions 5 and 6)

Q.: Were there any SA Leaders in the Officer Corps of the 1. Tank Division FHH under your command?

A.: In the 1. Tank Division the following SA leaders were in the Officer Corps at its formation in autumn 1944: the Commander of the Divisional Administrative Company, the Divisional Supply Commander, a Company Commander with the Tank - Grenadier - Regiment, moreover the Commander of the Engineer's Batailliion of one Artillery Section, killed or missing at Budapest, as well as the Divisional Surgeon. On the occasion of the re-formation of the Division in the beginning of 1945, an Artillery Section Commander was added to the above - mentioned officers. All the others were normal reserve or regular army officers, With the

H5128-0129

2. Tank Division FHH,as far as I know, the percentage of SA leaders was still less, as this Division brought with it the skeleton corps of the old 13. Tank Division. It is not known to me that a SA leader in the officer corps was with the Staff of the 4. Tank Corps and the Corps troops. The small percentage of SA leaders in the officer corps of the army troops, designated FHH, is to be explained by the fact that the mass of the SA leaders from the first day of war were in action with the army troops and wished to remain with those with whom they had trained in peacetime. They did not wish to be with the FHH divisions only formed in the course of the war.

6. Frage: , Was the percentage of SA members in the army units, designated FHH, greater than in other troop units?

A: The percentage of true SA members was not greater than in the regiment or battalion of the 3. Tank Division under my command. The above-mentioned officer percentages were also normal. In my Tank-Grenadier - Regt. there were at that time for example 2 SA leaders as company chiefs. The young volunteers from the SA Standarte FHH formed 50 % of the Tank Grenadier Regiment of the 1. Tank Div. FHH. , with the other units of the Division at the utmost 25 %, partly 0 % of the total. For example, there were 8 Catholic priests in one of my medical companies. At the second re-formation of the 1.Tank Div. FHH in the beginning of 1945 were even some Army troops units, for example the Artillery Regiment and the Tank units supplied just as they were. After the short military sport training with the SA Standarte FHH, many

H5128-0130

of the young volunteers, as I could often confirm from talks, fell themselves to be not SA men, but furnished as reason for their voluntary report to the FHH, that they wished to join a well equipped Tank Division with armlet of the army, and not the SS or something similar.

s/ Guenther PAPE

Subscribed and sworn before me this 23 Day of July at Nuernberg/Germ.

s/ S.A. BINDER

Capt. Inf. 0358239

I, URBOVER, certify that I am fully conversant with the English and German languages and that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/ Irene URBOVER

SA - NS-REITERKORPS

REITERCORPS #1.

UR No. 693 for 1946

Attested at 32 Norbertstrasse, Cologne, in the magistrate's room of the Notary, on 7th May 1946.

Before the undersigned

E d u a r d C r e m e r

notary at Cologne

there appeared:

Doctor Josef H a u b r i c h, Attorney-at-Law, resident at Cologne-Marienburg,

known to the notary.

He declared:

I was married to a Jewess who committed suicide in February 1944 when she was bidden to appear before the Gestapo. I myself was constantly persecuted politically until the Americans marched in; I was never a member of the NSDAP or their associates and am known as an anti-fascist. I am now an attorney-at-law and town-councillor.

I have professionally made enquiries as regards the NS Riders' corps in Cologne.

I have ascertained that the NS Riders' Corps was only founded after the seizure of power in 1933 and partly arose through co-ordination of riders' associations, which here in the West and particularly in rural districts consisted entirely of devout Catholics.

The NS Riders' Corps in Cologne stood apart from the real SA and had almost entirely sporting and society aims; it kept away from political and ideological activity. There was no so-called political schooling at all.

It was precisely those people who wanted to avoid entering the NSDAP who joined the NS Riders' Corps. That was why, later on, the NS Riders' Corps was regarded by the Party with mistrust.

H5128-0131

H5128-0132

In any case, it is in no wise to be compared with the SA.

I affirm the truth of the above statements in lieu of oath.

This written statement was read out, agreed to by the person who appeared and signed by his own hand.

(signed) Dr. Haubrich

" Eduard C r e m e r.

Certified as a true copy, which is hereby granted to Dr. Josef H a u b r i c h, Attorney-at-Law, resident at Cologne-Marienburg.

Cologne, 7th May 1946.

The Notary:

(signed) Eduard Cremer,

H5128-0133

Nuremberg, 29th June 1946.
Courthouse

REITER CORPS 13.

Affidavit

I make the following Statement to be produced at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg. I affirm the truth of the statement in lieu of oath: -

I - re. my person:

Name	Heinz Wilhelm Guderian
born	17th June 1888
at	Kulm on the Vistula
Religion	Protestant
last rank	General
present abode:	Courthouse, Nuremberg.

II - re. the matter:

In the time before the outbreak of World War II, I was from November 1938 to September 1939, as Chief of Mobile Troops, the highest ranking Ordnance officer, not only of the Panzer troops but also of the whole of the Armed Forces' cavalry. Owing to my position and knowledge of the building up and development of the German armed forces, I can vouch for the following facts:

Between the German armed forces and the NS Riders Corps there was no military co-operation, either in respect of tactics or strategy. The cavalry of the armed forces saw to the training of its rider-recruits itself and was not dependent on the co-operation of the NS Riders' Corps. Relations with the NS Riders Corps were neither sought nor developed by the armed forces. I knew Litzmann, chief of the NS Riders' Corps, personally but never co-operated with him as regards military matters. The opinion that the function of the NS Riders' Corps was to ensure recruits for the armed forces is wrong and could be formed by someone totally unaware of the real circumstances.

H5128-0134

The so-called Rider's Certificate arose from the understandable desire of every enthusiastic rider, when he was called up to the Army, to join a mounted unit, just as a mountaineer or a skier wanted to serve in a mountain-troop unit. But the Armed Forces were seldom able to take the rider's certificate into account, owing to the Fuehrer's orders for motorisation, and thus the percentage of cavalry to the total army declined steadily. Whereas, up to 1935 there were still 18 cavalry regiments, at the beginning of the war there was only one compact cavalry brigade, which was subsequently enlarged to a division during the war. Panzers had taken the place of the cavlary, and that was particularly emphasized by the fact that 40% of the panzer officers came from former cavalry regiments. In view of this development an affiliation of units of th[illegible] in the Armed Forces was neither intended, nor did it take place.

I affirm the truth of the above statement in lieu of oath.

(signed) Heinz W. Guderian

I, Emma W. Schwabenland, fully conversant with the English and German languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

(signed) Emma W. Schwabenland.

Sworn before me at Nuremberg, Germany, the 28th of June 1946,

Jack G. Wheeler,
1st Lt. G.O. 13304 98
(Signature, Grade, A.S.N.)

Affidavit

Instructed as to the consequences of making a false Affidavit, I make the following statement, in lieu of oath, to be produced at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg: -

I - re. my person:

My name is	Emil E. Maschmann
born	4th December 1899
at	Mayence
Religion	Protestant
Profession	Bank procurator (now unemployed)
Present domicile	am Rosengarten 12, Mayence.

II - re. the matter:

1. As sports-writer (Truppf. Dienstgr.) 150th Reiterstandarte of the Kurpfalz group I had from 1934 to 1939 ample occasion to have an idea of the working of their service, i.e. Rider Companies of the widespread Standard Organization - Taunus region and the Rheinhessen Province included -. For this reason I consider myself entitled to give a short description of these separate formations, both from a purely sporting angle and the political recruiting of their members.

2. As, after the seizure of power, it seemed superfluous to use the SA as in the years up to 1933, they had to be given new duties. The political leadership therefore, at that time, organized not only the whole of the sporting world (founding the Reich League for physical culture 1934), but also sought for a further field of activity for the SA in duties aimed at sporting objectives.
Thus it came about that motoring sporting associations, as well as marine and riding associations, were affiliated to the SA at short notice. The former succeeded after a comparatively short while in gaining their independence, owing to their political influence with Hitler, which was only granted partly to the Riders' Corps, as their top-leaders remained subordinates to the SA Leadership, although their whole service duties were quite different to those of the remainder of the SA.

H5128-0135

H5128-0136

3. The members of the NS Riders' Corps were, during the whole period of National Socialism, treated by the Party and the SA in general as "outsiders"; they were not invited to any demonstrations of a political nature against the Church, Jews and guilds. I never knew of a case in which a member of the NS Riders" Corps of the Kurpfalz group took part in the events that occurred on 9/10. 11.1938. The members of the NS Riders' Corps only learned of these events afterwards.

4. Training in the NS Riders' Corps had nothing to do with the following of military objectives. Riding, driving and horse breeding served no military requirements. It was carried on in towns as sporting activity and in the country as a necessary agricultural activity (horsebreeding). I do not know that in the Kurpfalz group of the NS Riders' Corps armed forces manoeuvres or exercises were carried out. Furthermore, co-operation with infantry units for military or tactical objectives never took place. There was, equally, no training in the handling of military weapons.
The Rider Certificate only confirmed the sporting knowledge of a rider and was no proof of military fitness. In most instances the Draft Boards took no notice of a Rider Certificate or ridership training when it was a matter of calling men to the Armed Forces. These men were more often than not posted to technical or other motorised units.

5. Literature read in the NS Rider Corps was purely sporting literature concerning horses, more particularly "Die deutschen Reiterhefte" ("The German Rider's Review"), "St. George", "Reitlehrer von Mueseler" ("Riding Lessons" by Mueseler) etc. No notice was taken of political daily papers and we wondered greatly at the propaganda articles published in them and which gave a totally false impression of the activities of the NS Riders' Corps. In our opinion it was a matter of purposely inserted articles which sought to justify certain high-up and paid persons in the top leadership of the SA keeping their positions, whilst they tried to impute to the NS Rider Corps an importance which neither the latter nor the Armed Forces recognized as being true.

H5128-0137

6. The Prosecution authorities have recognized the NSKK and NSFK, equally cited, as sporting organizations and consequently excluded from prosecution. The decisive viewpoint in exculpating these two formations, which is precisely their sportive nature, must even more so be certainly applied to the NS Riders' Corps.

But the formal reason for which the Rider Corps is still under suspicion, viz. the Rider Chiefs being subordinate to the SA Chief, appears insignificant when compared to the purely sporting aims and activities of the three individual associations. As the International Military Tribunal, which placed justice before everything, has dealt with two precedent cases, no right thinking man could understand it, if the NS Rider Corps were to be treated on a different footing to the two other sporting associations.

I affirm the truth of the foregoing in lieu of oath.

(signed) E. Maschmann

Sworn before me at Nuremberg, Germany,
the 27th of June 1946.

Jack I. Bailey Major TC 0442584
Signature Grade A.S.N.

I, Betty D. Richardson, being fully conversant with the English and German languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

Betty D. Richardson Civ. 409
Signature Grade

REITERCORPS 24.

A f f i d a v i t

Instructed as to the consequences of an affidavit, I make the following statement, to be placed before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in lieu of oath :-

As to my person:	My name is	Rudolf Erpf
	born on	2nd October 1887
	at	Stuttgart
	Religion	Protestant
	Resident at	7 Kanonenweg, Coburg.

As to the matter:

1. For 17 years I was a member of the "Johannis zum wiedererbauten Tempel" ("The rebuilt temple of John") free-masons lodge at Ludwigsburg and held in it for 7 years the rank of steward of the lodge and finally master of the lodge. I was, in consequence, never a member of the NSDAP, but was on the contrary considered a political enemy of the Nazis. As an ardent rider, I belonged to the Ludwigsburg Horsemen's Association, in which I fulfilled the post of deputy-chief.

When, in 1933/34, the Party carried out the affiliation of all associations and sportsmen, the chairman feared that the Ludwigsburger Horsemen's Association would be broken up and therefore had the association turned over to the NS Rider's Corps. As a matter of fact two rural riders' associations in the neighbourhood of Ludwigsburg: the Schieberdingen and Moeglingen ones were actually broken up because they refused to be transferred to the NS Riders' Corps.

As the leading member of the lodge I merely took part, as a guest of the NS Riders' Corps, in its riding work. I carried on relations with my previous riding comrades in Ludwigsburg until my transfer to Coburg in 1936. Although I was a member of the lodge, I was also accepted there as a guest for riding. I consider, in view of my close relations with riding circles in Ludwigsburg and Coburg, as a non-member of the NS Riders' Corps I can give an unbiased opinion as to its aims and activities. In the NS Rider Corps horseracing and horsebreeding were to the

H5128-0138

H5128-0139

forefront. We felt drawn to one another, not by any political ties, but by love of horses and joy in sporting events. Service in the NS Rider Corps consisted of riding, driving, veterinary work and hunting and horseshows, in which ladies also took part.

As far as I know, the NS Rider Corps never took part in any cases of political activity against those who thought differently. I remember very well that efforts were continually being made to separate the NS Rider Corps from the SA. But in consequence of its political untrustworthiness and lack of influence the NS Rider Corps remained subordinate to the highest SA leader. Many who tried to avoid political service in the Party joined the NSRK in order to devote themselves to sport. I can say quite freely that the Reitersturm was nothing else than a Riders' Association who wore brown uniforms. Riding was taught in the Reichs riding schools. When those taking part retruned they said no mention of politics had been made during the lessons.

I never heard anything about the SA in general having anything to do with concentration camps or that when guilds' property was occupied they took part in it; nor in the guarding of PoW did the co-operate.

I can affirm that among NS Rider Corps circles ther was never any talk of a war of aggression, nor would it have been planned or intended or even accepted joyously. On the contrary, we were glad that the Olympic Games at Berlin, which I also attended, could be considered as a festival of international understanding and brotherliness.

Prior to 1933 a bronze, silver or gold medal was given in riding circles for proficiency. Whereas every horserider and member of the NS Rider Corps tried to win the decoration, the Riding Certificate awakened little enthusiasm. To gain the Rider's Certificate no political or military knowledge was demanded. This certificate gave the right - but only on paper - to young men to do their service in

H5128-0140

a mounted unit. It is therefore quite wrong to say that the NS Rider Corps had to provide for recruits to the Armed Forces cavalry.

It is too absurd to say that the NS Rider Corps did, by its activities, co-operate in the preparation of a war of aggression. The importance of horses in warfare declined steadily after the first World War. On Hitler's instructions, horses in the German Armed Forces were steadily replaced by motorisation. Hitler had no love for horses

In addition, I would like to mention that in the Coburg Riders Company a half-Jew, Dr. Egon S c h m i d t from Coburg, as well as Bank Director Florey from Sonneberg, whose wife is a Jewess and was put into a concentration camp, rode alongside me. Another lodge member was Dr. Freysold, Attorney-at-Law. All these people, who rode in the SA, had no possibility of being taken into the NSDAP but within SA riding circles they were in every respect considered and recognized.

I am at any time prepared to repeat these statements on oath before the International Military Tribunal.

As a proof that Hitler did not wish to hear anything about horses and did his best to replace horses by motors, above all in the Armed Forces, I wish to draw attention to the following: About 1940, a few comrades of my son-in-law had to go to Berlin, as sub lieutenants in the cavalry regiment No.18 of the German Armed Forces, to take the oath. Some of these young officers were received by Hitler. In the ante-room they were instructed what they would be allowed to speak about with Hitler. The were strictly forbidden to turn the conversation to horses and riding; otherwise Hitler would have flown into a rage.

I affirm the truth of the foregoing in lieu of an oath.

(signed) Rudolf Erpf

Sworn before me at Nuernberg, Germany
this 26 th day of June 1946.

Robert W. Spilner, 2nd Lt. Infantry
Signature Grade,
O. 1334040
A.S.N.

H5128-0141

I, Betty D. Richardson, being fully conversant with the English and German languages, certify that i have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

Betty D. Richardson Civ. 409
Signature Grade

H5128-0142

Affidavit

Instructed as to the consequences of a false declaration, I make the following statement to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, in lieu of oath : -

I. As to my person: My name is Hans Jakob RIETLI

born 5th March 1898 in Stuttgart

Religion Protestant

Profession up to 17th June 1946 State architect, technical school

Residence Stuttgart 13, Rotenbergerstr. 117.

II. As to the matter:

1. I belonged to the Stuttgart riders' company from 2nd January 1934 to the end of March 1937 and again from 1st April 1939 to April 1943. During these many years of membership, and in particualr in the two years when I had to leave the riders company at the demand of the NSDAP, because of my previous membership of a lodge, I spoke to many comrades of my company and, whenever the occasion presented itself, to riders in other companies about the existence and duties of the Rider Companies. For that reason I may be allowed pass a general opinion as to these matters.

2. In the question as to whether the affiliation and consequently the mixing into the Party could be accepted or not, what was decisive was the effort to collect the majority of horsemanship amateurs into separate groups in a workable economic manner, in order that they might enjoy their individual sportmen's lives, in spite of the change-over, and without making any political demands possible.

a) The Wurtemburg NSRK was, from the SA in general, a separate unit in the pursuance of its duties. Our service was independently organized, apart from the SA. I never knew of any case where a member of my former company was troubled by the SA legally.

b) The independence from the Party and the SA was particularly evident in financial matters. The horses, stables, carriages, saddles, harness etc. were not the property of the Party or the SA., but were paid for by the members. The cost of buying and maintenance was not borne by the

H5128-0143

SA but was paid for by the members. If members of the SA wanted to ride with us, they had to pay for doing so; hour by hour, just like any other guests.

3. a) There was no obligation to read National Socialistic propaganda literature. The evilly-known paper "Der SA Mann" had no official character but was part of the business speculations of the Eher publishers. Their contents were so often a crass exaggeration of the real conditions that all circles of the NSRK, with whom I came into contact, refused to read that paper. Other papers, such as the "Der SA-Fuehrer" never reached the greater majority of the members at all. In the columns of these papers there were articles by authors who were mainly occupied in some Party official job and sought to stress the necessity of their jobs by such stuff, even more so when they had little to do. Precisely in the NSRK there was an unsurmountable mistrust and horror of persons employed officially, viz. paid Fuehrers.

b) On no member of the company was pressure put by the leaders to get him to leave a religion. Religious beliefs remained unmolested.

c) Recruits to the NSRK were trained in decent fellowship, readiness to help others and love of animals, whilst avoiding intentionally political tendencies.

d) Sporting capacity was tested by exams for the Rider's Badge in varying degrees. This badge, the receipt of which was eagerly sought, contained no swastika and was already in existence prior to 1933.

e) Many Rider's Companies had a ladies' section, whose members took part in the riding lessons and cross-country rides, when there were sufficient horses.

5. I wish to particularly stress that NSRK members with whom I came into contact never took part in demonstrations against people of other beliefs. Jews, priests or guilds, nor had they any knowledge of such being planned Furthermore, when the excesses took place in November 1938 no member of the NSRK participated in the .

The Rider's Companies were never asked by the SA to take part because their members were looked upon as bad National Socialists and consequently politically untrustworthy.

H5128-0144

When the ROEHM Putsch took place in 1934 the SA marched through Stuttgart but no riders were there. They only heard of the whole insurrection after it took place, through the broadcasted reports and the press.

6. a) Riding was not taught with the idea of training horse lovers for war. At the time we sincerely believed in HITLER's assurances of peaceful intentions. The rider companies in Stuttgart carried on their duties independently; no cross-country exercises were carried out with the SA or any branches of the Armed Forces and which might have been for military-tactical purposes. Nor were any army forces added to the Rider Companies; there was an intention to do this but we were able to prevent it.

b) The possession of a Rider's Certificate was only in exceptional cases useful in getting a recruit for the army into a mounted unit. From conversations with cavalry officers, when we had tournaments, it always became patent that the young officers and non-commissioned officers had a very exalted opinion of our Rider Companies and that they much preferred to have young men with no previous horsemanship knowledge as recruits.

c) From the whole building up of the Armed Forces it became apparent that HITLER did not attach much importance to horses in modern warfare. He only encouraged motorization. I know of two cavalry regiments which became panzer units and had to give up their horses. But NSKK and NSFK are justifiably classified as sporting organizations, which are not among the accused.

d) The assertion that service in the NSRK was of military value is quite erroneous. If it were so, then every sport such as rowing or learning to fly or drive motor vehicles would also come under suspicion.

e) The conception of the word "soldier" is inevitably bound up with the handling and technical knowledge of firearms. Members of the NSRK only practised shooting with small calibre weapons.

7. There was room in the NSRK for political opponents of National Socialism Numerous members had joined us because they were able to carry on their sports without being obliged to join in the general political work of the SA. I myself was a free mason until my lodge was forcibly broken

H5128-0145

up after 30th January 1933, and at the demand of the Party I had to leave my Rider Company in April 1937; but in April 1939, contrary to the dictates of the Party, I was able to rejoin my old comrades and riders at their behest until I was called to the Armed Forces in April 1943. Although, for the reason stated, I should never have been taken into the Party, no discrimination was shown to me in the Rider's Company. When in 1938 the members affiliated to the Party received the command to join the NSDAP, and a number of them did not do so, both they and I remained quite unmolested in the Rider's Corps.

8. The horses belonging to the Stuttgart rural Rider's Association were from 22nd July 1937 onwards insured with the British "Eagle, Star & British Dominions Insurance Co., Ltd," London/ Hamburg, under Policy No. H.60202/45232 dated 28th July 1937. I do not think that at that time there was any connection of the NSDAP that paid premiums to a foreign insurance company.

I affirm the truth of the foregoing in lieu of oath.

(signed) Hans RIETH

Sworn before me at Nuernberg, Germany,
the 27th of June 1946.

Jack I. Bailey Major TC 0442584
Signature Grade A.S.N.

I, being fully conversant with the English and German languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

Betty D. RICHARDSON Civ. 409
Signature Grade

H5128-0146

A f f i d a v i t

Instructed as to the consequences of a false affidavit, I make the following statement to be produced to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in lieu of oath :-

I - As to my person: My name is Eugen Wagner
born on 12th March 1892
born at Esslingen a.N.
Religion Protestant
Profession technical employee
Present domicile 5 Ottilienstrasse, Esslingen a/Neckar.

II - As to the matter:

1. Personal membership of the Esslingen Riders' Corps from 1934 to 1945. Service rank in 1934: Obertruppenfuehrer (technical sergeant in SA), (compulsorily transferred from the Stahlhelm); finally Obersturmfuehrer (1st Lt.) in the NS Riders' Corps.

I spoke about the attitude of the Riders' Companies with most of the members of my Company and also with members of others. I regularly attended the horse-shows and talked there with many members of the NS Riders' Corps from all over the Reich. For this reason and in view of my lengthy membership I may be allowed to form a general opinion, and above all of conditions in South Germany.

2. There was practically no connection with the SA in general. The NS Rider Corps was, as an independent special Corps, subordinate to the Reich Inspector of Riding & Driving in Berlin. The connection with the SA only came about because this Reich Inspector was himself subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the SA.

3. The aims and duties of the NS Riders Corps in South Germany were exclusively restricted to horses, viz. the care of horses, driving and riding.

H5128-0147

4. To my knowledge of the circumstances, there was practically not teaching of idealogical or political matters.

5. The NS Rider Corps did not take part in political demonstrations against people of other religious belief, the Church. Jews, guilds etc., nor in the excesses of 9./10./11 1938.

6. The assertion that the activity of the NS Riders' Corps helped to prepare the war can only be characterized as absurd. From World War I onwards horses no longer played an important part in modern warfare. That applies not only to Germany but to all modern countries: riding, driving and the care of Horses were practised solely for sport's sake or for agricultural purposes. I do not know of any cases in which the NS Riders' Corps, in any part of Germany, undertook warlike exercises or manoeuvres. I have never heard that military cross-country exercises were carried out by units of the NS Rider Corps - whether with infantry units of the SA or with units of the Armed Forces. Military or tactical considerations or duties formed no part of the NS Rider Corps' work. There was no teaching how to handle military weapons.

The Rider's Certificate only meant that those who held it were proficient in their sporting knowledge: riding, driving and the care of horses. The Rider's certificate by no means meant that the holder was suitable for the army.

In actual practice, the Rider's Certificate hardly played any part because the armed forces only required a small number of riders and drivers and these were trained in their own centres. Most holders of the Rider's Certificate were consequently drafted, not into cavalry units, but into motorised or other technical units. If the reproach is made to the NS Riders' Corps that because it trained its members in riding and driving, then it helped to prepare for war, then the prosecution would be more justified in accusing every automobile club or school where people were taught to drive motor

H5128-0148

vehicles of preparing for war, because in modern warfare the use of motor vehicles is much more important than knowing how to ride a horse. Thus, the accusation of preparing for war should apply much more to the NSKK or NSFK, but they are not among the accused in this trial.

7. The newspapers and instructional matter that was usually read in the NS Riders' Corps was: "The German Horsemen's Review", "St. George", "Mueseler's Riding Lessons" etc. These are all purely specialised horse & sporting literature.

The SA paper called "The SA Man" was usually not read. The few copies received usually lay around in the quarters in a dusty condition. The magazine "The SA Fuehrer" was only known to the higher authorities. Both journals were in no wise representative of the duties and activity of the NS Rider Corps. It is true that in these papers many articles were published which were usually laughed at, because they were a grotesque contradiction of the real activity of the NS Rider Corps. Most of them were obviously false propaganda, easily recognized by horselovers. Their clearly recognized object was to justify the existence of the NS Riders' Corps, as far as Hitler was concerned.

But the principal paid authorities of the NS Rider Corps had clearly an interest in the continuance of it. That is why they contributed many untrue reports of the supposed military importance of the NS Rider Corps and its importance in the so-called pre-military training. They hoped by so doing to prevent dissolution of the NS Rider Corps by Hitler, who was a well known opponent of horseriding.

Actually, all these propaganda articles have nothing to do with the real activities of the NS Rider Corps, which was a purely sporting and agricultural affair, as I have depicted above.

H5128-0149

8. The members of the NS Rider Corps were already against any war because the greater number of them was peasants, who in any case did not want to hear of war.

In the cities the NS Rider Corps often had an international nature because foreigners thus had personal and social connections open to them Thus, the following foreign guests regularly took part in the riding lessons given by the Reserve Section of the NS Rider Corps in Esslingen :

the American vice-consul at Stuttgart, Francis Spalding;
the British consul " ", Maurice Smith;
" Swiss officer, Fred Birenstihl
" American jumper, Madelaine Roentgen-Mc Harg;
" Norwegian, Mrs. Pfeiffer.

I affirm the above to be true, in lieu of oath.

(signed) Eugen Wagner

Sworn before me at Nuernberg, Germany,
the 27th of June 1946.

Jack I.Bailey Major TC 0442584
Signature Grade A.S.N.

I, Betty D. Richardson, being fully conversant with the English and German languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

Betty D. Richardson Civ 409
Signature Grade.

H5128-0150

REITERCORPS 68.
3rd June 1946

Statement made under oath, to be produced to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg.

I. As to my person: I, farmer Fritz S U E M M E R M A N N, was born on 21st October 1887 at Froemern, Kreis Unna, Westphalia. I am a Protestant; my permanent residence is the Korte[illegible] estate near Unna.

II. As to the matter: Since 1924 I was the Chairman of the Froendenberg Rural Riders' Association (Reiterverein) and also District Chairman of the Kreis Unna Rural Riders' Association. Later I became Provincial Chairman of the Rural Riders', Driving & Breeders' Associations of the Province of Westphalia, and I held this position for 12 years. The Province of Westphalia is one of the most important horsebreeding parts of Germany and we had in our province no less than 180 such Riders, Driving & Breeders Associations.

These rural Riders & Drivers Associations had nothing whatever to do with politics. They rathermore fulfilled a peasantry requirement, as the young peasants could only gain knowledge of horsebreeding and the care of horses through these associations, including the treatment of sick horses and the improvement of draught-horses. The aim of the associations was to promote horsebreeding and improve the economic importance of horses.

When, in 1933, the NSDAP seized power they drew the whole sporting life of Germany to the movement. The rural Riders Associations had to face the choice of either joining the Party or being closed down. In the latter case the whole, considerable means of the associations would have been confiscated, and the dissolving of the rural Riders Associations would have meant that they could no longer fulfil the task of helping horsebreeding. Under the pressure of these circumstances, the joining of the Riders Associations to the Party organization took place. A few of the Riders Associations joined the SS. The greater number of them were attached to the SA as independent NS-Riders' Corps.

Furthermore, after this so-called "affiliation" the nature and the task of the Riders Associations did not alter, although they were now called NS

H5128-0151

Riders Corps or SA Riders. The SA Riders here in Westphalia pursued their habitual sportsmans life and kept away from politics. I myself had the rank of Obertruppfuehrer and led the Froendenberg troop. No man in my troop had bee a member of the SA or of the Party prior to 1933. No member of my troop took part in any demonstrations whatsoever against people of other political ways of thinking. Political or ideological schooling was not practiced. A large part of the Riders did not belong to the Party. During riding lessons employe workmen and ladies in civilian dress took part and they had nothing to do with the Party or SA.

Relations with the Party and the SA in general were always strained. We were considered politically untrustworthy because we had nothing to do with the storm troops of Adolf HITLER and openly criticised the measures of the Party.

The assertion that the duty of the Riders Association was to supply the Armed Forces with recruits for the cavalry is unfounded. The Armed Forces had their own training establishments for their cavalry, within the Armed Forces. In this connection, the Armed Forces would not let the SA have anything to say and did not even consider the so-called rider's certificate, whilst on the other hand people who had the purely sporting riding and driving badge had preference to enter the cavalry.

The best proof that the SA cavalcade did not have the task of training troopers for the Armed Forces lies in the fact that when war broke out in 1939 most of the members of the SA cavalcade who were farming were not recruited, because they were working on their farms to supply food which was important and indispensable.

In conclusion I should like to point out that in the case of rural peasants their co-operation with the SA cavalcade by no means had the object of helping National Socialism or militarism, all the more because peasants are dead against war. But the fact was that their horses were taken by the SA cavalcade and horsebreeding, as such, constantly improved.

(signed) Fritz SUEMMERMANN

H5128-0152

This statement was confirmed by oath before me Otto EYLARDI, German Lawyer of the Amtsgericht, UNNA, and the Landgericht DORTMUND i/W. in my presence at UNNA on June 25th 1946.

(signed) Otto Eylardi (Attorney-at-Law)

This statement was confirmed by oath before Otto EYLARDI, German Lawyer of the Amtsgericht, UNNA, and the Landgericht, DORTMUND i/W. in my presence at UNNA on June 25th 1946.

(signed) W.A. Gyllenspetz, Major PSO. II,
fo O/C.HQ.Mil.Gov.L/K.Unna CCG (B.E.)

UNNA, 25th June 1946

To-day the farmer Fritz SUEMMERMANN, living at Korten, Froemern, L/K. UNNA, appeared before the undersigned Public Safety Officer of H.Q. 1020 Mil. Gov. UNNA. He was not personally known to the signer but was identified by Rechtsanwalt Otto EYLARDI jr., who was personally known to the signer, as the farmer Fritz SUEMMERMANN.

Herr SUEMMERMANN submitted the statement attached to this report (Date of statement: 3/6/46). The statement was read over to him, whereon Herr SUEMMERMANN declared: -

The statement read over to me is right in all particulars. And I am willing to confirm it by oath. I know the meaning of the oath and know that perjury is liable to prosecution.

(signed) W.A. Gyllenspetz, Major PSO. II

for O/C. HQ. Mil. Gov. L/K. Unna CCG (B.E.)

SA-STAHLHELM

SA STAHLHELM No. 1.
Defense Exhibit No. 1

Carl S i m o n
- - - - -
Koeln-Lindenthal
am Frielendom 9

Cologne, June 19th 1946.

I am making the following affidavit for the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, and I know that false affidavits are punishable under the laws of the Military government and under German criminal law.

My name is Carl Simon, born 8/11/1883 in Koblenz, by profession a merchant; residence as mentioned above, married, father of four children

I have not been a member of the NSDAP or of any of its organizations.

1) As a front combatant of the world war I entered the Stahlhelm legion of combatants, at the beginning of 1926, and became at the end of 1926 local group leader (Ortsgruppenfuehrer) of the local Stahlhelm group Cologne-Suelz, Cologne-Klettenberg and Cologne-Zollstock. In 1930, I became Gau manager (Gaues Kreftsfuehrer) of the Stahlhelm Gau Cologne who had at that time 10-20.000 members. In addition I was entrusted from 1933 to 1934 with the leadership of the Stahlhelm circle (Stahlhelmkreis) Cologne city left Rhine bank. At the end of 1934, I became deputy Gau leader of the Stahlhelmgau Cologne until its dissolution in November 1935. Afterwards, I liquidated the Gau area.

Before 1933, the Stahlhelm Gau Cologne belonged to the Regional Federati (Landesverband) Westmark. Its area was the region extending from Koblenz to about the Dutch and Belgian frontiers. After the assumption of power by the NSDAP the legion was divided into the Legions Lower Rhine and Westmark. At the end of 1933 - up to then - Regional Legions of the Stahlhelm were divided into sub-groups, which corresponded to the Gau areas of the NSDAP. Regional Leader of the sub-group-Achen was count Clemens Beissel.

My following statement refers to the entire district of the Stahlhelm from Koblenz to Duesseldorf, with, in my estimation, 100.000 members.

2) Concerning the aims and purposes of the Stahlhelm, I declare that the Stahlhelm was an absolute enemy of any war of aggression. This attitude was expressed at all assemblies and in the publications. Concerning the regulations of the Versailles treaty, the Stahlhelm insisted on the removal of the burdens laid upon Germany, but exclusively in a legal manner, by negociations with the treaty partners. The Stahlhelm campaigned for the union of the combatants of all countries, which was aimed at the avoidance of any future wars. When, in the year 1934, a conference of the combatants of several countries took place in Budapest, the NSDAP prohibited the participation, which had already been announced, of the Stahlhelm. In the summer of 1933, the delegates of the British Legion (English combatants) came, at the end of their visit of Germany, to Cologne, as guests of the Stahlhelm of the Gau Cologne. The Gau leadership and the Gestapo, however, prohibited the conferences and arrangements which were to have taken place. Only a reception by the organisations of the NSDAP took place.

3) Up to the assumption of power by the NSDAP, the relations between Stahlhelm and NSDAP were very strained. There were numerous attacks against the Stahlhelm.

-1-

H5128-0153

H5128-0154

SA STAHLHELM AFFIDAVIT No. 1.
Defense Exhibit No. 1

When the claims for power of the NSDAP became known, a lage afflux of persons coming from all classes of the people into the Stahlhplm occurred in autumn 1932. This afflux became stronger at the beginning of 1933, and consisted of members of all political parties up to the extreme Left. Racial, political and religious differences did not play any part. This circumstance increased the membership of the Stahlhelm in the district from Cologne to Duesseldorf to about 100.000 members. In the whole of Germany, the figures rose to 2 to 3 million members of the Stahlhelm owing to this inrush. The cause and the aim of this afflux was the opposition of the old and new Stahlhelm members against the claims for power of the NSDAP. This led, alread since the spring of 1933, to numerous disselutions, confiscation and arrests of Stahlhelm groups, their members and thdr property In April 1933 I myself was taken, as a Gau manager, into protective custody for two days by the Gestapo, with some comrades. I was arrested anew in July 1933, in September 1933 in April 19 In this latter case owing to sabotage of the SA reserve.

4.) When the Legion leader (Bundesfuehrer)Seldte put, in the spr of 1934,the Stahlhelm under the control of the Supreme SA leader (Hitler) and dismissed, on April 27th 1933, the deputy Legion leader Duesterberg, the indignation within the Stahlhelm was universal. At that time, new members were continuously being enlisted in nearly all distracts and all Stahlhelm people provided with new uniforms, in order to be able to start a revolt at a suitable date.

In the time to come, agreements were reached between Hitler, the chief of staff of the SA Roehm and the Legion leader of the Stahlhelm Seldte, concerning the coordination and the incorporation of the Stahlhelm by the SA, agreements which were made known to the Stahlhelm adherents only in an incomplete and, partly, distorted form.

5.) Already on June 31st 1933, the "Scharnhorst" i.e. the Stahlhelm youth, was mandatorily melted with the Hitler youth; it was called up with its subordinate leaders and informed that it was to be, from now on, a part of the HJ.

6.) In September 1933, the whole of the "Wehr-Stahlhelm", i.e. the Stahlhelm members up to their 35th year inclusively, were included in a similar manner into the SA, and throughout without and against the will of the members. For instance, about 32.000 Wehr Stahlhelm members were called to a roll-call in the Gau Cologne. On this occasion a high-ranking SA leader held a short speech and issued the order, that from now on they were a part of the SA. A short ti earlier, it had been made known that the transferred formations would remain in separate units, together with their subaltern leaders, while in the SA, and would even continue to wear their field-grey uniform. Immediately after the transfer it was stated to the that they had to get no more orders from the Stahlhelm and that their future uniform would be that of the SA. This union was received with aversion by the overwhelming majority of the Wehrstal helm members. Large parts of them did not participate in the SA duties. They were partly fetched to duty by task details and by police. Those who continued to refuse any service were often dismissed from their jobs at the instigation of the NSDAP and became unemployed. Neither were they given new jobs by the labor exchanges. On the whole, the attitude of the Wehrstahlhelm members towards the NSDAP remained the same as before; they clung to the hope that son change of conditions would once more lead them into the Stahlhelm

7.) In September 1934 the order became known that the so-called "Original Stahlhelm" (Kernstahlhelm), i.e. the older members,had to form, within their ranks,the SA reserve I (Stahlhelm). This order came from the Legion's direction (Bundesfuchrung) and was based on an agreement between the latter and the SA chief of staff and Hitler. In January 1934. it was made known that this SA reserve I (Stahlhelm) was made a part of the SA and was to be fusioned there with the -until then- SA reserve of the SA men into the SA reserve I. For the rest, however, the SA reserve I originating from the Stahlhelm was to have a certain autonomy within the SA and was to keep its leaders with the exception of the highest ranks, as well as its fiel grey uniform, just as up to now; also, they were to remain members of the Stahlhelm.

8.) That, in this way advertised incorporation of the SA reserve I (Stahlhelm) took then place; in the Gau Cologne in the first days of April 1934. It happened by an order emanating from the chief of staff of the SA and the Legion leader of the Stahlhelm, Seldte, without any previous consultation of the Stahlhelm members and without their consent being asked for. A fusion according to units, as had been the case with the Wehrstahlhelm, did not take place. The transferred Stahlhelm members were not allowed to quit the SA reserve voluntarily, in order to join other unions. Individuals who wanted to leave the SA either because of bodily unfitness or because of other reasons, had to make applications for their release and had to state their reasons.

I want to state the following concerning the incorporation of the SA reserve I (Stahlhelm) into the SA in April 1934:

The orders issued for this fusion by the Regional leader of the Regional Legion Lower Rhine of the Stahlhelm did not correspond to the order of the Legion's direction. This latter said, that the fusion of Stahlhelm and SA was a voluntary one, so that the Stahlhelm members had the right to decline any service in the SA. But the overwhelming majority of the transferred Stahlhelm members did not know anything about this actual order of the Legion's direction, so that they assumed that they were taken over into the SA automatically and as cumulatively. Owing to this circumstance, they did not take any steps to prevent that fusion- nearly all of them - and remained in the SA reserve I and at the same time in the Stahlhelm, which had been changed in the meantime into the National Socialist German Combatants Legion (Stahlhelm) - NSDFB. Even after the fusion, they wanted to cultivate the old comradeship, and remained in the expectation of some change of political conditions, the more so, as once again their autonomy within the SA had been promised them. A small number of those transferred Stahlhelm members, it is true, has then applied for a withdrawal from the SA. But these applications were granted only in a very few cases, and their result was, that great difficulties were caused to the applicants in their economical position. A withdrawal from the SA was connected, in fact, with the greatest difficulties and drawbacks.

Only I and my close collaborators had known the actual text of above-mentioned order of the Legion's direction, according to which the transfer of the Stahlhelm into the SA should have been a voluntary one, whereas the Regional leader Count Clemens Beissel had published this order in a distorted form, i.e. in the sense of a compulsory transfer. This was the reason of my express refusal of the transfer into the SA, and of the refusal of some leading comrades.

H5128-0155

H5128-0156

Defense Exhibit No. 1

This resulted in a renewed protective custody lasting a few days, for sabotage of the SA reserve, in April 1934.

I remained, of course, in the Stahlhelm as responsible leader of the Gau Cologne and had just as before the closest connection with the Stahlhelm members transferred into the SA, as these remained, on the whole, Stahlhelm members and participated in our common comradeship assemblies in the evenings. I am, therefore, in a position, to bear witness to their further attitude towards the NSDAP.

9) On the occasion of those comradeship evenings and at the monthly assemblies of the Stahlhelm members of the entire Gau Cologne, the original Stahlhelm members and Wehrstahlhelm members now in the SA currently complained about bad treatment and insults on the side of the SA leaders and the elder SA members. The attitude of the transferred Stahlhelm members towards the NSDAP and its organizations remained unchanged. They comforted themselves with the hope for a speedy change.

I consider it as absolutely out of question that the Kernstahlhelm and Wehrstahlhelm members transferred into the SA have participated in possible criminal aims and acts of the SA within the meaning of art. 6 of the Charter, or that they have helped those aims, if known to them. At any rate, I do not know of any cases of participation by Stahlhelm members in the Cologne Gau, although I was fully conversant with the conditions of the Stahlhelm members in the SA, even after the dissolution in November 1935. Soon after the Roehm riot of June 30th 1934, the greater part of the still existing Stahlhelm units were gradually prohibited and dissolved throughout Germany owing to alleged anti-state plots. Not one single case is known to me, that in the Gau Cologne a former Stahlhelm member has participated in the destruction of Jewish property or in bad treatments or persecutions of Jews or in the destruction of synagogues and Jewish dwellings in November 1938. On the contrary, many Stahlhelm members have helped the Jews in this time, as already earlier and still later on. In September 1944, when the last actions against Jewish mixed marriages and half-breeds were executed, a large number of Stahlhelm members has warned the half-breeds in time and has helped them to escape.

10) On the occasion of the transfer of Stahlhelm into the SA, the Stahlhelm leaders received in our Gau, in most cases, a rank in the SA which was usually two, but at least one grade lower than the corresponding Stahlhelm rank. Hardly anybody in the SA then became more than Obertruppfuehrer, even if he had been in the Stahlhelm, e.g. Battalion or regiment commander. Very few exceptions were made, for people who either had already had a leading position in the SA or the NSDAP or who had some claims on them. Accordingly, Count Clemens Beissel became at that time immediately Standartenfuehrer with the rank of a brigade commander.

The first promotions of the Stahlhelm members in the SA were announced after about 1½ years. As far as I know, only one person has become a Sturmbannfuehrer in the SA in the Gau Cologne.

The transferred Stahlhelm leaders have mostly done their service in the SA in a subordinate capacity in addition to their profession and without pay, whereas the older SA leaders did full-time service and were paid.

The transferred Stahlhelm leaders themselves have, nearly all of them, contributed to the maintenance of the old Stahlhelm spirit and to the opposition against the NSDAP in the ranks of their subordinates after the incorporation.

H5128-0157

Defense Exhibit No.1

11.) According to my intimate knowledge of conditions it is certainly not true that, as far as the Rhenish districts are concerned, the Stahlhelm members transferred into the SA may have become voluntarily members of the SA and wanted to help the purposes of the NSDAP. They never would have entered the SA - reserving, of course, certain exceptions - if they h not been incorporated by orders from above and by deception and duress, as stated above.
It was hardly possible for the transferred Stahlhelm members to leave the party. It was generally known that any such withdrawal was followed by police supervision, dismissal from one job, and, possibly, closing of one's plant or business. Such results were constantly threatened by the superior SA offices during the whole time after the fusion of Stahlhelm and SA. In cases where the transferred Stahlhelm members did not do any SA service, they were dismissed from the SA, with the result that they lost their position, especially when they we officials. For the rest, the majo ity of the transferred Stahlhelm members remained in the SA in order to cultivate the old fellowship, while their political attitude remained as mentioned above. Especially the Kernstahlhelm members now in the SA remained there as a separate body and formed a fore body which was considered and treated as such by the SA leaders and old SA members.
Should former Stahlhelm leaders who hold positions of higher and highest rank after the fusion with the SA, assert that the transferred Stahlhelm members, or at least their majority, had become willing members of the SA, then this is by no means the case. I cannot but assume that those persons would like to cover and to extenuate their own conversion by such an assertion.
Owing to my constant contact with other Gau and Regional legions I am in a position to assure that this is the case, on the whole, for nearly all Regional legions. Until the end of the war, former Stahlhelm members were considered by party offices and Gestapo as members of a former anti-state organization and often persecuted.
12.) The SA reserve I organized at the time of the fusion of the Kernstahlhelm , and comprising the Kernstahlhelm members, has been dissolved in the Gau Cologne some years before the war, in connection with the shrinking of the active SA formations, and the members were distributed among the active SA formations. Those active SA formations now got smaller reserve groups. Now, e.g. an active SA Sturm was composed of generally four groups, 1-2 of which were reserve groups. The members of these reserve groups retained the "R" on the tabs of their official uniform as before. All the Kernstahlhelm members transferred in 1934 came in such way in the newly formed reserve groups of the active formations of the party.

signed: Carl S i m o n

Sworn before me this 20th day of June 1946
(signed) Montgomerie, Maj. R.A.
SO II Legal 808 L/A Mil. Gov. Det.

H5128-0158

A F F I D A V I T

of

Dipl.Ing. Dr. phil Richard W E N Z L, Freiburg, i.Brsg.

My name is Richard WENZL, born on 29 July 1892, resident of Freiburg i.Brsg., Oberriedenstr. 27, I am by profession a consulting engineer.

I never belonged to any party, joined in 1925 the Stahlhelm where I had the following leading positions:

1926 in the district headquarters, 1927 for special duty, Legion Headquarters for Economic matters, 1929 Regional University Leader, 1931 Deputy regional leader, also regional junior Stahlhelm Leader, 1932 deputy Leader of the Landesverband (branch) Baden-Wuerttemberg (as the Regional Leader was ill) from March 1933 on Regional Leader Baden Wuerttemberg From August 1933 on until March 1934 on leave, from March 1934 on again Regional Leader of the NSDFB- branch Baden (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Frontkaempferbund, - Nat. Soc. German War Veterans Legion)

Facts:

1) relationship between Stahlhelm and NSDAP and its organizations.

Already from 1930 on the relations were strained, as the Stahlhelm rejected to the radicalism of the NSDAP and, especially in questions of economy and religion, had a different point of view. So for instance were the members of the NS continuously forbidden to attend lectures given by the undersigned. The habit of the NS to admit with open arms expelled or resigned members of the Stahlhelm had an aggravating effect It were exactly these new members of the Stahlhelm expelled NS-members who used to incite against the Stahlhelm. Repeated attempts to establish a loyal relationship with the NSDAP, wer regularly frustrated by the non compliance with every "gentleman's agreement" on the part of the NS.

2) The taking over of the Wehrstahlhelm by the SA took also place in the district Baden Wuerttemberg in the fall of 1933 in the course of the placing of the entire Stahlhelm under Hitler in accordance with Hitler's decree of 4 July 1933 and the executive decress of the OSAF (Supreme SA Commander Roehm) of June and July 1933. Hereby the Subleaders of the SA deviated from and disregarded the assurances and directives of the OSAF, given in the decree, in exactly the same way as in the whole Reich. The attempt of the State leaders and of the men charged with the incorporation to secure some alleviations were, in the end, of no avail. A possibility of the Young and Wehr (Original) Stahlhelm men to evade the taking over did not exist, they were transferred against their will.

3) The Kernstahlhelm (Original Stahlhelm) (Age 35 to 45 years had to be taken over into the SA RI (Reserve I) in accordance with OSAF of 6 November 1933 (i.e. Hitler's order!) The formation of SA units in the region Baden-Wuerttemberg took place in an way similar to that in the whole Reich. As the SA group leader concerned intended a reduction of the formation strengt the Stahlhelm attempted to sabotage the transfer partly. About the consequences of this attempt see below! In accordance with order OSAF from the beginning of 1934 and with other measures of the Gru.Fue. (Group Command) the SA RI coming from the Stahlhelm was later also broken up and by order taken over almost overywhere into the active SA.

H5128-0159

4) The resistance of the Stahlhelm men against the taking over was especially in South Western Germany very strong. The National Command and their representatives as well as nearly all Sta. leaders tried in innumerable conferences with the SA group to obtain compliance with the agreement National Command OSAF and the principal orders. I myself, had several sharp arguments with the Group Commander. In addition there were several favorable circumstances for the regional sectors (Landesverband), such as exchange of Brigade commanders and above all the possibility of using the Swiss newspapers. They always reported extensively about the happenings in the neighbour country and were in full sympathy with the Stahlhelm. The consequences of this struggle showed up only some months later when in other regional sectors, but all the more strong Wehrsta-SA-men (former original Stahlhelm men) which did not recognize the transfer and did not show up for duty, were by force brought in by police and constabulory, threatened with arrest or arrested rightway, subsequently expelled from the SA and permanently watched by the police. Most severe economic damages, often dismissal from work and bread, disciplinary transfer, demotion to lower income ratings, a.s.o. were the consequences. All comrades who even tried to get out of the SA again were reported to the Gestapo as "politically unreliable" and kept on file and watched as state enemies until the end of the National Socialistic State.

Examples:

a) The regional commander (Landesfuehrer), that is myself, was arrested in May 1935 on orders of the Gaultiter, brought to the concentration camp Kisslau and only released at the end of June 1935 on intervention of numerious high persons. Subsequently I was indicted for high treason. Although the Reich Minister of Justice quashed the proceedings before the special court for lack of evidence, permanent surveyance and being spied upon by the SD and Gestapo were the consequence, together with 12 to 14 searches of my home, censoring of telephone and mail and deprivation of the right to serve in the army until the end of 1939.

In July 1938 I, with my wife and a number of other prominent Anti NS men, were again arrested and imprisoned in the Gestap jail in Stuttgart until 30 August 1938 and indicted for high treason. Only by General Bodenschatz and Udet vouching for me was I released again.

b) The district commander Neustadt, comrade Franz Denz was already shortly after the transfer of the Wehrsta. to the SA as SA-Sturmbannfuehrer arrested, brought in by the SS and subjected to chicaneries during proceedings of many month's, his public house publicly boycotted and persecuted in a similar way as under a).

c) The deputy Regional Commander Ernst Leppert was just as I, arrested in July 1938 and kept in jail, under indictment for high treason, until the end of August 1938.

d) The Gaufuehrer Karlsruhe Dr. Warth arrested and persecuted exactly as under c).

5) The bonds between the transferred SA men in the SA were maintained everywhere, in spite of the prohibition of participation in meetings of the Kersate (Original Stahlhelm) or the later NSDFB-Stahlhelm, in spite of the breaking up of the Wehrsta-Units, in spite of punishments, pressure and terror. When the transferred Jungsta (Junior Stahlhelm) and Kernsta (Original St.) (SARI) were forbidden by the SA to take part on STa-meetings, frequently also the dual membership

in the Stahlhelm, I issued the "Heimatrechtbefehl" (Home right order) of 1 June 1934 which guaranteed to every Sta-man, transferred to the SA, the "home right" in the Stahlhelm.

It is an established fact that the Stahlhelm men in the SA were always considered to be foreign bodies and consequently unreliable. They were neglected in promotion, never regognized fully as SA men, prejudiced economically, in a number of cases even expelled from the SA for unreliability and then kept on record as "p.u." (politically unreliable) with the police and Gestapo.

Nearly all transferred Sta men never, neither in mentality nor behavious, became SA men, but always remained Stahlhelm men.

6) The attitude of the transferred Stahlhelm men had to my knowledge been in accordance with the ideals of the Stahlhelm and the State ining, I deem it impossible that the men took part in ter or actions such as Jew baiting or attacks on the Church. I did not hear of a single such case.

The NS-militarism was always rejected by the Stahlhelm, since it always declared itself in innumerable demonstrations of the National Command as well as of the regional commanders against a new war and rather in the contrary attempted at every occasion the contact with foreign war veterans.

On the other hand, had the transferred Sta -men as well as those who had remained in the Stahlhelm everywhere and always tried to oppose the radicalism of the NS and they had never given up hope to be able, in cooperation with other oppositional circles, to break one day Hitler's dictatorship. The tolerance for other political and philosophical opinions experienced in the front line enabled the Sta men again and again to biuld a bridge of understanding between all men who rejected and fought National Socialism.

7) Persecution for religious and racial reasons

I do not know of a single such case on the part of the Stahlhelm. But I know of such persecutions of Sta comrades. Examples: a) The Sta comrade, former consul, Bielefeld who belonged to the local group Freiburg was expelled by the Gestapo from the Stahlhelm, his wife forced to divorce him and he himself persecuted so much by the Gestapo that he chose suicide. His funeral took place with a large participation of the local group Freiburg. Comrade Bielefeld was a Jew.

b) In January 1936 the "Basler Nationalzeitung" published the exclusion of 12 Stahlhelm members from army service as reserve officers

with special reference to the fact that all these men were Catholics. On checking this news proved to be correct. These men who previously had leanings to the Zentrum Party and who joined the Stahlhelm because of its attitude for the Church and against the NS were now declared unreliable by the NSDAP for their positive attitude towards the Church as well as for their previous membership in the Sta.

c) The Regional Commander (that is myself) as a devoted Catholic was under the special protection of his Excellency the Archbishop of Freiburg, who, in his diocese, forbade from the pulpit all attacks on the Stahlhelm - the best proof for the friendliness of the Stahlhelm towards religion - In 1938, while in jail in Stuttgart, this attitude was expounded as high treason conspiracy of the Regional Commander.

8) Every attempt of leaving the SA was either in vain or resulted in severest persecution.-

Honorable discharge was hardly ever granted - in exceptional cases for very good reasons of health. Applications for resignation were either not answered or their withdrawel was demanded under heaviest pressure. Frequently even heavy punishments were inflicted for "behaviour not suited to an SA man".- Those cases of leaving of which I heard concern expulsion with all economic and political consequences, registration with the police and Gestapo, economic boycott, disciplinary transfer for civil servants or even loss of job and pension. After June 30, 1933 the terror was exercised less by the SA but rather by the organisations of the NSDAP, for instance PO, by the SD and the Gestapo.

An expelled SA man was considered an outlaw

Those Sta-comrades who through a ruse or through faulty transfer lists were not included in the transfer fared not much better. That fact alone, in the end the fact in general that an STa man did not go over to the SA, sufficed to represent the concerned as politically unreliable.

Long after the liquidation of the Stahlhelm on 10 November 1935 until the collapse the NSDAP considered the previous membership in the Stahlhelm as synonymous with enemy of the State or at least with an open or secret opposition against National Socialism.

signed: Dr. Richard Wenzl

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of July 1946

signed: A.E. Schrader Jr.

I, Albert E Schrader JR. being thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

A.E. Schrader Jr.Lt.Comdr.USNR

H5128-0161

SA STAHLHELM AFFIDAVIT No. 3.

SA-3

Statement.

Realizing the significance of an affidavit and being aware of the fact, that the rendering of a false statement under oath, is punishable by the occupying authorities and the German courts, I make the following statement:

I. concerning my person: Dr. Kurt Loske, 40 years old (born 17 April 1906, Cologne), applicant on probation for higher legal service, (Assessor) address: Cologne, Blumenthalstrasse 23.

Member of the Stahlhelm since 1927. District leader of the Scharnhorst-Youth association in Cologne since 1933. In 1934/35 legal expert (Rechtsreferent) in the central office of the Stahlhelm in Berlin. In 1935 - 37 legal adviser to the liquidator of the Stahlhelm, Bankdirector (retired) Th. Gruss.

After liquidation of the Stahlhelm assigned to NSDAP without application. (Entry date, 1 April 1936)

II. concerning facts: The Stahlhelm was in opposition to the NSDAP and its ideology.

All elements of an oppositional attitude gathered in the Stahlhelm after 1933, especially after the liquidation of all other parties. In general vigorous intervention was expected to be taken against the party in cooperation with the Reichswehr. The less understandable was therefore the removal of Duesterberg and the betrayal of Seldte by putting himself under the orders of the highest SA leadership (Spring 1933).

The transfer of the Scharnhorst and the incorporation of the Wehrstahlhelm was carried out by announcing the facts of the transfer in the form of an order during a roll call. The possibility to resist this order did not exist for the individual member since the transfer was carried out, cumulatively and with simultaneous transfer of lists of respective members.

H5128-0162

H5128-0163

The transfer of the Kernstahlhelmer into the SA-Reserve was carried out in a similar manner. Here too it was carried out against the will of the individual by order and transfer of the lists of members.

With drawal from the SA was possible - according to official regulations of the SA - only in special cases (physical unfitness for service or old age). All other applications for withdrawal required the stating of special reasons and were almost always rejected in the years of 1933 to 35. For persons transferred from the Stahlhelm such an application resulted in most cases in a dismissal from the SA. In the many cases which came to my knowledge in my official capacity, the argument advanced for the dismissal was, that the applicant had shown his reationary attitude and his opposition to the SA, already by the sole act of applying for withdrawal and was therefore unbearable to the SA. The dismissal from the SA was marked in the disciplinary lists of the SA (Straflisten) a copy of which was forwarded to the competent Police, resp. Gestapo offices. Thus, the dismissed was characterized as at least politically unreliable, if not even an enemy of the state. The result was his dismissal from public service, and his removal from all other organizations of the party (even of the professional ones). Private persons and business people risked the danger of a boycott or the closing of their establishment.

From my activity as legal advisor in the Central office (Bundesamt), I know of numerous cases where such procedures were adopted against former members of the Stahlhelm, who had applied for withdrawal from the SA. Especially numerous, with above mentioned results, were cases in which members of the Stahlhelm, after joint-membership in both the Stahlhelm and the SA was prohibited and members of the Stahlhelm transferred to the SA had applied for remaining in the Stahlhelm.

These members of the Stahlhelm, marked by the practice of the SA to dismiss instead of granting withdrawel, were as a rule arrested as politically unreliable elements at the next best opportunity and frequently transferred into concentration camps.

As far as these cases came to the knowledge of the Central Direction (Bundesleitung) - which in consequence of the liquidations and the suppressions of the Stahlhelm in the various parts of Germany in 1934/1935 and the herewith connected destruction of organization was generally not the case - it was my task by authority of the chief of the Central administration, to get these men released from protective custody or from concentration camps. In this capacity I was constantly travelling throughout Germany in 1935 in order to help the internees. Of course the results of an attempted withdrawal became known in the local associations and restrained most of the former comrades from further applications for withdrawal.

Furthermore in connection with this, I conducted in the Spring and Summer of 1935 alone about 100 workers trials, in which the reinstitution in their work resp. office of dismissed former members of the Stahlhelm was fought for. It should be mentioned here, that even in the most favorable cases, that is to say where the courts possessed the courage not to consider a dismissal from the SA as a justifiable reason for notice, the employers of the dismissed former member of the Stahlhelm would rather pay a high sum of compensation than to be prepared for reinstallment.

After the liquidation of the Stahlhelm, Seldte in a conference with Hitler

H5128-0164

H5128-0165

was assured that the consequences of a disciplinary dismissal from the SA of former members of the Stahlhelm were to be abolished. This assurance like the other promises of Hitler during the dissolution of the Stahlhelm has in no way been complied with. On the contrary, we still had ap. 2 -300 cases submitted to us during the liquidation the clarification of which was simply rejected by the competent offices of the SA. Thus it came about that comrades had to suffer the consequences of their dismissal from the SA, as late as 1938 and 1939, and in two cases I know of, up to 1943.

Dr. Kurt Loske

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of July 1946

A.E. Schrader Jr.

I, ALBERT E SCHRADER JR being thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

E.A. Schrader Jr.
Lt. Comdr. USNR.

Defense-Exhibit No.4

A F F I D A V I T.

I, Doctor of law Georg D u e s t e r b e r g born on 6 Aug.1906

In Bremen

at present time prisoner of war in the CIE 91 Darmstadt

being duly sworn, depose and say:

I am the only son and only child of Lt.Colonel(retired) Theodor Duesterberg and his wife Florentine Duesterberg née von Tecklenburg.

I never was a member of the NSDAP, nor of any of its organizations. I studied law and during the war from 1940 on I was occupied as Chief staff intendant (Oberstabsintendant) in the administration of the Counter-intelligence office(Amt Ausland-Abwehr) at the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW). Later on I directed that office of which the chief was Admiral Canaris a friend of my father's. Admiral Canaris, on account of his disagreements with the Third Reich, surrounded himself by men to whom he had absolute confidence. In my case he also wanted to protect me against the continuous persecutions by the Gestapo and the Security service (SD) to which our entire family was exposed for political and racial reasons. For instance in the years 1934 to 1939 he warned our family several times against waves of arrestations, so that every time we were able to leave Berlin, under false names, for days or weeks. My political opinions were also known to Colonel of the General Staff (i.G.) Hansen, executed after the 20th July 1944, who had quite lengthy conversations with me, with regard to the keeping ready and use of money, at disposition of the Counter-intelligence (Abwehr), for the uprising of the 20th July. All my military superiors were executed at that time. By chance I excaped from being arrested.

As son of the Lt.Colonel retired and second Chief (Bundesfuehrer) of the Stahlhelm (Organization of war veterans) Duesterberg I know about the state of affairs and events in the Stahlhelm.

The Stahlhelm was a democratic organization of the veterans (alte Frontsoldaten) of the first world war comprising all parties and having a purely democratic constitution.It was directed by two chiefs (Bundesfuehrer)who, in regular interwals were elected by the chiefs of the regional units (Landesverbandfuehrer). These too were elected by their subaltern leaders and so forth down the scale to the lowest leaders, chosen from the members out of their own ranks. The chiefs (Bundesfuehrer) were bound to sign jointly, they had to answer for their activity, politics, financial matters etc. before the assembly of regional chiefs (Landesverbandfuehrer) and were bound to follow the resolutions of this assembly. From this democratic system of election of leaders the situation often resulted that privates were elected to leaders by their comrades which then had veterans officers as subaltern leaders, that princes and generals stood within the ranks and were lead by workmen etc.

H5128-0166

From the described democratic constitution of the organization (Bund), from the attitude hostile to the leader-principle (Fuehrerprinzip), from the calm and moderate attitude of the members, the veterans of the first world-war, the opposition of the Stahlhelm resulted against the NSDAP together with its methods of proceeding and many of its leaders. The Stahlhelm belonged to no party, it comprised men of the parties of the right, the middle and the left, workers, peasants and small employees making up the majority of its members, as well as land owners, manufacturers(Fabrikant) and former officers. The opposition was increased, by the bitter attacks of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations: in the press and in speeches, surprise assaults against individual members and violent interruptions of assemblies of the Stahlhelm, up to the intentions of a rising of the Stahlhelm in the years 1933 and 1934.

In the ranks of the Stahlhelm and among its officers antisemitism did not prevail, as an example my father whose grandfather had had himself baptized was repeatedly elected second leader (Zweiter Bundesfuehrer) of the legion.

My father became the center of the opposition of the Stahlhelm. From 1931 on he found himself in clear opposition to Hitler and his leaders and he seized every opportunity of fighting against them. He refused upto the last to submit or join the Stahlhelm to Hitler or the party. On account of that he was most violently attacked in speeches and press for political and racial reasons.

Starting out from this opposition my father was also advanced as a candidate for the presidency of the Reich, to prevent those who were against Hindenburgs policy, as well as the moderate right from voting for Hitler.

My father refused, in spring 1933, any higher state position or material donation, offered to him by the new government, because he was not going to be bribed.

On 26th April 1933 occured the breaking of the constitution of t Stahlhelm organization by the first Reich leader Seldte, who und false pretense had my father in his Berlin office, removed and arrested by force of arms. He let my father know that it was Hindenburg's wish that he should resign. Hindenburg himself late assured my father, that he knew nothing about it. Thist step was taken by Seldte in agreement with Goering. He had tried before continuously to win over the majority of the regional leaders to his policy, the submission of the Stahlhelm to Hitler. The majority however of the Stahlhelm leadership remained in opposition. It was an openly known fact, that at the meeting of the regional leaders, at that time at which, according to the articles of the organization, the leader of the legion (Bundesfuehrer would have to be newly elected, Seldte would not have been re-elected. Shortly after Seldte joined the party and placed the legion under Hitler .

In those months, February, March, April 1933 there came voluntar ly every day Stahlhelm men from all walks of life, armed , as protective guards, to the cellar of our appartment house in Berlin, as protection for my father, as they knew the measures , of the leaders of the NSDAP of those days, and wanted to prevent them.

H5128-0167

H5128-0168

Affidavit Georg Duesterberg

My father continued to be considered the man representing the will to opposition of the preponderant part of the Stahlhelm. A large number of leaders stayed in continuous connection with him. Nearly every day simple Stahlhelm men came to our apartment to assure him of their fidelity. These demonstrations of fidelity continued for the whole year despite the fact that my father was put in the death cell in Dachau on 1 July 1934, on which day he was condemned to death by the Special Court (Sondergericht) in Munich and he only came out again alive through Hindenburg's intervention, and then, had to spend a longer period of time at the Columbia prison in Berlin, and our apartment, our mail and telephone were continuously watched. Despite this, workmen and peasants appeared even after their weeks work on Sundays from out of town with flowers, and men presented themselves, who without remuneration wanted to form a protective guard for my father in our apartment. The continuous watching and marking down of our visitors was known to these men and inspite of that they continued their opposition.

A unification, however, of the will to opposition in the Stahlhelm was prevented forcefully by Seldte. The Stahlhelm opposition fell to pieces after various leaders had been removed.

The transfer of the Stahlhelm to the SA was accompanied by strong terror against the anti-National Socialist Stahlhelm men. The resistance was to be broken down by removing and arresting my father, by waves of arrests in all parts of the Reich, by fights in the local groups, by surprise attacks on individual members and by removal of leaders of the opposition. These measures during the period of transfer had in part the desired effect on the little Stahlhelm man, who feared or had to fear for his family. More than the measures of force, the measures of deception of Seldte, and the men behind him, were to lead to success. He had my father close the whole press including the Stahlhelm press, his measures were presented as being approved by Hindenburg and the Reichscabinet. On the other hand Hindenburg's telegram of thanks for his services rendered to the Fatherland was published in the press, whereby the little Stahlhelm man was to be shown again that Hindenburg was in agreement about every thing. In this way all means were put to work : once Hindenburg causes the forced removal by use of arms and the arrest of the 2nd leader of the Bund, then Hindenburg expresses his words of thanks for loyal service. All this was made known to the Stahlhelm man, only that in the first place Hindenburg knew nothing about these other measures, except about the retirement of my father. This the Stahlhelm man did not come to know. Furthermore, matters were carried on by using promises and assurances.

In the transfer of the Stahlhelm to the SA, what was decisive for another part of the men, was their military discipline, which caused them to follow the orders and instructions of the new leaders, put in office by Seldte.

The transferred Stahlhelm men, insofar as they really had not already perceived the true situation were to have an unpleasant awakening. In the SA-Stuerme (SA-Companies) these men were maltreated, suspected, and assigned to low positions. They were always considered as opposition and reaction. They were watched over by their new comrades as well as by the Security Service (SD) and the Gestapo. Arrests did not diminish.

H5128-0169

A new opposition formed again, men and ex-leaders of the former Stahlhelm came to my father and tried to win him for foolish intentions to make a putsch. Individual new SA-Stuerme (SA companys) veh hankered after a putsch. During all the years upto the end of the war demonstrations of loyalty by men, transferred to the SA were given to my father, who was always considered as the person, who had resisted Hitler, who had been right in his opinions that Hitler meant war and Germany's downfall. As if by a miracle he escaped death on the 20th July 1944, though for years he had been in regular, confidential contact with Goerdeler, Wagner, Count Blumenthal and had exchanged political ideas with them. His social connections led to proceedings for integrating the armed mighty which was stopped only in July 1945 by the state attorney's office (Staatsanwaltschaft) in Grimma/Saxony. Though his political opinions were known everywhere, he had kept the confidence of many men that were transferred to the SA at the time. They all abhored Seldte as the traitor of the Stahlhelm and of its men. None had forgiven him the abuse of their confidence, By word and by letter they expressed this again and again to my father in all these years.

signed: Dr. Georg Dusterberg

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 27th June 1946.
I further certify that I have read the above declaration.

Darmstadt CIE No 91
signed: Martin H. Weik
Martin H. Weik
1st Lt Inf

326th Headquarters
Intelligence Detachment
APO 175
Official
Rubber Stamp

Camp 91

H5128-0170

Defense exhibit No.9

A f f i d a v i t

I, attorney-at-law Dr. Karl M a y e r , Nuernberg Uhlandstr. 13/II born February 10th 1894 in Zweibrücken, declare on oath the following, to be presented to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg:

1. In the year 1929 in Nuernberg I joined the Stahlhelm, Legion of Veterans (Bund der Frontsoldaten) owing to the following reasons:

a) there was at that time a strong rightist agitation going on among the German people, and I considered it necessary to channel this movement, if possible, into a moderate and constitutional organization like the Stahlhelm, instead of into the NSDAP with its SA and SS.

b) the radical flank groups had their militarized combat formations: the NSDAP its SA and SS, the KPD the "Red Combatant Union" (Rotfrontkämpferbund). Moreover, there existed the "Reichsbanner Black-red-gold")Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold) as a uniformed combat formation of the SPD and the leftist Bourgeoisie. I thought it necessary to contribute to the strengthening of the "Stahlhelm, Legion of Veterans "(Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten) as a combat organization of the moderate rightist movement.

c) the Stahlhelm, Legion of Veterans, (Stahlhelm,Bund der Frontsoldaten) aimed at a loosening of the restrictions imposed by the Versailles treaty, including the sphere of military sovereignty, but only with legal means and in conformity with international law.

d) the leaders and members of the Stahlhelm were for an overwhelming part, just as myself, combatants of world war I. They knew war and its terrors and refused, therefore, another war or preparations for it, unless it were one undertaken in rightous defense.

e) The Stahlhelm's platform was one of Christian ideology and of social equality. It also made efforts to educate youth in the spirit CF. Fränkischer Kurier of 11 September 2 "The Claims of the German Movement" (Forderungen der deutsch Bewegung)(Duesterberg on the aims of the Stahlhelm). Fränkischer Kurier of 29 April 33 "The 10 Commandments of the Junior Stahlhelm" (" Die 10 Gebote an den Jungstahlhelm

2. After the dissolution of the leftist organizations Reichsbanner and Rotfrontkämpferbund in the year 1933 the "Stahlhelm", Legion of Veterans "remained the sole combat organization besides the SA and SS, and many hundred thousands of Germans joined the Stahlhelm, at that time because they saw in it the last non-nationalsocialist organization, which was yet able to counterbalance the SA and the SS. The severe strain between Stahlhelm on the one hand, and the SA and SS on the other, which existed already before 1933, increased accordingly more and more.

Annex: Cf. "Der Stahlhelm" No.14 of 2 April 1933 (occurrence in Brunswick)

Defense Exhibit 9

"Fränkischer Kurier" of 14 April 1933 (occurrences in Berlin)

"Fränkischer Kurier" of 22 June 1933 (dissolution of the Stahlhelm in the Rhine province ect

The ruling spirit of the Stahlhelm may be decribed by the following event, which I experienced myself:

in the year 1931, the Bavarian Stahlhelm leader (Stahlhelmführer) colonel (Oberst) von L o n z gave a speech in Nuernberg in front of about 200 Stahlhelm leaders of Northern Bavaria on the occasion of the fusion of "Reichsflagge" and "Stahlhelm". In the course of this speech he spoke ironically of "holy Adolf", who hung on every wall in the Munich Brown House, that it incited to "vomiting", and spoke of the SA as the "brown plague".

In March 1932, the Nuernberg Stahlhelm held a great electoral meeting in the Hercules-Saalbau on the occasion of the Reich president election. The Nuernberg Stahlhelm leader at that time B r a u n held a speech, in which he declared that every Stahlhelm member who did not vote for the Stahlhelm candidate, the second leader of the legion (den 2.Bundesführer lieutenat-colonel (Oberstleutnant) Duesterberg, was a scoundrel.

This resulted in the withdrawal from the Stahlhelm of many members who sympathized with National Socialism.

In the "München-Augsburger Abendzeitung" (Munich-Augsburg Evening Paper) of 19 November 32, No.311/32 one can find the following open letter of the Stahlhelm leadership to Reich president von Hindenburg:

" In the name of the Stahlhelm, Legion of Veterans, which is conscious of being in unison with the majority of those Germans who are willing to work and are ready for a constructive policy, we implore Your Excellency to conserve the authoritarian form of government independent of parties. The result of the Reichstag election of 6 November 32 has proven once more the impossibility of a settled parliamentary majority. The German people does not want any more to be ruled by a party, whatever it may be. It wants a strong government independent of parties, in order to be able to begin at last peaceful constructive work."

This letter has been written at a time when it was clear that the NSDAP aimed at exclusive party rule in Germany, a few months before the actual "seizure of power" by the NSDAP.

When the great afflux into the NSDAP began, in March 1933, and this movement also affected the Stahlhelm, I spoke myself in a meeting of the Nuernberg Stahlhelm group St. Lorenz with the utmost sharpness, against any joining of the NSDAP. I was then deputy leader of this local group.

3. In the year 1933 the first Stahlhelm leader S e l d t e began step by step to deliver the Stahlhelm into the hands of the NSDAP. The Stahlhelm members considered this attitude of Seldte more and more as a treason towards the Stahlhelm. On 26 April 33 the second legion leader (der 2.Bundesführer) Duesterberg was dismissed from his position (cf.Fränkischer Kurier of 28 April 33.)

H5128-0171

Defense exhibit No 9

On 27.4.33 S e l d t e declared through the radio:

> "I herewith declare my entry into the National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP) Accordingly, I place myself and the Stahlhelm, League of Veterans, Stahlhelm, (Bund der Frontsoldaten) founded by me, as a compact military unit under the command of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler....."

"The Stahlhelm" No 18 of 30.4.33.
On 27.4.33 the Bavarian regional leader colonel v. L e n z (Bayer. Landesfuehrer Oberst) was dismissed from his position

"Der Stahlhelm" of 7.5.33.

On May 1st 1833 Rudolf H e s s published the agreement reached between Hitler and Seldte, that "the Stahlhelm was to remain a compact body"
However, at the same time the regulation that a member of the NSDAP could also be a member of the Stahlhelm, and vice-versa was repealed. This regulation was intended to achieve, that members of and candidates for the NSDAP could join afterwards the ranks of the SA and SS, if they wanted to enter a combat formation" (Accordingly, not into the Stahlhelm!).
"Fraenkischer Kurier" of 2.5.33 No 121.
On 21.6.33 Seldte subordinated the Junior Stahlhelm to the Supreme SA leadership (Obersten SA-Fuehrung) and attached the youth organization of the Stahlhelm, the "Scharnhorst Youth", (Scharnhorstjugend) to the Hitler Youth.
"Der Stahlhelm" of 25.6.33 No 26 and the proclamation by Hitler of 26.6.33 Fraenkischer Kurier of 28.6.33 No 177.
However, the proclamation by Hitler of 26.6.33 recognized the Stahlhelm (Kernstahlhelm) (Original Stahlhelm) as an autonomous organization along with SA, SS and HJ.
On 2.7.33 Seldte issued a federal order containing a prohibition of admission or application of new Kernstahlhelm members (Newspaper cutting).
In October 1933, the Wehrstahlhelm (Jungstahlhelm) was made a part of the active SA by order. At first, the Kernstahlhelm remained yet unchanged.
In December 1933, the Kernstahlhelm was re-baptized SA reserve I (Stahlhelm), but still remained an autonomous formation along with the SA and SS. It even retained its grey uniform, but had to wear a swastika armlet and adopted the rank designations of the SA.
I myself took over at that time, with the rank of an Obersturmbannfuehrer, the command of the units of the SA reserve I (Stahlhelm) formed out of the old Kernstahlhelm, which existed in Nuremberg, Fuerth and Erlangen. For further details also concerning the SA reserve II, which was formed in the main out of the old veteran associations, cf. annex to "Der Stahlhelm" of 3.12.33 Nr. 49.

H5128-0172

Defense exhibit No 9

4.) In the spring of 1934, the measures ordered by Seldte for the mass integration of SA reserve I (Stahlhelm) into the SA or SS reserve began anew. In this connection it was explicitly guaranteed, that the old Stahlhelm units up to the brigade would be retained as compact formations.
I myself did not participate in the negotiations concerning this integration. They were conducted by the then regional leader (Landesfuehrer) of the Stahlhelm for Northern Bavaria D e c h a n t. Dechant participated at that time in a leader meeting of the Stahlhelm in Northern Germany, I cannot remember any more where, at which this integration was discussed. He told me that most of the Stahlhelm leader were against this integration, because one could not trust the promises given by the Nazis.
S e l d t e is said to have declared in this connection:

"If necessary 7. 65."

(This was meant to signify, if necessary, we have pistols Cal. 7.65)
Seldte was successful and the integration was ordered.
I myself took part in the formation of "Standarte R 19" formed out of the old Stahlhelm at that time, and which was terminated in June 1934. The reasons which were decisive for this resolution, which was arrived at, under difficult conditions, after thorough discussion with other leading local comrades, were the following:

a) the promise given us, that the old Stahlhelm units would be also retained in the SA reserve as compact formations up to the brigade level. (Franconia: "Brigade R 77" and Nuremberg "Standarte R 19", about 3000 men.)

b) the fact, that Hitler was then only Reich chancellor and Herr v. Hindenburg still Reich president.

c) the Reichswehr was at that time not yet co-ordinated and at least the rank and file was sharply against the SA. It was not yet co-ordinated, nor had it sworn fidelity to Hitler but to the Reich president v. Hindenburg, who died unfortunately on August 2nd 1934.
This discord was also known to us and led in Nuremberg too to drastic incidents; e.g., a few Reichswehr soldiers at that time were thrashed by a larger number of SA leaders in an inn in the neighbourhood of the Hainberg exercise ground, in the presence of SA brigade commander (SA Brigadefuehrer)
B r e y m a n n.

H5128-0173

Defense exhibit No. 9

The regional police (Landespolizei) endeavored to bring SA and Stahlhelm leaders closer together on the occasion of a comradeship evening given in its mess, at which I participated. The prevailing mood was one of tenseness and irritation! The host was only able to avoid an open scandal by exertin gr pains, because the SA leaders were arroused about the conduct of general S t e p h a n u s during a speech of the Bavarian minister of the interior W a g n e r .

The strain between Reichswehr and SA reached its peak on the occasion of the so-called Roehm Putsch at the end of June 1934. At that time, the Standarte R 19, consisting of Stahlhelm members, had decided, in the case of an open conflict to march, together with the Reichswehr against the old SA. Preparations had already been taken for this eventuality and in particular contact had already been established with the local Reichswehr offices in Nuernberg, as well as with the central offices in Berlin.

5. On the occasion of the political examination of the leaders and men originating from the Stahlhelm, I was refused by the Gauleitung as politically unsuitable (because of my well-known anti-nazi attitude and as "related to Jews"), did not get any SA rank either, and withdrew in November 1934.

A few months later, about February 1935 or somewhat later, the Standarte R 19 was dissolved - a breach of the given promise - and its men distributed among units of the old SA or SA reserve. I do not have information any more concerning particulars, but I was informed that at that time many old Stahlhelm members, took advantage of the opportunity to press their withdrawal from the SA.

A true Stahlhelm member did not fit into the SA.

Nuernberg, May 6th. 1946.

(signed) Karl Mayer.

UR No. 518 I herewith certify the authenticity of above signature of attorney-at-law Herr. Dr. Karl Mayer, in Nuernberg, Uhlandstrasse 13/II. Herr Dr. Mayer has shown me as proof of identity his registration card issued by the Military Government.

Weissenburg, Bavaria, May 9th 1946.

(signed) Geislinger, Notary public.

H5128-0174

H5128-0175

Translations of Sth Affidavits

H5128-0176